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l)SOCIAL FUNCTIONS OF EMOTIONS IN SOCIAL DILEMMAS
Cooperation is both one of the fundamental organizing principles and one of the major
problems of contemporary society. On the one hand, most people readily act in the
collective interest by donating to charity, helping out their co-workers or voting during
elections, even when they could easily get away with not engaging in these time-, money-
and energy-consuming acts. On the other hand, societal issues such as organizational
misconduct, loutish behaviour and global warming arise exactly because people do not
always cooperate, but often pursue their self-interest instead. These type of situations
where the collective and self-interest collide have become known as social dilemmas. 
It has been established for decades that social dilemmas elicit strong emotions in
people – even to the extent that threats and curses are no exception. Yet that these
 emotions are not just remarkable, intrapersonal phenomena but that they may actually
lead others to cooperate is an idea that has long been alien in psychology. Only recently
have scholars started to accept that emotions generally fulfil clear functions in social
interactions. However, it has never been investigated directly whether this also means
that expressing emotion helps to establish cooperation in social dilemmas. This
dissertation is a first step to fill this empirical vacuum and a test of whether cooperation
truly is a human talent.
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CHAPTER 1 
 
1. GENERAL INTRODUCTION 
 
Walking through a busy shopping street often pervades me with a sense of intense 
wonder. So many complete strangers crowd the street, yet somehow they all manage to co-
exist in the overarching cooperative enterprise that we call society. And their cooperation 
is not limited to institutionally enforced behaviors such as paying taxes. Most of these 
people also dutifully vote during elections, separate their garbage, donate to charity and 
sign petitions, even when they could easily get away with not engaging in these time-, 
money- and energy-consuming deeds. And also on a smaller scale people cooperate. 
Friends and family readily help each other out, employees engage in extra-role activities to 
keep their company going, passengers in public transport voluntarily offer their seats to 
elderly people and some even risk their lives to rescue others in emergencies. Cooperation, 
then, appears a fundamental organizing principle of social interaction, not only in dyads, 
but also in groups and society as a whole. 
 In spite of these examples of good citizenship, generous deeds and helpful 
gestures, there are unfortunately also examples aplenty where people refrain from 
cooperation to the detriment of their peers, colleagues or even fellow world citizens. Non-
cooperation, or defection, creates not just small scale problems such as unproductive 
meetings due to the ill preparation of the attendees, failed team-projects due to free-riders 
and interpersonal conflicts or accusations of loutish behavior when favors are not provided 
or reciprocated. Also large scale problems such as global warming, deforestation, 
overpopulation, pollution, overfishing, fuel shortage and, eventually, wars are the result of 
people pursuing, willfully or not, their own rather than the collective interest. Studying 
how and when people manage or fail to cooperate therefore not only provides insights in 
an innate human talent. Hopefully, it also helps to overcome many urgent and critical 
problems that contemporary society faces. 
 Portraying cooperation as an innate human talent when the world is plagued by so 
many problems that result exactly from a failure to cooperate may sound ironic. Yet 
humans are the champions of cooperation and, unlike other eusocial species such as bees, 
ants, termites, wasps and naked mole rats, cooperate not only with genetic relatives (i.e., 
kin selection, Hamilton, 1964) but even with complete strangers (Nowak, 2006). 
Incidentally, humans arguably also have the widest array of emotions at their disposal, or 
at least are able to master their emotions in ways that animals cannot (Panksepp, 1998). Of 
course, correlation does not imply causation, but a first clue to a strong connection 
between human emotion and cooperation is the now classic observation that defection 
elicits unusually strong emotional reactions in people:  
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One of the most significant aspects of this study, however, did not show 
up in the data analysis. It is the extreme seriousness with which subjects 
take the problems. Comments such as, “If you defect on the rest of us, 
you’re going to have to live with it the rest of your life” were not at all 
uncommon. Nor was it unusual for people to wish to leave the 
experimental building by the back door, to claim that they did not wish 
to see the “sons of bitches” who doublecrossed them, to become 
extremely angry at other subjects, or to become tearful.  
 
(Dawes, McTavish, & Shaklee, 1977, p.7). 
  
In a way, this dissertation starts where the above quote ends. Experiencing strong 
emotions is one thing; the question of whether they actually help to rectify a fellow group 
member’s defection is another. Such questions have long been alien to social psychology 
for two reasons. First, emotions have typically been studied as intrapersonal, rather than 
social, phenomena. And second, that emotions are functional has not always been 
recognized and has sometimes been outright denied. Modern accounts of emotion, 
however, have generally started to converge on the idea that whereas certainly not all 
emotions are always functional at every intensity and at every point in time, they generally 
fulfill clearly specifiable social functions and thus coordinate and lubricate social 
interactions (Fischer & Manstead, 2008; Keltner & Gross, 1999; Keltner & Haidt, 1999; 
Keltner & Kring, 1998; Oatley & Jenkins, 1992). It is therefore frequently assumed that 
the communication of emotion has an important function in establishing and maintaining 
cooperation (Buck, 1984; Fessler & Haley, 2003; Gintis & Bowles, 2003; Keltner, Haidt, 
& Shiota, 2006), but direct tests using game-theoretical derivatives of cooperative 
situations are, though encouraged, lacking. This dissertation is a first step to fill that 
empirical vacuum. 
 The four empirical chapters in this dissertation are not arranged chronologically, 
but according to the social complexity of the cooperative situations that are studied: from 
direct reciprocity between dyads, via indirect reciprocity between dyads in a larger group 
context, to public good dilemmas in groups. In this first chapter I will therefore start with 
introducing these specific cooperative situations and, in doing so, review many major 
developments during more than fifty years of research on cooperation. Subsequently, I will 
give a working definition of emotion and review how during the twentieth century scholars 
came to see emotions as social, even socially functional. Finally, I will review 
contemporary research to show how a social-functional approach to emotion can inform 
research on cooperation and I will provide an overview of the specific questions that will 
be answered in each individual chapter.  
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1.1 COOPERATION AND SOCIAL DILEMMAS 
 
Cooperation is studied in many disciplines, varying from biology to economics 
and from game theory to social psychology. As a result, definitions of cooperation may, 
however subtly, differ. In this introduction I therefore prefer a widely applicable definition: 
Cooperation is the act of forfeiting one’s self-interest to benefit the common interest. A 
few remarks are in place here. Although the preposition co- (or com-) means “together” or 
even “simultaneous” in Latin, the word co-operation is typically used to describe a 
unilateral act. Ergo, I can cooperate when the beneficiary is not around, does not know that 
I am cooperating, or is even defecting against me. Second, self-interest (or individual 
interest) is more routinely contrasted against collective rather than common interest. As 
long as one realizes that the number of individuals in a ‘collective’ can be as small as two, 
this should not be confusing. Third, the critical reader may object that what I defined as 
cooperation is, in fact, altruism. Such readers are in good company (e.g., Hamilton, 1964; 
Trivers, 2002) and I am sympathetic toward this view, as long as it is acknowledged that 
there are also different types of altruism (Sober & Wilson, 1998). Cooperation, however, is 
the more frequently used term in the traditions that are most relevant to this dissertation, 
including social psychology, and hence my preference (e.g., Dawes, 1980; Nowak, 2006; 
for more on this conceptual issue, see Krebs, 2008). Finally and most importantly, 
disciplines also differ markedly in how they describe situations in which actors have to 
choose between cooperation and defection. For example, biologists and evolutionary 
psychologists are predominantly theoretically interested in cooperation and how it can 
emerge from selfish replicators, which is why they speak of the (evolutionary) problem or 
puzzle of cooperation. Social scientists, on the other hand, are predominantly practically 
interested in cooperation and how to promote it, which is why they speak of social 
dilemmas. With these conceptual issues cleared up, let us proceed to a selective review of 
the vast literature on cooperation and social dilemmas. 
 
 
1.1.1 Cooperation through direct and indirect reciprocity 
 
Writings on the conflict between self-interest and the collective interest date back 
to at least as early as the founding father of modern political philosophy, Thomas Hobbes. 
In his work Leviathan (1651/2008) he elaborates on his view that the cooperative endeavor 
that is society requires an absolute sovereign, because what will otherwise ensue is 
regression to the ‘natural condition of mankind’, characterized by a pervasive insecurity 
that dooms cooperation. Still, cooperation started receiving widespread scholarly attention 
only halfway the previous century with the foundation of game theory (Von Neumann & 
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Morgenstern, 1944). Game theory captures the decision options and corresponding 
outcomes of agents by means of abstract formalizations of reality such as matrices or 
decision trees and subsequently provides a mathematical analysis of such games to 
determine which decision options or strategies lead to optimal outcomes. A famous 
example of a game, first formalized by Tucker (1950), is the prisoner’s dilemma (Rapoport 
& Chammah, 1965), which is also a classic paradigm to study social dilemmas. 
 
Table 1.1: The prisoner’s dilemma 
                                              Player 2 
Cooperate Defect 
 
Cooperate 
                    R (= 4) 
 
R (= 4) 
                    T (= 6) 
 
S (= 0) 
 
 
 
Player 1 
 
Defect 
                    S (= 0) 
 
T (= 6) 
                    P (= 2) 
 
P (= 2) 
T = Temptation to defect, R = Reward for mutual cooperation, P = Punishment for mutual defection and S = 
Sucker’s payoff. A prisoner’s dilemma requires that T > R > P > S and 2R > T. 
 
The following situation constitutes a prisoner’s dilemma. Imagine you and 
another player both have ¼2. Each of you has to decide anonymously to either keep these 
¼2 (i.e., defect) or to donate these ¼2 to the other (i.e., cooperate). If you donate your ¼2, 
the other player receives ¼4 and vice versa. Both decision options from both players result 
in the matrix depicted in Table 1.11. A quick glance at the matrix reveals that—regardless 
                                                          
1
 This situation perfectly fits widely used definitions of cooperation that can be paraphrased as the act of paying a 
cost (in this case ¼2), for another individual to receive a benefit (in this case ¼4), where the benefit is larger than 
the cost (cf. Nowak, 2006). This definition is more concrete than the one I provided, but seems less inclusive. If 
in Table 1.1 the Temptation to defect (T) would be 5 or 7 instead of 6, it would still be a prisoner’s dilemma and 
cooperation would still be possible, but it would not longer be isomorphic to any situation where a specific cost is 
paid to provide a specific benefit (which only holds for prisoner’s dilemmas where R + P = T + S). I therefore 
wonder if this alternative definition is also meant to encompass cooperative acts for which the required cost or 
provided benefit is dependent on whether one’s recipient cooperates or defects, as is the case in many prisoner’s 
dilemmas. 
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of the other person’s choice—defecting always yields ¼2 more than cooperating. However, 
if both players then choose this individually rational option of defection, both players 
retain only their original ¼2 without accumulating the extra money that would result from 
mutual cooperation. This paradigm therefore neatly captures the central feature of social 
dilemmas: Individual rationality leads to collective irrationality. 
 One may counterargue that this matrix does not represent a real dilemma at all, at 
least not to people who perceive defection as unethical and who would rather obtain the 
Sucker’s payoff (S) than violate their own moral standards by defecting. This is exactly 
where game theory and psychology are forced in separate directions. Luce and Raiffa 
(1957), both game theorists, would answer that “[s]uch an argument is inadmissible since 
the numerical utility values are supposed to reflect all such ‘ethical’ considerations” (p. 96, 
quotes in original). But this explaining away of such ‘ethical’ considerations is, in turn, 
inadmissible to social scientists or psychologists in particular. After all, these 
considerations—and how they reframe social dilemmas—is exactly what psychologists 
study, because it allows them to predict who will donate their ¼2 in which situation and 
why. Game theory thus focuses on situations that by definition are interpreted as social 
dilemmas by actors, but must concede that these actors are a simplification of real people. 
Psychology on the other hand, focuses by definition on real people, but must concede that 
these people may mentally transform any outcome matrix according to their own motives 
such that it may no longer represent a social dilemma (Kelley & Thibaut, 1978; Messick & 
McClintock, 1968).  
 Eventually, a hybrid of both approaches, engineered by Robert Axelrod (1984), 
showed how cooperation can be successfully established when the prisoner’s dilemma is 
repeatedly played against the same opponent (i.e., the iterated prisoner’s dilemma). He did 
this by organizing a computer tournament in which strategies for the iterated prisoner’s 
dilemma, submitted by worldwide experts, took part. Creative—even professional—
human input would thus compete in game theoretical format. Surprisingly, the simplest 
strategy emerged victorious: tit-for-tat. All tit-for-tat does is cooperate on the first move 
and then mirror its opponent’s moves. Its success was repeatedly demonstrated, including 
in ecological simulations where strategies increased in the population if they did well 
(Axelrod, 1984). Evolutionary simulations even showed that reciprocal strategies can 
evolve from a population of completely random strategies (Axelrod, 1997). Axelrod’s 
work may therefore be interpreted as a further foundation of Trivers’ (1971) claim that 
cooperation can evolve through direct reciprocity (or reciprocal altruism). The principle of 
direct reciprocity is similar to that of tit-for-tat: to return helpful and harmful deeds in kind. 
The success of tit-for-tat has been criticized (Binmore, 1998) and some important 
boundary conditions of its success have been identified (Fudenberg & Maskin, 1990; 
Selten & Hammerstein, 1984), but it is nevertheless the strategy in dyadic interactions that 
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has received most attention from social psychologists (e.g., Komorita, Hilty, & Parks, 
1991; Parks & Rumble, 2001; Sheldon, 1999; Van den Bergh, Dewitte, & De Cremer, 
2006; Van Lange, Ouwerkerk, & Tazelaar, 2002; Van Lange & Visser, 1992). 
 Still, improving on the strategy of tit-for-tat is possible. It always starts with a 
cooperative move, even against opponents who never cooperate. Consequently, if one’s 
opponent is infamous for defecting, it would still be wise to play tit-for-tat, but then with 
defection as a first move instead (Nowak & Sigmund, 1998; Pollock & Dugatkin, 1992). 
This improvement requires one to observe social interactions between other people as a 
third party and to remember who frequently cooperates and who does not. In this way 
reputations are created. Because people with a positive reputation are likely to reciprocate 
cooperation, third parties may find cooperating with them a worthwhile investment. The 
subsequent increase in reputation of these third parties may then encourage cooperation 
from other observers, who may subsequently be cooperated with by yet others. The result 
is indirect reciprocity (Alexander, 1987): a cooperation mechanism where cooperative acts 
are reciprocated by third parties, rather than by the recipient (as is the case with direct 
reciprocity).  
Indirect reciprocity is particularly amenable to psychological study, because it 
requires morality, perspective-taking, advanced communication skills, lie detection and 
coping with ambiguity, while giving rise to gossip, social norms, information sharing 
networks, laws and, eventually, society. At the same time, it is a research area where 
theory and simulations have left empirical research far behind. Evolutionary game theory 
has already proven that cooperation through indirect reciprocity can be established when 
notorious defectors are defected against and when such retaliatory, justified defection does 
not damage one’s reputation (Leimar & Hammerstein, 2001; Ohtsuki & Iwasa, 2004; 
Panchanathan & Boyd, 2003; Sugden, 1986). But empirical research has not been able to 
demonstrate that people indeed respond differently to such justified defection than to 
defection that is motivated by mere greed (Bolton, Katok, & Ockenfels, 2005; Milinski, 
Semmann, Bakker, & Krambeck, 2001). This is a central problem in the otherwise rapidly 
expanding field of indirect reciprocity (Nowak & Sigmund, 2005). 
 
  
1.1.2 Public good dilemmas, resource dilemmas and coordination 
 
Defection in social dilemmas causes problems not only in dyads, but also in small 
groups or even worldwide. The two-person prisoner’s dilemma therefore seems but a very 
specific case of a social dilemma (Dawes, 1980). Indeed, during the seventies experimental 
research using this paradigm has been heavily criticized for its lack of external and 
especially ecological validity (Apfelbaum, 1974; Hamburger, 1979; Kelley & Thibaut, 
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1978; Nemeth, 1972; Pruitt & Kimmel, 1977; see also Colman, 1995; Van Lange, 
Liebrand, Messick, & Wilke, 1992). Criticisms included—besides the limited number of 
actors—the dichotomous nature of the decision options, the symmetric relationship 
between actors and, more broadly, the apparent discontinuity between real world situations 
on the one hand and the display of numerical utility values in highly abstract decision 
matrices on the other. Two ecologically more valid paradigms were therefore developed 
that have dominated modern social dilemma research ever since: the resource dilemma, 
also called commons dilemma or take-some game, and the public good dilemma or give-
some game. 
 The resource dilemma was inspired by Hardin’s (1968) ‘tragedy of the 
commons’, in which several herdsmen who share the same pasture follow their individual 
interests by continuously increasing their herd with extra cattle. Collective disaster results: 
an overgrazed pasture. Although previously studied in agricultural economics, such 
resource dilemmas became increasingly popular in psychology during the 1970s 
(Brechner, 1977; Jerdee & Rosen, 1974; Rubenstein, Watzke, Doktor & Dana, 1975). This 
paradigm allows a number of people to harvest resources from a common pool. The more 
they harvest, the slower the pool regenerates. Overharvesting may then result in a 
suboptimal replenishment rate or, in some variations, prevent one’s requested harvest from 
being granted.  
Public good dilemmas model problems such as the provision of community 
centers, clubs, bridges, streets without litter and clean air. Clean air, for example, requires 
costly individual investments such as paying extra for an environment-friendly car. But 
because nobody can be excluded from the benefits of clean air, not contributing to this 
public good is tempting. Again collective disaster may result: unbreathable smog. The 
public good dilemma is based largely on theoretical work by Samuelson (1954) and Olson 
(1965) and became popular during the 1970s as well (Marwell & Ames, 1979). In this 
experimental paradigm a number of people can contribute to a public good. All individual 
contributions are multiplied (by a factor > 1) and divided equally among all people, 
including those who did not contribute. The parameters in both resource and public good 
dilemmas can easily be varied. The number of group members can range from two to the 
number of people that can be accommodated or realistically simulated in the laboratory. 
People’s ability to cooperate or benefit from collective success can be varied, such that 
asymmetric situations are created. But above all, contributing or refraining from harvesting 
a specific amount of resources is a more ecologically valid representation of cooperation 
than is choosing a decision option from a matrix with numerical utility values. 
Whereas many social scientists have focused outright on putting forward practical 
solutions to public good and resource dilemmas, some have taken a more indirect, 
theoretical approach that is rooted in game theory. And although bridging game theory and 
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psychology has proven more difficult for resource and public dilemmas than for direct and 
indirect reciprocity, game theory has inspired some important psychological research 
which, eventually, can be used to promote cooperation. I will therefore proceed with 
reviewing some theoretical research before closing this section with some research on 
concrete solutions to social dilemmas. 
At first sight, game theory offers little hope of cooperation in public good and 
resource dilemmas. After all, cooperation is costly and even when public good or resource 
dilemmas are iterated, playing tit-for-tat is less effective in groups than in dyads 
(Komorita, Parks, & Hulbert, 1992). The situation changes, however, under the realistic 
assumption that the production function of many common resource pools and public goods 
is not linear but step-level. A resource dilemma would be step-level if harvests only impair 
the regeneration rate of the pool after surpassing a critical threshold. An example of a step-
level public good dilemma would be the construction of a bridge, because here financial 
contributions need to surpass a specific threshold, too, before the bridge can improve the 
infrastructure (Hardin, 1976). In public good dilemmas this threshold is called a provision 
point and most public goods arguably have one (Hampton, 1987; Hovi, 1986; Taylor, 
1987; Taylor & Ward, 1982). Step-level production functions can make cooperation the 
dominant response option, even to the narrowly self-interested actor that game theory 
assumes. That is because when one’s contribution is critical, which means that it makes the 
difference between reaching the provision point or not, cooperation serves one’s self-
interest (Van de Kragt, Orbell, & Dawes, 1983). Thus, perceptions of criticality may 
engender cooperation (Chen, Au, & Komorita, 1996; De Cremer & Van Dijk, 2002; Poppe 
& Utens, 1986; Rapoport, 1985; Suleiman & Rapoport, 1992). 
Technically speaking, though, because a contribution to the public good that is 
critical serves both one’s self-interest and the collective interest, it does not really qualify 
as cooperation. For that reason, step-level social dilemmas satisfy only less strict (but 
commonly-used) definitions of social dilemmas (Liebrand, 1983) and share many 
similarities with coordination games instead. In his seminal work ‘The strategy of 
conflict’, Schelling (1960) provides numerous examples of such games. Imagine, for 
instance, that you and your partner privately and anonymously have to pick either “heads” 
or “tails”. If both of you pick the same option you both win a prize. What is characteristic 
of this game is that there is no dominant strategy: your choice to pick “heads” is “good” 
only if your partner did so too and the same is true for picking “tails”. Interestingly, the 
lack of a dominant strategy does not prevent people from coordinating successfully: in the 
above example 36 out of 42 people chose “heads” (Schelling, 1980, p. 55), which is way 
above chance. Is this finding encouraging in view of successful coordination in step-level 
social dilemmas?  
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The answer is: partially. It is not necessarily true that in public good dilemmas 
step-level production functions induce more cooperation than do linear production 
functions, because the increased contributions due to perceptions of criticality may be 
cancelled out by the decreased contributions due to the fear of completely wasting one’s 
contributed resources if the provision point is not reached (Rapoport & Eshed-Levi, 1989). 
But it is true that when group members are determined to reach the provision point, they 
can often—even without any communication—converge on a configuration of individual 
contributions that efficiently realizes the public good. Such tacit coordination is a 
remarkable achievement, because it often depends on factors that are extraneous to the 
formal, mathematical structure of the game. Consequently, people converge more often on 
“heads” instead of “tails” than game theory would predict, exactly because they coordinate 
on the basis of cues which game theory assumes to be trivial, including the order of the 
presented response options. Coordination in step-level social dilemmas, then, is inherently 
social psychological because “the player’s objective is to make contact with the other 
player through some imaginative process of introspection, of searching for shared clues” 
(Schelling, 1980, p. 96). 
 Such shared clues need not be numerous to realize successful coordination. In 
fact, when only the threshold level and the number of group members is known, 
coordination in symmetric social dilemmas proves straightforward. People simply divide 
the threshold by the number of group members and contribute or harvest that amount of 
resources (Allison, McQueen, & Schaerfl, 1992; Allison & Messick, 1990; Van Dijk, De 
Kwaadsteniet, & De Cremer, 2009). Thus, each member of a five-person group should 
contribute 100 endowments to reach a provision point of 500. This decision heuristic is 
based on equality and is both fair and efficient (Stouten, De Cremer, & Van Dijk, 2005). In 
asymmetric social dilemmas, people often use a second decision heuristic instead: 
proportionality. For example, group members with twice as many endowments as others 
should also contribute twice as much to the public good. Interestingly, the framing of 
asymmetric social dilemmas (e.g., as games of giving versus of not giving endowments) 
largely determines, independently of their outcome structure, if people adhere either to 
equality or to proportionality (Van Dijk & Wilke, 2000). This sensitivity to framing may 
seem whimsical, but as long as all group members display the same sensitivity, successful 
coordination still results.  
 So far, decision heuristics may seem panaceas for problems of coordination. But, 
alas, their guidance is often more suggestive than strict. This is evidently so in situations of 
environmental uncertainty. Here, uncertainty about the task environment, including the 
number of fellow group members or the level of the provision point, can impair adherence 
to equality or proportionality (Biel & Gärling, 1995; De Kwaadsteniet, 2007; Suleiman & 
Budescu, 1999; Van Dijk, Wit, Wilke, & Budescu, 2004). But also in situations of social 
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uncertainty, characterized by uncertainty about the actual decisions that fellow group 
members will make, successful coordination may be difficult (Messick, Allison, & 
Samuelson, 1988; Suleiman & Rapoport, 1989; Wit & Wilke, 1998). When, for example, 
the provision point in public good dilemmas rises to more than 60% of all the endowments 
that group members can contribute, some confirmation of other people’s willingness to 
also contribute is typically required for collective success (Poppe & Zwikker, 1996; 
Suleiman & Rapoport, 1992; Van de Kragt et al., 1983). Coordination, then, is not just 
about picking a decision heuristic to adhere to. It requires being open and responsive to 
socially informative cues that indicate to what extent which group members will follow or 
deviate from which decision heuristics so that one can subsequently estimate what course 
of action oneself should undertake. 
 The course of action that one should undertake need not be limited to the 
contribution of endowments or the harvest of resources. Especially when the prospects of 
successful coordination are bleak, one may also resort to or vote for the implementation of 
structural solutions to social dilemmas. These solutions eliminate or alter the pattern of 
incentives that characterize social dilemmas (Messick & Brewer, 1983; see also Foddy, 
Smithson, Schneider, & Hogg, 1999). The most obvious structural solution to social 
dilemmas is to change their payoff structure (Kelley & Grzelak, 1972; Komorita, Sweeney, 
& Kravitz, 1980; Stern, 1976), including by means of sanctions (Caldwell, 1976; De 
Cremer & Van Dijk, 2009; Mulder, Van Dijk, De Cremer, & Wilke, 2005; Tenbrunsel & 
Messick, 1999; Shinada & Yamagishi, 2007) and rewards (Komorita & Barth, 1985), but 
other examples include installing an autocratic leader (Hardin, 1968; Messick, 1984; 
Wilke, 1991) or a democratic leader (Van Vugt & De Cremer, 1999), reducing the group 
size (Brewer & Kramer, 1986; Hamburger, Guyer, & Fox, 1975; Liebrand, 1984) or 
introducing an option to exit the group (Boone & Macy, 1999; Hayashi & Yamagishi, 
1998; Orbell, Schwartz-Shea, & Simmons, 1984). While many structural solutions are in 
some way costly, for example because installing a leader restricts the individual’s freedom 
of choice, various studies indicate that such solutions are still preferred if collective failure 
would otherwise be a likely result (Messick et al. 1983; Rutte & Wilke, 1984).  
 
 
1.1.3 Summary 
 
The study of cooperation has a rich history. Richer, in fact, than could possibly 
have been outlined here. Still, many major developments in the last 50 years have been 
discussed, ranging from the emergence of game theory and the success of the tit-for-tat 
strategy in situations of direct reciprocity to how direct reciprocity in the presence of 
interested observers can give rise to another underlying mechanism of cooperation: 
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indirect reciprocity. Another major development was the paradigm shift in social dilemma 
research in the 1970s which led to the introduction of resource and public good dilemmas, 
where collective success often depends on coordination and the implementation of 
structural solutions. In spite of all these developments, however, the finding that social 
dilemmas elicit remarkably strong emotions (Dawes et al., 1977) has remained relatively 
unexplored. Obviously, any attempt to start this exploration should be solidly founded on 
emotion theory, so this is where I will turn to now.  
 
 
1.2 EMOTION 
 
1.2.1 Toward a working definition  
 
Nowadays, it almost seems mandatory for any scholarly essay on emotion to start 
with William James’ (1884/1969) famous question “What is an emotion?” or to at least 
paraphrase his famous bear paragraph. Unfortunately, after more than a century, a 
conclusive answer to the famous question remains to be formulated and the famous 
paragraph appears widely misinterpreted (Ellsworth, 1994). James proposed, though in a 
somewhat ambiguous formulation that he later regretted (James, 1894), that when seeing a 
bear, the sensation of bodily changes, including trembling, sweating and an increased 
heartbeat, is an integral part of the subsequently arising emotion of fear. What he did not 
propose, is that an emotion is identical to the sensation of bodily changes or visceral 
feedback. Indeed, Cannon (1927) presented convincing arguments against this straw man, 
such as that dogs display emotional behavior even after visceral feedback is surgically 
disabled (Sherrington, 1906). Not until the 1960s, after the heyday of behaviorism, did 
scholarly interest in emotion recover from this theoretical blow and were a number of 
James’ ideas that were implicit in his writings independently reinvented. 
 The last 50 years have seen much progress, but many conceptual issues still 
prevent a waterproof definition of emotion from being formulated (Frijda, 2008). For 
example, are emotions biologically basic, neatly specifiable, coherent modules (Ekman, 
1992; Panksepp, 1992; Tooby & Cosmides, 1990), or are they mosaic instead—
constructed from multiple, dissociable components that correspond only loosely to distinct 
emotion labels (Ortony & Turner, 1990; Scherer, 2001)? What is the nature of subjective 
emotion experience and what is its relation to consciousness (Charland, 2005; Barrett, 
Mesquita, Ochsner, & Gross, 2007)? And could it be that emotions cause behavior not 
directly, but only indirectly through reflection (Baumeister, Vohs, DeWall, & Zhang, 
2007)? Such questions, however, are of peripheral importance in this dissertation. The 
focus here is not on what emotions are, but on what emotions do, in particular in the 
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interpersonal or intragroup context of social dilemmas where they, as noted before, surface 
so readily. It therefore seems wise to provide a pragmatic definition of emotion that 
focuses on the commonalities of most modern emotion theory so that a highly theoretical, 
though not highly relevant conceptual debate can be avoided. 
 Emotions are responses to specific stimuli, including events, people or objects. 
Consequently, emotions require—be they perceptual or cognitive, situationally induced or 
cognitively generated, sequential or not and recursive or not (Clore & Ortony, 2008)—
evaluations or appraisals of this stimulus (Arnold, 1960; Lazarus, 1966; Ortony, Clore, & 
Collins, 1988; Roseman, 1984; Scherer, 1984; Smith & Ellsworth, 1985). Through 
appraisals of, for example, pleasantness or unpleasantness, the meaning of a stimulus for a 
person’s well-being is construed. This activates relevant emotional components such as 
physiological changes (e.g., arousal), facial expression and posture, subjective experience 
(e.g., feeling mighty) and action tendencies (e.g., to aggress; Frijda, 1986). These 
components may recruit additional (e.g., cognitive) resources to appraise the stimulus or 
even directly affect the stimulus, which may influence the further unfolding of emotion. 
Emotions are more dynamic and episodic processes than moods, which are generally less 
intense (Mandler, 1983), longer lasting (Ekman, 1984) and not directed at specific stimuli 
(Parrott, 2001), although this distinction is more often made theoretically than empirically 
(Fredrickson, 2001). Affect is a broader term, encompassing both moods and emotions, and 
can be defined as a valenced evaluation in reference to the self (Baumeister et al., 2007). 
Put simply, affect indicates if something is good or bad for oneself. While this demarcation 
of the emotion concept provides no more than a working definition, it is adequate for the 
present purposes. 
 The study of emotion spans many disciplines, from biopsychology to 
anthropology, many traditions, from psychoanalytic to behaviorist, and many levels of 
analysis, from intrapersonal to cultural. I do not wish to debate the intrinsic superiority of 
one approach over another, which would be tiresome, not to say supercilious. However, 
this dissertation specifically examines if emotions have interpersonal effects in social 
dilemmas. It therefore seems obvious to focus on social accounts of emotion, which 
describe how emotions are expressed to others, how they may influence their behavior and 
if they fulfill any social functions. 
 
 
1.2.2 Early social accounts of emotion 
 
The basis for social accounts of emotion can be traced back as far as Darwin’s 
(1872/2007) analysis of emotion expression. Although he remains relatively silent on its 
communicative potential, he does note, for example, that “[The movements of expression 
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in the face and body] serve as the first means of communication between the mother and 
her infant; she smiles approval, and thus encourages her child on the right path, or frowns 
disapproval” (p. 368). Perhaps not surprisingly then, developmental psychology was one of 
the first disciplines to theorize explicitly about social functions of emotions (Barrett & 
Campos, 1987; Bowlby, 1969; Campos & Stenberg, 1981). In fact, a classic study by 
Sorce, Emde, Campos and Klinnert (1985) provides quite literal a demonstration of 
Darwin’s statement. These authors showed that infants who were confronted with the 
uncertain situation of having to cross a visual cliff to reach an attractive toy were more 
likely to do so when their mothers displayed joy or interest than fear or anger. Whereas 
such early demonstrations of social function only occurred more than a century after 
Darwin’s analysis of emotion expression, there has been some other early work on emotion 
that stressed its social significance. 
 Much research and theory on emotion has focused on the universality of its facial 
expression (e.g., Ekman, 1972; 1989; Ekman & Friesen, 1971; Izard, 1994). The 
underlying idea is that if pan-human evidence can be found that each emotion has a 
distinct facial expression, (biologically) basic emotions may be identified. Moreover, to the 
extent that these facial expressions can be reliably recognized, emotions may be 
communicated non-verbally and, consequently, could have interpersonal effects. Research 
that let people from various cultures, even preliterate ones, match photographs of facial 
expressions with a list of emotions indeed found above-chance recognition accuracy for at 
least six emotions: happiness, surprise, sadness, fear, disgust and anger (e.g., Ekman, 
Sorenson, & Friesen, 1969). Whether this really means that these six emotions are 
universal has been questioned (Ortony & Turner, 1990; Russell, 1994), but it is fair to note 
that non-verbal displays provide fairly reliable cues of the emotion that the sender 
experiences (Keltner & Kring, 1998). 
Some early, more theoretical work that regards emotions as inherently social is 
also available. Kemper (1978), for example, regards emotions as intrinsically connected to 
losses and gains in power (“involuntary compliance”) or status (“voluntary compliance”). 
Gaining power may induce satisfaction and feelings of confidence and security, whereas 
losing power, especially when unexpected, would induce fear or anxiety. Loss of status 
may induce shame or embarrassment when oneself is to blame and anger when someone 
else is to blame. De Rivera (1977; 1984; de Rivera & Grinkis, 1986) also situates emotions 
between, rather than inside individuals, but offers a different taxonomy of emotions, along 
four dimensions. First, emotions can be directed toward either the self or the other and 
second, can be either positive or negative. Third, emotions differ along an ‘extension-
contraction’ dimension. In the case of negative, other-directed emotions, extension 
emotions encourage pushing the other away (e.g., anger) whereas contraction emotions 
encourage pulling the self away (e.g., fear). In the case of positive, other-directed 
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emotions, extension emotions encourage wanting to give to the other (e.g., love), whereas 
contraction emotions encourage wanting to get from the other (e.g., desire). A final, fourth 
qualification, that of psychological space, specifies if the emotion appeals to 
belongingness, recognition or existential motives. Longing, admiration and wonder, for 
example, are all positive, other-directed contraction emotions, but are situated differently 
in psychological space. Longing refers to wanting to belong with others, admiration refers 
to wanting to be like others, and wonder refers to wanting to comprehend the being of the 
other. Although one may wonder to what extent emotions can be so neatly structured as 
Kemper and de Rivera suggest, their taxonomies do reflect something basic about 
emotions: they are intrinsically connected to the specific type of social relationships that 
people develop with each other.  
Averill (1980) takes this argument a step further with his social-constructivist 
perspective on emotion. First, he argues that emotions are syndromes that occupy the 
entire person. With this he means that appraisals, physiological changes, expressions and 
action tendencies may all be typical of emotions but none of these characteristics, either 
single or combined, is a necessary or sufficient condition for an emotion to occur, nor can 
emotion be reduced to them. Subsequently, he claims that the composition of such 
syndromes has to be derived primarily from the social context, because it is in this social 
context that emotions have function and meaning. Thus, Averill claims not just that 
emotions are best regarded as social phenomena, but even that the meaning of emotions 
cannot be properly understood by studying only their constituent elements. 
 
 
1.2.3 Modern social accounts of emotion  
 
Modern work on emotion is to some extent congruent with Averill’s bold 
statement on the social nature of emotion, though I should state explicitly that this does not 
mean that the intrapersonal functions of emotions have been ignored (Frijda, 1986; 
Levenson, 1994; 1999; Oatley & Johnson-Laird, 1987; Tooby & Cosmides, 1990). Indeed, 
in the prototypical example of an individual that is ambushed by a predator, fear is clearly 
functional without being social. It reprioritizes one’s goals, in this case making safety the 
primary goal, narrows down one’s thought-action repertoire and increases heartbeat and 
blood flow to the leg muscles to increase the chances of making one’s escape. That 
emotions fulfill such intrapersonal functions is uncontroversial. But at the same time one 
may wonder if our ancestors were not better protected from such basic threats by their 
ability to live together in groups and defend collectively than by their ability to quickly 
activate their leg muscles. If so, then fear would remain functional, but in particular at the 
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interpersonal level where it warns against imminent exclusion from one’s social group 
(Williams, Forgas, & Von Hippel, 2005).  
But evolutionary arguments are not necessary to see that the functions of many 
emotions as well as their causes and consequences are predominantly social (Parkinson, 
1996; Parkinson, Fischer, & Manstead, 2005). Shaver, Wu, and Schwartz (1992) provided 
a telling illustration. They reported that when 120 participants each described personal 
experiences of anger, love, joy, sadness and fear (see Shaver, Schwartz, Kirson, & 
O’Connor, 1987), more than 3 out of 4 of these written emotion episodes centered around 
their relationships with other people. Emotion theory also began to increasingly recognize 
the social nature of emotion. Manstead and Fischer (2001) introduced social appraisals in 
appraisal theory by noting that other people’s reactions to an emotional event are often also 
instrumental to one’s own appraisal process and subsequent emotion experience. For 
instance, your friend’s admiration may make you feel proud of an achievement you would 
otherwise regard as not worth mentioning. Yet emotions are not only socially influential 
through their contextual meaning. When emotions are expressed in face-to-face settings, 
‘primitive emotional contagion’ may occur, caused by people’s tendency to “automatically 
mimic and synchronize expressions, vocalizations, postures, and movements with those of 
another person and, consequently, to converge emotionally” (Hatfield, Cacioppo, & 
Rapson, 1994, p. 5). But also in computer-mediated interaction, where mimicry is 
impossible, emotional contagion seems to occur (Friedman et al., 2004; Thompson & 
Nadler, 2002; Van Kleef et al., 2004), suggesting that the emotional connotation of 
typewritten language is sufficient for people to unintentionally catch other people’s 
emotions (see also Derks, Fischer & Bos, 2008).  
While the emotion literature became more social, scholars also started to 
speculate more about how specific emotions were socially functional. There is now 
considerable consensus about these social functions. For example, anger signals retaliation 
or opposition, rectifies injustice and socially corrects wrongdoings (Averill, 1982; De 
Cremer, Van Kleef, & Wubben, 2007; Frijda & Mesquita, 1994). Guilt motivates 
corrective and reparative behaviors like making amends and rectifying transgressions 
(Baumeister, Stillwell, & Heatherton, 1994; Frijda & Mesquita, 1994; Lewis, 2008). Love 
strengthens social bonds and attachment (Fredrickson, 1999). This increasing emphasis in 
the 1990s on the social functions of emotion is perhaps most evident, though, from a 
special issue in the journal Cognition & Emotion (1999, issue 5) specifically dedicated to 
functional accounts of emotion. 
Functional accounts focus on why people have emotions and why emotions are 
structured as they are (Keltner & Gross, 1999). Consequently, they are concerned with 
what beneficial social consequences emotions have. It should be noted, however, that such 
consequences are not equivalent to the social function of emotion. Empathy, for example, 
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may be a beneficial social consequence of arachnophobia, but the function of 
arachnophobia is clearly not to elicit empathy. Instead, those beneficial social 
consequences that emotions are specifically designed to bring about are indicative of their 
social function. Functional accounts thus specify what type of goal-directed action is 
implied in the origin and development of the emotion and its communication (Keltner & 
Gross, 1999). 
Emotions can be socially functional at four different levels of analysis: the 
individual, dyadic (or interpersonal; Fischer & Manstead, 2008), group and cultural level 
(Keltner & Haidt, 1999). At the individual level, emotions inform the individual about 
social events and conditions that require attention or action and also prepare the individual 
for such social action, be it through physiological change or an increased sensitivity to 
emotion-relevant stimuli. At the dyadic or interpersonal level, emotions are informative 
not only of the affective state that one’s interaction partner is experiencing, but also of his 
or her beliefs and intentions. Moreover, emotions evoke affective states in the other, as 
when an embarrassed individual evokes amusement in others (Keltner, Young, & Buswell, 
1997) but also as when anger spreads through contagion (Hatfield et al., 1994). Finally, as 
is illustrated by parent-child interactions, the communication of emotion may be a 
deterrent or incentive for social behavior. At the group level, emotions define group 
boundaries and identify group members, as is apparent when supporters cheer for their 
favorite team (Keltner & Haidt, 1999). Emotions also help individuals to assume certain 
roles within the group and to negotiate their status. Higher status is typically attributed, for 
instance, to angry than to sad men (Brescoll & Uhlmann, 2008; Tiedens, 2001). 
Furthermore, emotions may defuse certain group challenges, such as resource allocation, 
for example by solidifying the group bonds and thereby preventing discord. At the cultural 
level, finally, emotions allow people to shape their cultural identity, to teach cultural norms 
and values to their children and to preserve their cultural inheritance. Although all levels of 
analysis are to some extent relevant to social dilemmas, this dissertation focuses in 
particular on how the communication of emotions helps people to coordinate their 
individual actions in a social dilemma, which is why the interpersonal level of analysis is 
of primary importance.  
A social-functional account of emotion is a powerful theoretical framework to 
embed empirical research in, but it must be used carefully. First, it would be overzealous to 
impute functionality to any emotion episode. Or as Aristotle (trans. 2004) famously put it: 
“(…) it is easy to get angry—anyone can do that—(…); but to feel or act towards the right 
person to the right extent at the right time for the right reason in the right way—that is not 
easy, and it is not everyone that can do it” (p. 48). In fact, psychopathology offers ample 
examples of the apparent dysfunctionality of emotion (Keltner & Kring, 1998). 
Functionality, then, seems a matter of degree. Moreover, empirically demarcating when a 
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beneficial consequence of an emotion can be equated with its function is difficult. This 
complicates empirical tests. For example, empirical evidence that a coffee maker can be 
used to prepare soup is easily delivered, but such evidence unveils at best only the 
functionality of certain subcomponents of a coffee maker. With highly abstract emotions 
this difficulty is even more pronounced. Applying a milder form of social functionalism 
therefore seems wise (Keltner & Haidt, 1999). My focus, then, will not be to make 
grandiose claims about the universal virtues of emotions, but instead to examine if the 
communication of emotion brings a solution to specific social problems closer. 
With such social problems I mean, of course, problems of cooperation. That 
emotions are functional in this domain should at least have some intuitive appeal by now, I 
hope. Nevertheless, an explicit integration of both literatures and an examination of 
relevant empirical evidence is necessary to show that emotions are not just another 
variable that sorts effects in social dilemmas, but instead are intrinsically connected to 
people’s potential to cooperate. 
 
 
1.3 INTERPERSONAL EFFECTS OF EMOTIONS IN SOCIAL DILEMMAS 
 
That emotion communication helps to establish cooperation in social dilemmas 
has been proposed before, by various authors even (e.g., Boone & Buck, 2003; Bowles & 
Gintis, 2003; Fessler & Haley, 2003; Frank, 1988; Keltner et al., 2006; Nesse, 1990). Their 
arguments are typically based on evolutionary game theory. For example, Frank (1988; 
2004) proposes that emotions work as a commitment device. Cooperation in a prisoner’s 
dilemma may result if, once the time has arrived to make a decision, both players have 
developed enough mutual trust to not yield to the temptation of defection. Thus, both 
players need not only be committed to cooperate, but, importantly, also communicate to 
the other player that they are committed to cooperate. This requires a trustworthy, 
relatively foolproof signal, because otherwise defectors will simply imitate it to mislead 
and subsequently exploit cooperators. Emotions, and in particular love, gratitude and pride 
or feelings of friendship and obligation, (Nesse, 1990, Trivers, 1971) may have evolved to 
meet this demand, especially because emotion display is at least partly involuntary and 
high levels of emotional expressivity are difficult to imitate (Boone & Buck, 2003; see also 
Schug, Yamagishi, Matsumoto and Horita, 2009). To the extent, then, that players can 
reliably send and decode these emotions, it is possible to signal when one can be trusted to 
cooperate. This enables cooperators to not defect against each other. 
Other emotions, too, may be socially functional in social dilemmas. Retaliation 
against defectors, as motivated by anger, may be costly in the short-term but pay off in the 
long-term if it leads defectors to repent (Fessler & Haley, 2003). Studies on altruistic or 
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costly punishment indeed show that this mechanism is plausible (Fehr & Gächter, 2002). 
The communication of anger, then, can become a powerful way of averting defection. 
Conversely, defection against a cooperator may induce guilt. Others may interpret the 
communication of guilt as an intention to establish cooperation in the future and therefore 
respond leniently (Baumeister et al., 1994, Nesse 1990). Thus, emotions may communicate 
implicit promises for future actions, thereby removing social uncertainty or drastically 
changing the outcome structure of the social dilemma, possibly even to the extent that it is 
no longer perceived as a social dilemma. If that proves true, then emotions would function 
as indispensable and ubiquitous socially informative cues in social dilemmas. 
That emotions have become to fulfill these social functions in social dilemmas 
seems plausible. Words, after all, are cheap if they do not reflect any underlying—and 
more difficult to fake (Boone & Buck, 2003; Buck, 1985)—emotional commitment. 
Emotions may therefore provide reasonably reliable and useful information (Keltner & 
Kring, 1998) about one’s intentions to forgive, compensate, reciprocate, retaliate against, 
profit from, leave or exclude other group members in a social dilemma. But, as 
theoretically plausible as it may be that, in general, emotions have beneficial interpersonal 
effects in social dilemmas, direct empirical tests of such effects are undoubtedly subject to 
many moderating variables and boundary conditions. That is all the more reason, then, to 
ask if any empirical evidence is available for interpersonal effects of discrete emotions in 
social dilemmas. 
 
 
1.3.1 Empirical evidence 
 
 I have found little, if any, direct investigations of the communication of emotion 
in social dilemmas (and after four years of investigation the chances are slim, or so I hope, 
that any major evidence has eluded me). Indirect investigations, however, are readily 
available, so that is what I will appeal to now, starting with some additional anecdotal 
evidence from the study by Dawes et al. (1977) that I cited in the beginning. They 
observed that after participants had played a social dilemma that was preceded by a group 
discussion, strong emotions frequently surfaced: 
 
In pretesting we did run one group in which choices were made public. 
The three defectors were the target of a great deal of hostility (“You 
have no idea how much you alienate me!” one cooperator shouted 
before storming out of the room); they remained after the experiment 
until all the cooperators were presumably long gone.  
(Dawes et al., 1977, p.7) 
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Studies examining what effects such emotional expressions in social dilemmas had on the 
defector did not follow, however. In fact, the few available studies on affect in social 
dilemmas focus either on mood (Hertel, 1999; Hertel, Neuhof, Theuer, & Kerr, 2001; 
Knapp & Clark, 1991; Sanna, Parks, & Chang, 2003; Vollmeyer, 1994), on the antecedents 
of emotions (e.g., equality violations, Stouten et al., 2005; Stouten, De Cremer & Van 
Dijk, 2006) or on their intrapersonal effects. An example of the latter is the finding that 
participants who recalled an episode of guilt as opposed to a neutral event cooperated more 
in an iterated prisoner’s dilemma (Ketelaar & Au, 2003). Nelissen, Dijker, and De Vries 
(2007) replicated this effect in a one-shot give-some game and showed that it only 
occurred for pro-selfs (i.e., people with a disposition to maximize their own outcomes or 
their relative advantage over others, see Van Lange, 1999). Moreover they showed that 
fear reduced cooperation, but only for pro-socials (i.e., people with a disposition to 
maximize joint outcomes and strive for equality). De Hooge, Zeelenberg and Breugelmans 
(2007) also demonstrated that guilt motivates pro-selfs, but not pro-socials, to cooperate 
more. Moreover, shame did not have this specific effect, unless, as these authors later 
showed, the people toward whom one felt ashamed were also those who would benefit 
from one’s cooperation (De Hooge, Breugelmans, & Zeelenberg, 2008). Perhaps closest to 
an early demonstration2 of interpersonal effects of emotions in social dilemmas is a study 
by Frank, Gilovich and Regan (1993). In line with the above-mentioned idea of emotions 
as a commitment device (Frank, 1988), they showed that after half an hour of social 
interaction with the other player in a one-shot prisoner’s dilemma participants were able to 
predict with above-chance accuracy if the other would cooperate or defect. However, the 
role of emotion communication in this process is only implicit and neither measured, nor 
manipulated. All in all, then, social dilemma research shows that some discrete emotions, 
                                                          
2
 Some research on the communication of emotion in social dilemmas appeared (or is still in progress) only after 
most empirical chapters of this dissertation had already been published. Although it was therefore not used for the 
theoretical framework of the present research, it is still interesting to briefly summarize the findings of these 
studies. Kerr (2009) found that affective feedback in the form of happy and unhappy faces increased cooperation 
in an iterated, dyadic public good game, particularly among pro-selfs. Unhappy faces were less effective when 
sent to players who cooperated more than the person sending them. In a set of studies that also used facial 
feedback, Stouten and De Cremer (in press) found that sending happy and angry pictures moderated the effect of 
communicated intentions to cooperate or defect. Happiness led people to respond in a way that was more 
consistent with the verbally communicated intentions than anger did. Finally, Tanghe, Wisse, and Van der Flier 
(in press) showed that emotions with a high activation level (e.g., anger and enthusiasm) signal intentions to 
cooperate more than emotions with a low activation level (e.g., relaxation and boredom) do and therefore induce 
more cooperation in people, especially when they are low in trust and therefore presumably most attentive to such 
cues. This research underscores the idea that emotions affect cooperation rates by providing social information.  

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like guilt, affect one’s own cooperation rate, but there is little or no direct evidence that the 
communication of such emotions influences the decisions of other group members. 
 It may therefore be advisable to look at other situations where one’s own 
outcomes depend on one’s own decisions and those of others. Bargaining games are an 
important example of such interdependent situations (Pruitt & Carnevale, 1993). Typically 
(e.g., De Dreu & Van Kleef, 2004), two participants are assigned to the role of either buyer 
or seller and each receives a different chart that denotes one’s payoff for each possible 
agreement. The payoff chart of one’s negotiation opponent is unknown—in fact, this 
person is often simulated by a computer. The buyer and the seller then alternately make 
offers until an agreement is reached, in which case the negotiations end. Small monetary 
incentives are often awarded to further motivate participants to negotiate the best possible 
deal. For future reference, I will call this the negotiation paradigm. A related paradigm is 
the ultimatum bargaining game (Güth, Schmittberger, & Schwarze, 1982). Here, 
participants are assigned to the role of allocator or recipient and have to divide a sum of 
money. The allocator first proposes how the money should be distributed over both 
players. The recipient subsequently accepts or rejects. If the recipient accepts, the money is 
divided as proposed. If the recipient rejects, neither gets anything. 
 In the ultimatum bargaining game, too, intrapersonal effects of emotion have 
been obtained. For example, Pillutla and Murnighan (1996) found that anger over an 
allocator’s offer correlated strongly—even stronger than perceived unfairness—with 
whether recipients would accept or reject the offer. Such emotional rejections are not less 
likely to occur when, before making their decision, participants get one hour off to cool 
down (Bosman, Sonnemans, & Zeelenberg, 2001). Even more relevant to this dissertation, 
Xiao and Houser (2005) obtained preliminary evidence that the communication of emotion 
affects recipients’ decisions in an ultimatum bargaining game. When recipients could send 
messages to allocators and could thus, if they wished, express their discontent over an 
unfair offer, they were more likely to accept the offer than when they did not have this 
opportunity. Although this dissertation is concerned more with what happens when 
participants receive, instead of send, emotional information, the possible implications of 
this finding are interesting. It suggests that emotion communication itself can function to 
punish others, be assertive and maintain credibility without actually engaging in retaliatory 
behavior. Follow-up research has refined this claim by showing that this effect occurs only 
for pro-socials and that pro-selfs actually punish more when given the opportunity to 
communicate their emotions, presumably because for them this only makes the inequality 
more salient (Hibner, Samid, & Suleiman, 2009). 
 The empirical findings most relevant to this dissertation, however, come from an 
extensive line of research conducted mainly by Van Kleef and colleagues, who 
investigated how the behavior of negotiators is influenced by the emotions of their 
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negotiation opponent. For example, should negotiators keep their anger to themselves, or 
can the very communication of anger actually elicit concessions in the other? An 
impressive set of studies using the negotiation paradigm (reviewed in Van Kleef, Van 
Dijk, Steinel, Harinck, & Van Beest, 2008; for later studies, see Pietroni, Van Kleef, De 
Dreu, & Pagliaro, 2008; Van Kleef & Van Lange, 2008; Van Kleef & De Dreu, 2009) 
showed that the communication of anger is a double-edged sword. On the one hand it may 
have little effect or even, through emotional contagion, induce anger in one’s opponent, 
who is then likely to behave competitively and make few concessions (Friedman et al., 
2004). On the other hand, communicating anger conveys the impression that one is a tough 
negotiator, leading one’s opponent to concede because the negotiations might otherwise 
end in a stalemate (Sinaceur & Tiedens, 2006; Van Kleef et al., 2004a). Thus a search for 
moderators ensued and many were found. Negotiation opponents are unlikely to concede if 
they are not motivated to consider the strategic implications of the communicated anger in 
the first place, for example due to time pressure or personality (Van Kleef, De Dreu, & 
Manstead, 2004b), or because they are high in power or, relatedly, have several 
alternatives available (Sinaceur & Tiedens, 2006; Van Kleef, De Dreu, Pietroni, & 
Manstead, 2006; see also Van Beest, Van Kleef, & Van Dijk, 2008). Moreover, anger is 
only likely to elicit concessions when it is perceived as justifiable (Van Kleef & Côté, 
2007) and is directed toward a negotiator’s offer rather than to the negotiator as a person 
(Steinel, Van Kleef, & Harinck, 2008). Van Dijk, Van Kleef, Steinel and Van Beest (2008) 
obtained compatible findings for ultimatum bargaining, showing that allocators were more 
likely to turn down offers from angry recipients when they had little to lose or could 
deceive the recipient. Thus, being angry may pay off, but often it also backfires.  
 It is therefore worthwhile to investigate if there are other emotions that signal 
dissatisfaction with one’s current outcomes in a negotiation, but then without risking 
escalation. Disappointment may be such an emotion, because it signals that one’s positive 
expectations are not met (Van Dijk & Van Harreveld, 2008). Indeed, Van Kleef, De Dreu 
and Manstead (2006) found that a disappointed negotiation opponent elicited more 
concessions than a non-emotional opponent, particularly if the opponent was seen as 
trustworthy. Compared to studies on communicated anger, however, this encouraging 
finding has inspired decidedly less research, even though Van Kleef and Van Lange (2008) 
reported that disappointment elicited more concessions in pro-selfs than anger did. Work 
in progress on ultimatum bargaining (Lelieveld, Van Dijk, Van Beest, & Van Kleef, 2009) 
similarly shows that expressing disappointment toward the allocator is more effective than 
expressing anger, in particular when the recipient has little power. 
  The communication of two other emotions has received moderate empirical 
attention in negotiations: happiness and guilt. Happiness may signal that there is no threat 
to reaching an agreement. One’s negotiation opponent may therefore respond by make few 
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concessions (Van Kleef et al., 2004a). Kopelman, Rosette and Thompson (2006), in 
contrast, found that the display of positive instead of negative or no affect during 
negotiations led participants to close better deals. In line with a clear, though non-
significant, trend obtained by Steinel et al. (2008), this difference, too, may partly be 
explained by whether happiness was expressed over the negotiation opponent’s offers or 
more over the negotiation opponent as a person. The findings on guilt are less ambiguous. 
Guilt signals that one has been too tough a negotiator and that one wants to make up for it. 
It therefore elicits fewer concessions, though not a more positive impression, than when no 
emotion is communicated (Van Kleef et al., 2006). This seems to be particularly so when 
one’s negotiation opponent is perceived as trustworthy. 
 
 
1.3.2 Implications for emotions in social dilemmas 
  
All in all, the studies on negotiations have many appreciable aspects. First, it was 
made clear that the emotions that were communicated were also elicited in the same 
negotiation context. Participants did not simply receive messages reading: “I feel angry, so 
I will offer X”. Instead, anger was specifically expressed over the unfolding negotiation 
itself. Admittedly, emotions that carry over from unrelated situations are interesting too—
for one, they offer important insights about the boundary conditions of emotion 
regulation—but this research starts from the observation that social dilemmas are 
situations that elicit remarkably strong emotions. Thus I should clearly embed the 
communicated emotions in a social dilemma context, and build upon research that has 
taken a similar approach. 
A second advantage of the line of research reviewed above is that it shows effects 
of emotion that are truly interpersonal. The point of the research is not that emotions have 
intrapersonal effects on one’s own demands which may, in turn, influence the opponent’s 
demands (although this may certainly happen). Instead, it shows that the mere emotion 
communication itself is often sufficient to influence the opponent’s demands directly. Of 
course, negotiators may adjust their demands because they infer that an emotional 
opponent will make certain demands in the future. But the effects are not driven by the 
actual demands of the emotional opponent—indeed, these were kept constant—so this 
research shows that emotions fulfil functions that are truly social.  
 A final virtue of the abovementioned research is that its findings are in line with a 
social-functional account of emotion, yet at the same time show that further sophistication 
is needed to accurately predict actual behavior. Anger, for instance, may indeed function to 
induce corrective behavior, but only within certain boundary conditions and under specific 
circumstances. There is no a priori reason to assume that interpersonal emotion effects in 
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social dilemmas are not subject to similar moderators. Some of the studies that I will 
report, in fact, are inspired by this very notion. Moreover, as Van Kleef et al. (2008) also 
note, the exact structure of the relevant interdependence situation, too, determines what 
effects communicated emotions will have. This is particularly important because resource, 
public good and prisoner’s dilemmas come in many different forms, and all of them, in 
turn, differ notably from negotiation and ultimatum bargaining paradigms. 
 Compare the negotiation paradigm and the iterated prisoner’s dilemma, for 
example. Both are dyadic, interdependent games with repeated interaction, yet not only 
their framing but also their underlying outcome structures differ markedly. The negotiation 
paradigm is basically a game of mutual convergence through concessions. Moreover, 
convergence yields higher payoffs than no convergence, which means that sizable 
concessions need not be made as long as one’s opponent can be expected to keep making 
them. Conversely, if one’s opponent refuses to concede, making concessions oneself is the 
only way to prevent the highly undesirable outcome of a stalemate. Such a strategy of 
mismatching (Pruitt & Carnevale, 1993) is opposite to successful strategies in the iterated 
prisoner’s dilemma, such as tit-for-tat, which are based on reciprocity. They respond to 
cooperation with cooperation and to defection with defection. This also means that anger, 
for example, may be interpreted differently in both situations, even when both 
interpretations are in line with its social function of correcting social wrongdoings. In the 
negotiation paradigm, anger may mean “You’d better start cooperating, because I am not 
going to” whereas in the iterated prisoner’s dilemma anger may mean “You’d better start 
cooperating, because only then will I do so too.” 
 Resource dilemmas, public good dilemmas and cooperation through indirect 
reciprocity are even further removed from typical negotiation and ultimatum bargaining 
paradigms because these are situations that concern more than two persons. This adds a 
whole new layer of complexity, because the communication of emotion may now not only 
influence dyadic relationships within a group, but also intragroup dynamics more broadly. 
Whereas in dyads it is typically clear from one’s own outcomes if the other person has 
defected or cooperated, in groups one’s own outcomes are only an indication of the total 
amount of cooperation, not of exactly which group members have cooperated or defected. 
Due to such increased social uncertainty, Person A may be very interested to know what 
information Person B has about Person C. This is particularly true in step-level social 
dilemmas where coordination becomes an issue, because successful coordination requires 
having a fairly accurate estimation of how cooperative all other group members will be. 
Again, emotions may communicate such information. Person C’s behavior may elicit an 
emotional reaction in Person B which may inform Person A of the behaviors and intentions 
of both and subsequently influence Person A’s actions. Such actions of course include 
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cooperation and defection, but also preferences to install structural solutions in social 
dilemmas. 
To summarize, regardless of whether emotions are communicated in social 
dilemmas, negotiations or ultimate bargaining, they can be expected to signal one’s future 
intentions, expectations about others and satisfaction or dissatisfaction over the current 
situation or over other players. Thus, like in other interdependent situations, emotions in 
social dilemmas will function as socially informative cues. For two reasons, however, 
emotions can also be expected to have effects in social dilemmas that are unique to the 
findings reviewed above. First, social dilemmas have unique outcome structures that differ 
from negotiations and ultimatum bargaining. And second, research on negotiation and 
ultimatum bargaining has focused almost exclusively on emotions in strictly dyadic 
situations, whereas I will also study social dilemmas in which more than two people are 
involved. Emotions in social dilemmas, then, can be expected to assist in solving problems 
that pertain to coordination, reputation formation and structural change—all of which are 
unlikely to arise in other interdependent situations.  
 
 
1.4 OVERVIEW OF THE PRESENT DISSERTATION 
 
 The research area of emotion communication in social dilemmas is as wide as it is 
unexplored. With this introduction, four empirical chapters and a discussion section that 
integrates all findings I hope to advance this exploration considerably. As noted before, the 
empirical chapters are not arranged chronologically, but in order of social complexity, 
starting with direct reciprocity, via indirect reciprocity to step-level public good dilemmas. 
That does not mean that the later chapters are somehow more difficult to read or 
comprehend. Rather, direct reciprocity involves, similar to research on negotiations, only 
dyadic social interactions, whereas indirect reciprocity adds third party observers to this 
and in step-level public good dilemmas intragroup dynamics even need to be studied.  
 Thus, in Chapter 2 the focus is on direct reciprocity. It has been known since 
Axelrod’s (1984) famous computer tournaments that reciprocal strategies such as tit-for-tat 
are successful behavioral strategies that can establish cooperation while being 
unexploitable to defectors. But does the communication of emotions guide this process 
and, if so, how? Can emotion communication improve reciprocal strategies like tit-for-tat? 
While defection may indeed be discouraged by responding in kind with defection, the 
communication of emotion may assist in escaping from mutual defection so that mutual 
cooperation can be established. Which emotion, then, should best be communicated? Is it 
better to be angry or disappointed over the other person’s ongoing unwillingness to 
cooperate? Chapter 2 thus not only tests a possible improvement on one of the most 
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effective and famous strategies to induce cooperation—tit-for-tat—but is also a comment 
on the often heard phrase “I’m not angry, I’m disappointed”. 
 In Chapter 3 I take a closer look at the dynamics of indirect reciprocity. As noted 
before, there is elegant game-theoretical evidence that cooperation through indirect 
reciprocity is possible. This requires that defectors should be defected against and second, 
that such retaliatory defection should not increase one’s chances of being defected against. 
However, empirical studies have been unable to demonstrate that people do indeed 
distinguish such justified, retaliatory defection from unjustified, selfish defection. In 
Chapter 3 I investigate if such a distinction can be made through the communication of 
emotion. Does unjustified defection elicit more anger and disappointment than justified 
defection does? And do people therefore also infer that defection was justified when anger 
or disappointment is communicated? Do they then respond more leniently than when 
defection was unjustified? Moreover, paradigms with which indirect reciprocity can be 
studied are also very suited to study whether certain emotions can be classified as moral. I 
will therefore show whether anger can be truly moral and if something like moral 
disappointment actually exists. Chapter 3 thus is an attempt to reconcile game theory and 
empirical findings regarding indirect reciprocity and at the same time a test of the virtues 
of moral emotions—if they exist in the first place. 
 In Chapter 4 I investigate the coordination potential of anger and guilt in 
asymmetric step-level public good dilemmas. What can be inferred from these emotions? 
Whether or not the group has been successful in the past? Whether or not many resources 
will be contributed in the upcoming trial? What the prospects are of reaching the provision 
point? Depending on one’s answers, one may want to implement structural changes in the 
social dilemma: install a leader, or perhaps leave the group altogether. But how much do 
these inferences actually matter in asymmetric social dilemmas when the group member 
that feels angry or guilty is hardly instrumental in realizing the public good anyway? And 
what other boundary conditions to the interpersonal effects of emotion can be identified? 
Chapter 4 describes the complexities of asymmetric social dilemmas from the perspective 
of a newcomer who has only the emotions from his or her fellow group members to make 
sense of what will happen in the future—and how to respond. 
 Armed with the insights obtained in Chapter 4, I will study in Chapter 5 how guilt 
affects cooperation in step-level public good dilemmas. When is it helpful to know that a 
fellow group member feels guilty in the first place? I will measure what participants 
believe that the communication of guilt means for how much each fellow group member 
has contributed and will contribute in the future. But the crucial question, then, is if this 
convinces participants to donate the remaining amount of resources that they believe is 
necessary to reach the provision point—even if the provision point is quite high. Chapter 5 
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documents how in a situation of interpersonal guilt people try to coordinate their 
contributions to reach a provision point that is typically too high reach. 
  Finally, Chapter 6 provides an integration of all the previous chapters, discusses 
implications and contributions, suggests practical applications and outlines several possible 
limitations and avenues for future research. All chapters can be read separately, but this 
also means there is some overlap between them. May you enjoy reading this dissertation as 
much as I appreciate you having read not just the word of thanks but also this introduction!
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CHAPTER 2 
 
2. HOW EMOTION COMMUNICATION GUIDES RECIPROCITY:  
ESTABLISHING COOPERATION THROUGH DISAPPOINTMENT 
AND ANGER3 
 
2.1 INTRODUCTION 
 
Developmental, cultural, evolutionary and social psychologists alike have started 
to recognize that obtaining an adequate understanding of emotions requires taking into 
account the social environment in which emotions are elicited (Campos, Campos, & 
Barrett, 1989; Markus & Kitayama, 1991; Morris & Keltner, 2000; Tooby & Cosmides, 
1990). Accordingly, scholars have shifted their focus to the important social functions that 
emotions fulfill by coordinating interpersonal relations (Frijda & Mesquita, 1994; Keltner 
& Haidt, 1999; Oatley & Jenkins, 1992). In this view, emotions communicate specific 
intentions to interaction partners, which may help in overcoming interpersonal 
challenges—perhaps most notably the problem of cooperation (Bowles & Gintis, 2003; 
Keltner et al., 2006). 
 Cooperation is a decisive organizing principle of society, be it in hunter-gatherer 
tribes or complex nation-states (Nowak, 2006). Yet establishing and maintaining 
cooperation is problematic, because unconditional cooperators who invest costly time, 
effort or resources in others are vulnerable to exploitation by defectors. Reciprocity, or 
returning helpful and harmful actions in kind, represents a behavioral adaptation to this 
problem because it promotes cooperation by having cooperators retaliate against defectors 
(Parks & Rumble, 2001; Sheldon, 1999; Trivers, 1971). But because misunderstandings, 
ambiguous situations and unknown intentions greatly increase the complexity of 
reciprocity dynamics, scholars have proposed that emotions function as an indispensable 
and ubiquitous lubricant to establish and maintain cooperation (McElreath et al., 2003; 
Van Lange et al., 2002).  
Surprisingly, however, which discrete communicated emotions actually induce 
cooperation has (to our knowledge) never been tested empirically in the game-theoretical 
derivatives of reciprocal situations (i.e., prisoner’s dilemma and give-some dilemma or—
more broadly—social dilemmas, see Weber, Kopelman, & Messick, 2004). Nevertheless, 
some scholars propose that anger may have evolved to address defection in an interaction 
partner (Fessler & Haley, 2003; Keltner, et al., 2006). Physiologically and cognitively, 
                                                          
3This chapter is based on Wubben, De Cremer, & Van Dijk (2009a). 
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anger facilitates retaliatory action (Cannon, 1929; Lerner & Tiedens, 2006), making 
defectors more likely to cooperate because their costs of future defection are increased. But 
negotiation research suggests that communicating anger sometimes also has the opposite 
effect (Van Dijk et al., 2008; Van Kleef & Côté, 2007). Through emotional contagion it 
may elicit anger in the target person (Hatfield et al., 1994), who may become more likely 
to retaliate instead. Anger may therefore also engender rapid escalation (Canary, Spitzberg, 
& Semic, 1998). Thus, communicated anger may force cooperation by announcing 
retaliation, but it can also backfire, yielding mutual defection and an interpersonal crisis.  
Although the theoretical debate of inducing cooperation in others has mainly 
focused on the antagonistic emotion of anger, we believe there is another largely 
overlooked emotion that seems relevant to this purpose: disappointment (Frijda, 1986; Van 
Dijk & Van Harreveld, 2008). Disappointment is experienced in response to unfulfilled 
positive expectations (Van Dijk, Zeelenberg, & Van der Pligt, 1999). Expressing 
disappointment to the person that caused this emotion therefore communicates that one had 
higher expectations of this person. It is this message rather than its action tendency that 
makes disappointment effective in inducing cooperation, because disappointment is 
associated with a tendency to do nothing (Van Dijk & Van Harreveld, 2008). Still, 
expressing disappointment in someone is a powerful statement that can even elicit 
concessions from negotiation partners (Timmers, Fischer, & Manstead, 1998; Van Kleef et 
al., 2006; Van Kleef & Van Lange, 2008). And exactly because it addresses defection 
without communicating a prospect of retaliation, as anger does, it is less likely to backfire. 
Our central hypothesis therefore is that reciprocal actions more successfully establish 
cooperation when one responds to defection with disappointment instead of anger. 
 
 
2.2 EXPERIMENT 2.1 
 
We will test our hypothesis by letting participants play a give-some dilemma (see 
below) against a tit-tor-tat (TFT) strategy. This strictly reciprocal strategy has become 
famous for establishing cooperation by always cooperating at its first move and 
subsequently mirroring its partner’s actions (Axelrod, 1984). By doing so, it is retaliatory 
because it responds to defection with defection but also forgiving because it resumes 
cooperation after defection when its partner does so too. Because anger and 
disappointment may elicit perceptions of retaliation and forgiveness too, these emotions 
could strongly influence the effectiveness of TFT. Finally, we will examine if any effects 
of these emotions will carry over to future interactions with the same partner in another 
context. 
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2.2.1 Method 
  
Participants and experimental design. Ninety-seven undergraduate students 
(22% male, Mage = 20.08) participated in exchange for ¼3.50 (approximately $5) or course 
credits. Participants were randomly assigned to the disappointment, anger or no-emotion 
condition. 
 Procedure. Upon arrival at the laboratory, participants were seated in separate 
cubicles in front of a computer. For our experiment we adjusted the paradigm used by Van 
Lange et al. (2002). Participants read that in every trial they and their partner, who was 
actually computer-simulated, would start with 10 coins and that they both had to decide 
simultaneously how many coins they wanted to donate to the other. Each coin kept to 
oneself was worth ¼0.50; coins donated to one’s partner were worth ¼1.00. This situation 
represents a give-some dilemma because keeping one’s coins yields higher individual 
outcomes than donating one’s coins, yet if both players follow this strategy, each 
individual obtains lower outcomes than if they both donate all their coins. Participants who 
obtained more money with the game had higher chances to win one of several ¼10 prizes. 
Subsequently, every participant played for 14 trials against a TFT-strategy that donated 10 
coins in the first trial and subsequently imitated the participant’s donations.  
 Emotion manipulation. Participants read that either they or their partner, if 
desired, could send the other player emotion messages every three rounds. Participants 
therefore first practiced in composing messages by selecting an emotion label and 
indicating to what extent they experienced this emotion on a scale of 0 (not at all) to 10 
(very much). To warrant the credibility of the emotion communication we emphasized that 
it was perfectly fine to communicate a specific emotion several times or with minimal 
intensity. Subsequently, their partner was seemingly at random appointed to send 
messages. After the second, fifth, eighth and eleventh trial participants in the anger and 
disappointment conditions would then receive a message reading that their partner felt 
angry/disappointed about the number of coins they had donated. It was clearly stated that 
the first emotion message pertained to the first two rounds and the subsequent emotion 
messages to every three preceding rounds. Participants in the no-emotion condition 
received no messages. To make the emotion information more realistic we covaried its 
communicated intensity with the number of donated coins. If participants had donated ten 
coins in the previous three trials the intensity was 0 out of 10—indicating that their partner 
did not at all feel angry or disappointed—and if participants had donated fewer coins the 
intensity increased to ultimately 10 out of 10 when no coins were donated.  
Dependent measures. Our main dependent behavioral measure was the number 
of coins participants donated to their partner in each trial. To explore if the communicated 
emotions would also spill over to cooperation decisions in a different context, we gave 
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participants the opportunity to affect their partner’s (and thereby also their own) chances in 
the lottery. They could anonymously decide to let their partner’s number of tickets increase 
or decrease with 0-10%. Afterwards, we also asked a series of questions on a 7-point scale 
(1 = totally disagree, 7 = totally agree). Seven items were used to measure participants’ 
impression of their partner (Van Kleef et al., 2006; e.g., “my partner made a cooperative 
impression”, “during the game, my partner made a hostile impression”). Retaliation 
perceptions were measured with the items “My partner will react fiercely when something 
is done to him or her”, “My partner will not retaliate if damage is caused to him or her” 
(reversed), and “My partner will take action if he or she is disadvantaged” (Į = .68). 
Perceived forgiveness was measured with the items “my partner is forgiving” and “my 
partner will not easily let a conflict get out of hand”; r = .39, p < .001. Participants were 
also asked how angry they felt. Furthermore, we asked in both emotion conditions if 
participants found it justified that their partner felt as he or she had communicated, and if 
participants could imagine their partner’s feelings (r = .95, p < .001). The emotion 
manipulation was checked by asking participants how often their partner communicated 
fear, shame, happiness, envy, pride, sadness and, importantly, anger and disappointment (1 
= not at all, 7 = very often). Finally, participants were debriefed, paid and thanked. 
 
 
2.2.2 Results  
 
Manipulation check. Separate one-way ANOVAs on the anger (F[2, 94] = 
54.64) and disappointment (F[2, 94] = 52.86) manipulation checks yielded strong effects 
of emotion (both ps < .001; both Ș²s > .52). Communicated anger was reported most often 
in the anger condition (Manger = 5.10, SD = 2.61 vs. Mdisappointment = 1.06, SD = 0.36 and Mno 
emotion = 1.60, SD = 1.22; both ts > 8.54, both ps < .001) and communicated disappointment 
was reported most often in the disappointment condition (Mdisappointment = 5.26, SD = 2.38 
vs. Manger = 1.13, SD = 0.72 and Mno emotion = 1.89, SD = 1.57; both ts > 8.09, both ps < 
.001).  
Cooperation. We pooled the post-manipulation trials in four blocks by 
calculating the average contributions in the three trials following each emotion 
communication and conducted a 3 (emotion) × 4 (blocks) mixed-model ANOVA. In this 
and subsequent analyses we controlled for any pre-manipulation differences in cooperation 
by including the average contribution in the first two trials as a covariate. Results revealed 
an overall interaction, F(2, 93) = 3.01, p = .05, Ș²p = .06 (see Figure 2.1).  
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Figure 2.1: Number of donated coins as a function of emotion and block.  
 
Note. Error bars depict standard error per condition. 
 
Post-hoc comparisons showed that cooperation increased faster when 
disappointment as opposed to anger (F[1, 59] = 3.90, p = .05, Ș²p = .06) or no emotion 
(F[1, 63] = 5.08, p = .03, Ș²p = .07) was communicated. Moreover, linear trend analysis 
revealed that communicating disappointment gradually increased cooperation (F[1, 29] = 
5.61, p = .02, Ș²p = .16) whereas anger and no emotion did not (both Fs < 1, both ps > .43). 
Finally, a one-way ANOVA on the last block of trials showed a main effect of emotion, 
F(2, 93) = 3.95, p = .02, Ș² = .06. Disappointment established more cooperation than anger 
(p = .007) with no emotion inducing intermediate cooperation in comparison to anger and 
disappointment (both ps > .12). 
To examine any spill-over effects in the give-some dilemma we conducted a one-
way ANOVA on the percentage with which participants decided to increase or decrease 
the other’s lottery tickets. Results showed a main effect of emotion, F(2, 93) = 3.35, p = 
.04, Ș² = .06. Post-hoc tests revealed that people allocated a more positive outcome to their 
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partner when disappointment (M = +6.24%) was communicated as opposed to anger (M = 
+2.34%, p = .01) or no emotion (M = +3.37%, p = .06). 
Emotion inferences. To test whether anger and disappointment affected 
retaliation and forgiveness perceptions, we conducted 3 (emotion) × 2 (perception: 
forgiving vs. retaliatory) mixed-model ANOVA. This yielded a significant interaction, 
F(2, 93) = 5.35, p = .006, Ș²p = .10 (see Table 2.1 for all means and standard errors). 
Simple-effect analyses showed that disappointed partners were perceived as more 
forgiving than retaliatory (p = .006), whereas for angry partners the opposite trend 
occurred, indicating they were perceived as relatively retaliatory (p = .15). Moreover, 
planned comparisons showed that angry partners were perceived as more retaliatory than 
partners in the disappointed (p = .05) and no-emotion conditions (p = .06) and as less 
forgiving (both ps < .02). 
 
Table 2.1: Retaliation and forgiveness perceptions by emotion. 
 Dependent variables 
Emotion  Retaliation Forgiveness 
Anger 4.73a  (0.18) 4.22a (0.24) 
Disappointment 4.21b  (0.19) 5.21c (0.24) 
No emotion 4.25ab (0.17) 4.98c (0.23) 
Note. Entries are means on 7-point scales, with higher values indicating higher retaliation or forgiveness 
perceptions. Standard errors are given in parentheses. Means in the same row or column with a different subscript 
differ at p  .05. 
 
Separate one-way ANOVAs showed main effects of emotion on reported anger 
(F[1, 93] = 7.64, p < .001, Ș² = .14) and impression of the opponent (F[1, 93] = 12.47, p < 
.001, Ș² = .19). Post-hoc analyses revealed that partners communicating disappointment (M 
= 6.11) or no emotion (M = 5.84) received a more favorable impression than partners 
communicating anger (M = 4.98; both ps < .001). Furthermore, angry partners induced 
more anger in participants (M = 1.84) than partners communicating disappointment (M = 
1.02) or no emotion (M = 1.10; both ps < .001). Finally, participants evaluated 
communicating anger or disappointment as equally justified (Mdisappointment = 4.89, Manger = 
4.54, F < 1, p = .42) and one sample t-tests showed that these ratings differed significantly 
from the midpoint of the scale (t[61] = 3.06, p = .003). These findings further indicate that 
the manipulation was credible and that differences in perceived appropriateness between 
both emotions cannot explain our findings. 
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2.3 GENERAL DISCUSSION 
 
 The present study investigated if the communication of discrete emotions is 
conducive to establishing cooperation when an interaction partner refrains from returning a 
favor. The results show that communicating disappointment in the other more successfully 
induces cooperation than does communicating anger or not communicating any emotion. 
Disappointed partners were perceived as forgiving rather than retaliatory, whereas the 
opposite was true for angry partners. Anger thus risks escalation, whereas disappointment 
emphasizes the possibility of obtaining better outcomes. Moreover, this behavioral effect 
carries over to future social decision-making with the same interaction partner. 
 Our point is not that communicating an intention to retaliate is necessarily 
detrimental. After all, reciprocation implies retaliation and TFT would be unsuccessful 
without it. But our results do show that addressing defection by communicating anger 
clearly overemphasizes retaliation. Not only did it evoke anger, participants also had a less 
positive impression of their partner. Expressing disappointment, however, is an attempt to 
address defection without incurring such costs. And in that it appears quite successful—at 
least when, like in the present study, its communication is experienced as appropriate. 
Moreover, because communicating disappointment does not lead to negative impressions, 
expressing anger still remains a viable option when disappointment fails to induce 
cooperation.  
 Even though we believe the importance and benefits of disappointment have not 
yet been fully appreciated in the emotion and cooperation literature, we do not want to 
suggest that it always induces more cooperation than anger does. For example, because 
anger more strongly emphasizes retaliation than disappointment does, it may be quite 
effective in averting defection when one’s partner fears retaliation. In our experiment 
communicating anger may have resulted in escalation because both players had equal 
retaliatory power, but when in asymmetric give-some dilemmas the more powerful person 
communicates anger this may actually promote cooperation (cf. Van Kleef & Côté, 2007). 
Taken together, these results show that how people establish and maintain cooperation can 
only be fully understood by recognizing that communicated emotions are inherent to the 
dynamics of reciprocity. 
 To conclude, the next time someone fails to return a favor, it seems wise to 
reciprocate this action while communicating disappointment instead of anger. This 
emphasizes potential forgiveness rather than retaliation, thereby maintaining a good 
relationship with the other instead of evoking anger. But above all, communicating 
disappointment is more likely to establish a mutually beneficial relationship. 
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CHAPTER 3 
 
3. THE COMMUNICATION OF MORAL ANGER AND 
DISAPPOINTMENT HELPS TO ESTABLISH COOPERATION 
THROUGH INDIRECT RECIPROCITY4 
 
3.1 INTRODUCTION 
 
Reciprocity is as pervasive in social interaction as it is conducive to establish and 
maintain cooperation. This is evident not only from proverbial wisdom such as “One hand 
washes the other”, “You scratch my back, I will scratch yours” and “An eye for an eye, a 
tooth for a tooth”. Scholars, too, have long since recognized the importance of reciprocity 
(Gouldner, 1960), judging from influential concepts as reciprocal altruism (Trivers, 1971), 
social exchange (Blau, 1964), exchange relationships (Clark & Mills, 1979) and strategies 
for resolving conflict (Osgood, 1962) or inducing compliance (Cialdini et al., 1975). These 
are all instances of direct reciprocity: no one but the recipient is expected, implicitly or 
not, to return helpful and harmful deeds in kind. Direct reciprocity resembles a barter 
economy based on the direct exchange of goods, because cooperation can only be 
established if what both parties have to offer each other is tailored to suit their needs. A 
limitation of such a mechanism is that person A may not provide a favor to B if B cannot 
reciprocate, even if B can actually cooperate with C instead and C can cooperate with A 
(Nowak, 2006). Money provides an economic solution to such allocation problems, but 
other solutions appear possible too. After all, when reciprocation is impossible or unlikely, 
people still do not ask for monetary rewards to donate blood, give up their seats in public 
transport, or even rescue complete strangers in emergencies (Becker & Eagly, 2004). 
Could one explanation for such behavior be that there is an equivalent of money that 
establishes cooperation when direct reciprocity is impossible?  
This is exactly what indirect reciprocity theory proposes (Alexander, 1987; 
Nowak & Sigmund, 2005). Indirect reciprocity occurs when a third party, rather than the 
recipient, reciprocates a helpful or harmful deed. Thus, A cooperates with B and C 
subsequently cooperates with A. Person C, in turn, may be compensated by B or by yet 
another person. Bookkeeping of this ‘passing the buck along’ is done informally through 
reputation rather than through money. A reputation, then, is an aggregated judgment of 
character based on all available information of someone’s cooperative and defective (i.e., 
non-cooperative) acts in the past. People with a positive reputation deserve cooperative 
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 This chapter is based on Wubben, De Cremer, & Van Dijk (2009b) 
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acts from others, whereas people with a negative reputation do not. Consequently, 
obtaining as positive a reputation as possible can become a goal in itself, as can be 
assessing, updating and communicating the reputations of others. Indirect reciprocity thus 
gives rise to gossip, information sharing networks, social norms, sanctioning systems, laws 
and, eventually, society. Forming a coherent reputation requires putting together numerous 
intricate pieces of ambiguous social information, which may be why people are equipped 
with faculties for advanced communication, morality, perspective-taking and lie-detection. 
Remarkably, these topics have been studied frequently in social psychology, but indirect 
reciprocity itself has received hardly any or only indirect empirical attention (De Cremer & 
Bakker, 2003; Hardy & Van Vugt, 2006; Klapwijk, Van Lange, & Reinders Folmer, 2009; 
Simpson & Willer, 2008). 
Whereas cooperation through indirect reciprocity is theoretically possible, 
empirical demonstrations have been inconclusive. In theory, defectors should receive 
defection as their just dessert. Moreover, such justified defection should not damage one’s 
reputation and, consequently, should not increase one’s chances of being defected against 
(Leimar & Hammerstein, 2001; Ohtsuki & Iwasa, 2004; Nowak & Sigmund, 2005). But in 
practice, people have difficulties deciding when defection is justified and when not. Bolton 
and colleagues (2005) found that, even though defection in response to defection is more 
justified than defection in response to cooperation, participants hardly responded more 
cooperatively to it. Milinski and colleagues (2001) even found that participants responded 
as uncooperatively to defection against an unconditional defector as to defection against a 
person whose reputation was unknown. Thus, empirical studies have not been able to 
confirm the theoretical assumption that people can successfully distinguish justified from 
unjustified defection. 
Perhaps justified defection would elicit more cooperation if it were clear to 
observers that it had the pro-social motive of retaliation against a defector. We will claim 
that the moral emotions of anger and disappointment fulfil exactly this communicative 
function (Haidt, 2003; Keltner & Haidt, 1999). Consequently, in Experiments 3.1 and 3.3 
we will show in a situation of indirect reciprocity that defection out of anger or 
disappointment is seen as a just response to unjustified defection. It therefore elicits more 
cooperation than when these emotions are not communicated. Moreover, we will show that 
the difference between both emotions is that disappointment signals that a defector has a 
more positive reputation than anger does (Experiments 3.2 and 3.3). Moral emotions may 
thus present a reconciliation for the theoretically postulated but empirically unverified 
claim that justified defection is perceived and responded to differently than justified 
defection is.  
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3.1.1 The dynamics of indirect reciprocity 
 
Cooperation is the provision of a benefit to a recipient who thereby gains more 
than that the benefit costs to the donor (Nowak, 2006). Consequently, cooperation pays off 
if the recipient reciprocates the cooperative act. But predicting if a recipient will 
reciprocate is difficult if you have never encountered this recipient before. One solution is 
to observe whether the recipient returns cooperative acts from other persons. By observing 
and remembering who cooperates and who does not, reputations are created. You 
minimize the risk of exploitation if you invest your valuable time, effort or resources in 
people with a positive reputation only. This discriminating strategy marks the onset of 
indirect reciprocity, because observers of your cooperative act may find cooperating with 
you worthwhile, and their cooperation may, in turn, be reciprocated by yet others 
(Alexander, 1987).  
It should be noted, however, that this strategy of basing your decisions to 
cooperate in indirect reciprocity solely on how frequently your potential recipient 
cooperates and defects often does not establish cooperation (Leimar & Hammerstein, 
2001; Nowak & Sigmund, 1998). It leads you to defect against a defector, but at the cost of 
decreasing your own reputation and therewith your own prospects of receiving cooperative 
acts. Indirect reciprocity theory has therefore posited that establishing cooperation requires 
observers to distinguish between defection that is justified and unjustified (Leimar & 
Hammerstein, 2001; Panchanathan & Boyd, 2003; Sugden, 1986). Unjustified is all 
defection against people with a positive reputation. Justified is all defection against people 
with a negative reputation. Justified defection therefore preserves one’s current reputation, 
whereas unjustified defection damages it. 
While theoretically important to solve the puzzle of cooperation, this distinction 
has received considerably less empirical attention. Most studies on indirect reciprocity 
inform participants only about the decisions of their immediate recipient (e.g., Bolton, 
Katok, & Ockenfels, 2004; Engelmann & Fischbacher, 2009; Klapwijk et al., 2009; Seinen 
& Schram, 2006; Stanca, 2009; Wedekind & Braithwaite, 2002; Wedekind & Milinski, 
2000). But to judge if a defection was justified or not one also needs information about the 
reputation of the person that one’s immediate recipient has defected against. Moreover, as 
noted above, two studies that did provide such information showed that people responded 
to justified defection almost as uncooperatively as they did to unjustified defection (Bolton 
et al., 2005; Milinski et al., 2001). How can this be? 
A critical examination of the concept of justified defection may be useful. If 
justified defection deserves more cooperation than unjustified defection does, it has to be 
because its underlying motive is reciprocated rather than the defection itself (Panchanathan 
& Boyd, 2003). That the motives for one’s actions matter in reciprocity has been proposed 
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long ago (Gouldner, 1960; Nemeth, 1972), has been formalized in various models 
(Dufwenberg & Kirchsteiger, 2004; Falk & Fischbacher, 2006; Levine, 1998; Rabin, 1993) 
and has received good empirical support (Blount, 1995; Charness, 2004; Cox, 2004; Falk, 
Fehr, & Fischbacher, 2008; Offerman, 2002; Tazelaar, Van Lange, & Ouwerkerk, 2004; 
Van Dijk & Wilke, 1999, but see Bolton, Brandts, & Ockenfels, 1998). Perhaps, then, for 
defection to qualify as ‘justified’, it needs to be clear that it is not only committed against 
someone with a negative reputation, but has a just motive as well. Defecting to withhold 
benefits from a defector is a just motive—defecting to obtain higher personal outcomes is 
not. Consequently, knowing that defection was committed in response to defection, but not 
knowing why may still lead to little leniency, as observed in Bolton and colleagues (2005). 
But also when exhaustive reputation information is available, as in Milinski et al. (2001), it 
may not be obvious when defection is motivated by a desire to retaliate. Even someone 
with a positive reputation may occasionally defect against someone with a negative 
reputation for no other reason than greed. Thus, unlike what is often assumed in the 
indirect reciprocity literature, having information about previous behavior but not about its 
underlying motives may be inadequate to determine if defection is justified or not.  
Another difficulty with the concept of justified defection is its complexity in 
practice (Milinski et al., 2001; Nowak & Sigmund, 2005; Panchanathan & Boyd, 2003). 
To judge if defection is justified, the reputations of the recipient and of the recipient’s 
recipient need to be known. These, in turn, are an aggregate of all information about earlier 
cooperative or defective acts. Perception errors may therefore occur and incomplete 
information may impede proper judgment. But this difficulty, too, can be remedied when a 
recipient would simply signal if his or her motive to defect is just and not selfish. At the 
very least, this would provide additional, more direct information to base one’s own 
decision to cooperate or defect on. Therefore, we will now turn to how such underlying 
motives for defection may be communicated and help in making a distinction between 
justified and unjustified defection.  
 
 
3.1.2 Moral emotions and justified defection 
 
 Misinterpretation of justified defection not only damages the reputation of the 
person who committed it, but also takes away an opportunity for third parties to respond 
cooperatively. Both those who observe and commit justified defection therefore profit 
from a reliable way to communicate when defection is justified, so that it is not met with 
less cooperation. Emotions can fulfil exactly such a communicative function. A social-
functional account of emotions (Keltner & Gross, 1999; Keltner & Haidt, 2001; Oatley & 
Jenkins, 1992) in fact suggests that emotions are relatively fast, involuntary and automatic 
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responses that coordinate social interactions by signaling one’s intentions and motivations. 
This coordination potential helps people to overcome social challenges, many of which 
pertain to the problem of cooperation (Bowles & Gintis, 2003; Fessler & Haley, 2003; 
Keltner et al., 2006). Indeed, that the communication of emotions affects other people’s 
willingness to cooperate has been repeatedly validated, mostly in bargaining studies (for a 
comprehensive review, see Van Kleef et al., 2008; see also Pietroni et al., 2008; Van Kleef 
& Van Lange, 2008; Van Kleef & De Dreu, 2009).  
These studies have all focused on anger with its social function of rectifying 
injustice (Solomon, 1990). A common finding is that anger signals dissatisfaction with the 
demands of one’s negotiation partner and a resulting unwillingness to make concessions 
before one’s opponent does so. This may indeed induce cooperation, though escalation 
may also result (Van Kleef & Côté, 2007; Van Dijk et al., 2008). Another emotion that is 
less studied than anger but that appears to address defection at least as effectively is 
disappointment (Lelieveld et al., 2009; Van Kleef et al., 2006; Van Kleef & Van Lange, 
2008; Wubben, De Cremer, & Van Dijk, 2009a). Disappointment is an emotional reaction 
to unfulfilled positive expectations (Van Dijk & Van Harreveld, 2008). In mixed-motive 
situations, characterized by both conflict and mutual dependence (Schelling, 1960), it 
therefore signals dissatisfaction with the other person’s unexpected decision to defect 
instead of cooperate. Thus, both anger and disappointment signal that the antecedent of 
one’s own defection is the perceived injustice of the other person’s defection.  
 It should be noted, however, that this extensive literature has only examined what 
may be called personal anger or disappointment (Batson et al., 2007; Batson, Chao, & 
Givens, 2009), that is, anger or disappointment aimed to address undeserved harm or 
defection against oneself. But in indirect reciprocity, anger and disappointment would need 
to address defection that is committed against others, including strangers. Such emotions 
that uphold the social order against transgressions from others, even if one’s own interests 
are not directly harmed, are called moral emotions, or, more specifically, other-
condemning moral emotions (Haidt, 2003). Whereas anger, with its clear pro-social action 
tendency of rectifying injustice, is a prototypical other-condemning moral emotion (Haidt, 
2003), disappointment has to our knowledge never been studied from a moral perspective. 
Yet, given the effectiveness of personal disappointment to avert defection in dyadic 
interactions, moral disappointment may quite possibly avert defection in third-party 
interactions as well. Defection in indirect reciprocity that is motivated by anger or 
disappointment, then, signals that this defection is a justified, moral action in response to 
unjustified defection and it should therefore not increase one’s chances of being defected 
against. Justified and unjustified defection may thus be distinguished.  
The paper proceeds as follows. First, we will test with a laboratory experiment if 
in a situation of indirect reciprocity the communication of anger and disappointment 
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indeed affects whether defection is seen as justified or unjustified and is responded to 
accordingly. Assuming that both emotions fulfil this function, one may then wonder how 
anger and disappointment differ from each other. We will therefore test in a follow-up 
scenario study if defection that elicits anger is believed to be committed by someone with a 
less positive reputation than defection that elicits disappointment. In a concluding 
laboratory study we will test both hypotheses simultaneously with a different paradigm. 
 
 
3.2 EXPERIMENT 3.1: JUSTIFIED VERSUS UNJUSTIFIED DEFECTION 
 
In Experiment 3.1 we will first examine if decisions in indirect reciprocity elicit 
anger and disappointment in observers and, in particular, if unjustified defection arouses 
more anger and disappointment than justified defection does. Second, we examine if third 
parties find defection out of anger or disappointment justified and respond accordingly. 
Below, we will formulate these hypotheses more specifically.  
Our first claim is that observing unjustified defection in indirect reciprocity 
triggers the moral emotions of anger and disappointment. Unjustified defection, as 
observed when someone defects against a cooperative recipient, should therefore elicit 
more anger and disappointment than cooperation does, as observed when someone 
cooperates with a cooperative recipient (Hypothesis 1). To exclude the possibility that 
reported anger or disappointment reflects the more general experience of negative affect 
rather than these two discrete moral emotions, we also included the emotional state of 
boredom as a control measure. Boredom was chosen for its negative valence and its 
obvious lack of a moral component, while still being conceivable as a third party’s reaction 
to a behavioral decision (Damrad-Frye & Laird, 1989). Our second claim is that anger and 
disappointment help distinguish justified and unjustified defection. Participants should 
then feel less angry and disappointed about defection against a defector than about 
defection against a cooperator (Hypothesis 2).  
In the second part of the experiment, participants receive information about the 
emotions of their recipient, so that effects of communicated anger and disappointment can 
be contrasted against a no-emotion and a boredom condition. The boredom condition again 
serves to show that any emotion inferences do not merely stem from the negative valence 
of anger and disappointment. The main purpose of Experiment 3.1 is to show that the 
display of moral emotions allows one to distinguish justified and unjustified defection. 
Thus, we predict people to infer that the person to whom anger or disappointment is 
directed has defected (Hypothesis 3a) and that this defection was unfair or disreputable 
(Hypothesis 3b). Second, we predict that someone who reciprocates such unjustified 
defection out of anger or disappointment is perceived to do so for moral reasons and is thus 
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a just, reputable person (Hypothesis 4). Therefore, we expect participants to respond to this 
justified defection with cooperation rather than defection (Hypothesis 5).  
 
 
3.2.1 Method 
 
Participants and experimental design. Participants were 27 undergraduate 
students (12 men, 15 women; M age = 21.11) who participated voluntarily and received a 
show-up fee of ¼7. They were told in advance that this fee could decrease or increase to ¼5, 
¼7, ¼9 or ¼11, depending on their own and other participants’ decisions. In the first part of 
the experiment we used a within-subject design to manipulate the information participants 
had about their recipient’s choice behavior (cooperated with cooperator vs. cooperated 
with defector vs. defected against defector vs. defected against cooperator). We measured 
participants’ emotions, as well as their choice behavior, which could afterwards determine 
their eventual payoff. In the second part of the experiment emotion (disappointment vs. 
anger vs. boredom vs. no emotion) was the within-subject variable and we measured 
emotion inferences and choice behavior, which could, again, determine the payoff of 
participants.  
Procedure. For this experiment we developed a new paradigm in which 
participants played for real money and in which full experimental control was maintained 
over the emotions that were communicated to participants. No deception was used, which 
renders alternative explanations based on any suspicion of participants unlikely (Hertwig 
& Ortmann, 2008a, 2008b; Kelman, 1967; MacCoun & Kerr, 1987; Taylor & Shepperd, 
1996). Moreover, providing tangible financial incentives makes cooperation truly costly, 
so that participants make more realistic and less socially desirable choices (Camerer & 
Hogarth, 1999). 
After participants had received their show-up fee and had been seated in separate 
cubicles, they proceeded with a first questionnaire. Participants, who were denoted with 
the letter M, read that in this experiment they would get the opportunity to help someone 
named person L. Person L had had the opportunity to help someone named person K, who 
had had the opportunity to help yet someone else. Participants knew that a future 
participant would in turn get the opportunity to help them. Thus, a chain was created such 
that participant could help and be helped by exactly one person5. Help could be given by 
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donating ¼2 of one’s show-up fee to one’s recipient. The experimenter would double this 
amount so that the recipient received ¼4. This situation allows for cooperation through 
indirect reciprocity because donating ¼2 is costly, but if a third party reciprocates this 
donation, the resulting benefit of ¼4 outweighs this cost.  
To measure participants’ emotional reactions to justified and unjustified 
defection, we used a variant of the ‘strategy method’ (Selten, 1967). This method requires 
participants to specify their response to every possible situation in a game, not just the 
specific situation that actually occurs. As a result, complete information about participants’ 
responses can be obtained and compared without sacrificing experimental control. 
Accordingly, participants had to indicate how angry, disappointed and bored they felt (1 = 
not at all, 7 = very much) over person L’s decision for each of the four possible situations 
that could emerge: (a) person L helped, but person K had not, (b) person L did not help, 
but person K had helped (c) both helped and (d) neither helped. Furthermore, for each of 
these situations they had to select which emotion they experienced most: 
“disappointment”, “anger”, “boredom” or “none of these”. For experimental design 
purposes (see below) we also asked if in each situation participants wanted to donate ¼2 of 
their show-up fee to person L or not. Afterwards, when person L and K’s actual decisions 
were known, participants could be paid accordingly.  
Subsequently, the experimenter brought in a second questionnaire in which we 
again applied the strategy method (Selten, 1967). This time, participants had to indicate 
their response (cooperate or defect) for each possible answer that person L could have 
filled out in the first questionnaire. More specifically, participants could choose to donate 
¼2 to person L for all of the following four possible situations: person L had not helped 
person K and felt (a) angry, (b) disappointed (c) bored or (d) no emotion information was 
available6. These situations were offered in random order. We also asked how many cents 
they would have donated if they could transfer any amount of money from 0 to 200 cents. 
                                                                                                                                                  
the second person. The fourth person in thechain was the first participant in our experiment. The last participant 
in the chain received an overpayment of ¼3 in an unrelated experiment and was told that this was because he 
would get the opportunity to help the second last person in the chain by donating ¼2, which would be doubled to 
¼4. All participants whose data are reported in Experiment 1 were told that they would be inserted in the middle 
of the chain, so that their help always benefited another participant and another participant always received the 
opportunity to help them. Participants were encouraged to ask for additional information about the first or last 
persons in the chain if they deemed this necessary for their decisions, but none did so. 
6
 We also asked if participants wanted to help if person L had helped and no emotion information was available. 
Because the hypothetical situation that person L had cooperated instead of defected was irrelevant to our research 
question about justified and unjustified defection, we included this question only to determine participants’ 
payoffs if the previous participant in the chain had actually cooperated. 

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When they filled out the first questionnaire, participants did not know that their answer 
would be communicated to other participants, so strategic motives for communicating a 
specific emotion were of no concern. Participants also had to indicate for each possible 
situation whether they thought person K had helped or not (-7 = definitely not, 0 = no idea, 
7 = definitely so) and if person L and K were considered just and fair (1 = totally disagree, 
7 = totally agree; all rs > .41, all ps < .03).  
After having finished both questionnaires, participants were debriefed and paid 
separately to guarantee their anonymity. The experimenter randomly selected either the 
decisions in the first or second questionnaire to determine the payment. If the first 
questionnaire was selected, the experimenter looked up if the previous two players in the 
chain had cooperated or not and checked if the participant had decided to help in that case. 
If the second questionnaire was selected, the experimenter looked up the communicated 
emotion and decision of the previous participant in the chain and paid participants 
according to their decision. Participants that had helped returned ¼2 from their show-up fee 
of ¼7 to the experimenter, who deposited ¼4 on their recipient’s bank account. Finally, 
participants provided their own bank account number and were thanked for participating. 
 
3.2.2 Results 
  
Experienced emotion7. To analyze if people’s reported emotions in the first 
questionnaire about person L’s decision to cooperate or not also depended on person K’s 
decision, we conducted a 4 (recipient’s choice behavior) × 3 (emotion) repeated-measures 
ANOVA, with both factors as within-subject variables. As in all similar analyses reported 
below, we employed a Huynh-Feldt (1976) adjustment to the degrees of freedom to correct 
for violations of sphericity. This yielded main effects of choice behavior, F(2.36, 59.10) = 
19.49, p < .001, Șp² = .43, and emotion, F(1.70, 44.24) = 24.38, p < .001, Șp² = .48, which 
were qualified by a significant choice behavior × emotion interaction, F(4.57, 118.74) = 
10.07, p < .001, Șp² = .28. 
 
                                                          
7
 Monetary decisions in the first part of the experiment were irrelevant to our hypotheses and measured only so 
that participants could reciprocate real instead of imaginary decisions in the second part of the experiment. Still, 
readers may be interested to know that our data strongly resembled those of Bolton et al. (2005): Cooperation 
with cooperators was more frequent than with defectors (55.56% vs. 11.11%) and these frequencies were not 
strongly affected by whether one’s recipient cooperated with a cooperator or with a defector (17 out of 27 vs. 13 
out of 27 cooperated, p = .12, two-tailed) or whether one’s recipient defected against a cooperator or defector (1 
out of 27 vs. 5 out of 27 cooperated, p = .12, two-tailed). 

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Table 3.1: Means (and standard deviations) of participants’ reported emotions by 
choice behavior of previous participant (L) and the participant before that (K) in the 
chain. 
Emotion Participant Decision K Decision L 
Disappointment Anger Boredom 
Cooperate 1.37a 
(0.63)
 
1.37a 
(0.69) 
1.67ab 
(1.24)
 
 
Defect 
 
Cooperate 
2.22d 
(1.67)
 
1.52a 
(0.98) 
1.33a 
(0.62)
 
Cooperate 4.44c 
(1.85)
 
3.07d 
(1.73) 
1.89b 
(1.01)
 
 
Defect 
 
Defect 
3.07d 
(2.13)
 
2.37b 
(1.61) 
1.79b 
(1.04)
 
Note. Higher scores indicate higher intensities of the reported emotions. Means in the same row or column with 
subscripts that do not contain one or two similar letters differ at p < .05.  
 
 We used planned comparisons to test for the relevant contrasts articulated in 
Hypotheses 1 and 2 (see Table 3.1 for all means and standard deviations). In line with 
Hypothesis 1, defection against a cooperator elicited more anger and disappointment than 
did cooperation with a cooperator (both ps < .001). That defection against a cooperator 
also elicited more anger and disappointment than it elicited boredom (both ps < .001) is 
evidence that unjustified defection specifically evokes moral anger and moral 
disappointment rather than just a global, negative affective state. Unexpected, but 
contributing to the status of disappointment as a moral emotion, is that the reported 
intensity of disappointment was higher than that of anger (p < .001). Furthermore, in line 
with the idea that unjustified defection elicits stronger other-condemning moral emotions 
than does justified defection, defection evoked more anger and disappointment in 
participants when committed against a defector than against a cooperator, (panger = .019, 
pdisappointment = .002; Hypothesis 2). Interestingly, we also found that cooperation with a 
defector elicited more disappointment than did cooperation with a cooperator (p = .006). 
This effect was not significant for anger (p = .40). 
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Table 3.2: Means (and standard deviations) of participants’ own cooperation and 
inferences about persons K and L. 
Communicated Emotion L Dependent Variable 
Disappointment Anger Boredom No Emotion 
Inferred Cooperation 
Decision K 
-4.66a 
(1.90) 
-4.79a 
(1.72) 
0.04b 
(3.02) 
-1.31c 
(2.13) 
Justice Perceptions K 3.44a 
(0.86) 
2.93b 
(1.24) 
4.09c 
(1.03) 
3.76c 
(0.91) 
Justice Perceptions L 4.56a 
(0.80) 
4.50a 
(0.87) 
3.30b 
(1.26) 
3.74b 
(1.04) 
Donated Money to L 67.22a 
(65.26) 
68.89a 
(68.00) 
21.63b 
(38.36) 
36.11b 
(57.38) 
Number of ¼2 
Donations 
9 / 27a 8 / 27a 2 / 27b 3 / 27b 
Note. Higher scores indicate higher cooperation or inferred cooperation and higher justice ratings. Means in the 
same row without identical subscripts differ at p < .05. 
 
Cooperation and emotion inference. We first tested if participants inferred that 
anger and disappointment were evoked by defection that was unjustified, as measured in 
the second questionnaire (Hypothesis 3a and 3b, see Table 3.2 for all means and standard 
deviations pertaining to Hypotheses 3 to 5). A repeated-measures ANOVA with emotion 
as the within-subject variable showed indeed a main effect on the item measuring person 
K’s choice behavior, F(2.33, 60.56) = 33.73, p < .001, Șp² = .56. Separate t tests revealed 
that when person L communicated anger or disappointment over person K’s decision, 
participants were more likely to infer defection than when boredom (tanger = -7.23, p < .001; 
tdisappointment = -6.44, p < .001) or no emotion was communicated (tanger = -7.23, p < .001 ; 
tdisappointment = -6.30, p < .001). Another repeated-measures ANOVA on justice judgments 
showed that participants did not approve of person K’s defection that they had just 
inferred, F(2.35, 61.17) = 10.25, p < .001, Șp² = .29. Separate t tests revealed that 
communicated anger or disappointment over person K’s choice behavior led participants to 
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judge person K as less just than when boredom (tanger = -4.13, p < .001; tdisappointment = -2.83, 
p = .009) or no emotion was communicated (tanger = -4.29, p < .001; tdisappointment = -2.51, p = 
.019).  
 Participants in the anger and disappointment conditions inferred that person K had 
committed an unjustified defection. Would they then judge person L’s defection against 
person K as fair (Hypothesis 4)? Another repeated measures ANOVA indicated that 
participants indeed did so, F(2.27, 59.09) = 13.67, p < .001, Șp² = .34. Person L was seen 
as more just when communicating moral anger or disappointment than when 
communicating boredom (tanger = 4.13, p < .001; tdisappointment = 4.78, p < .001) or no 
emotion (tanger = 3.26, p = .003; tdisappointment = 3.65, p = .001). Additional evidence that 
moral emotions justify defection is that person L was seen as quite fair, because one 
sample t tests showed person L’s justice ratings to be above the midpoint of the 7-point 
scale (panger = .006, pdisappointment = .001). 
 These data support our view that moral emotions signal unjustified defection, 
making that defecting in response is justified and does not lead to a bad reputation. But do 
participants actually meet such justified defection with cooperation (Hypothesis 5)? Due to 
the binary, non-independent nature of the cooperation measure, we used General 
Estimating Equations to obtain an omnibus test of this hypothesis (Diggle, Heagerty, 
Liang, & Zeger, 2002; Hardin & Hilbe, 2003), which indeed showed a main effect of 
emotion8, Ȥ²(4) = 13.77, p = .008. Separate one-tailed McNemar tests showed that 
communicated disappointment and anger elicited more cooperation than did boredom 
(pdisappointment = .008, panger = .035) or no emotion (pdisappointment = .016, panger = .031). 
Furthermore, repeated-measures ANOVA showed that emotion also affected cooperation if 
participants could have donated any amount of money from 0 to 200 cents, F(2.62, 68.21) 
= 7.89, p < .001, Șp² = .23. Again, anger and disappointment induced more cooperation 
than did boredom (panger = .002, pdisappointment = .001) or no emotion (panger = .019, 
pdisappointment = .006).  
 
 
3.2.3 Discussion 
  
Defection can have the unjust motive of selfishly maximizing personal gains or 
the just motive of withholding benefits from defectors. Distinguishing both motives is 
                                                          
8
 To test for order-effects of emotion we compared the fit of a model featuring only emotion with four models 
that also featured the interaction of emotion with the order in which one of four types of emotion feedback was 
provided. All these models provided a worse fit (all QICCs > 618.29) than the model with only emotion as a 
predictor (QICC = 532.29). We therefore collapsed choice behavior across order of emotion. 

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necessary to establish cooperation through indirect reciprocity. Experiment 3.1 showed 
that moral anger and disappointment help in making this distinction. These emotions are 
not only elicited by but also signal a previously committed unjustified defection. They 
communicate that defecting against this unjustified defection is a morally motivated, just 
course of action. Defection out of anger or disappointment is therefore met with more 
cooperation than when no emotional information is present. Moral emotions thus seem 
indispensable lubricants of indirect reciprocity. Yet an interesting, unanticipated finding 
remains. Cooperation with a defector, or ‘unjustified cooperation’, also elicited 
disappointment, albeit not as much as unjustified defection did. This suggests that 
cooperation can occasionally even damage one’s reputation. In the general discussion we 
return to this issue.  
 
 
3.3 EXPERIMENT 3.2: COMMUNICATED ANGER VERSUS DISAPPOINTMENT 
 
 So far, both anger and disappointment appear to help in distinguishing justified 
from unjustified defection. This begs the question how both emotions differ from each 
other. 
 Indirect reciprocity is based on the assessment and reassessment of reputation and 
the communication thereof. Consequently, it may be insufficient to merely communicate 
that someone’s reputation has been damaged. It may also be necessary to give an 
indication of how positive someone’s reputation initially was. With these two parameters—
reputation positivity and reputation change—community members can inform each other 
how much the defective and cooperative acts of fellow members have damaged or 
improved their reputations (see also Beersma & Van Kleef, 2009). Experiment 3.1 already 
showed that anger and disappointment communicate reputation change. What we will 
propose and test in Experiment 3.2 is that both moral emotions differ in how positive they 
communicate a defector’s initial reputation to be, such that the more positive a defector’s 
initial reputation is, the more likely it is that this defection will elicit disappointment rather 
than anger. 
 There is some indirect theoretical support for the idea that moral anger and moral 
disappointment communicate differential reputations in indirect reciprocity. Recall that 
disappointment is the emotion that occurs if an outcome does not fulfil one’s positive 
expectations (Van Dijk & Van Harreveld, 2008). Consequently, feeling disappointed in 
someone else should communicate that this person has not lived up to your high 
expectations or, put differently, to his or her positive reputation (cf. Lelieveld, et al., 2009; 
Timmers et al., 1998; Van Kleef, et al., 2006; Van Kleef & Van Lange, 2008; Wubben, et 
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al., 2009a). Moral disappointment should then be elicited when observing a person with a 
positive initial reputation commit a moral transgression such as unjustified defection.  
Disappointment is characterized by a tendency to do nothing rather than by clear 
retributive action tendencies (Van Dijk & Van Harreveld, 2008). This may precisely be 
why disappointment is functional in addressing defection by people with a positive rather 
than a negative reputation. First, a positive reputation can only be obtained by being 
responsive to the needs of others, so the mere expression of disappointment itself may 
suffice to get someone with a positive reputation to repent. Second, because the other 
person is likely to remain a valuable interaction partner, announcing retaliation may, unlike 
signaling a tendency to do nothing, be overly harsh and lead to unwanted, irreversible 
escalation (Wubben et al., 2009a). This would be particularly unfortunate when the other’s 
alleged defection stems from a misperception—a plausible explanation when somebody 
with a positive reputation suddenly defects (Van Lange et al., 2002). Add to this that a 
tendency to do nothing also includes a tendency to not engage in cooperative behavior and 
it is clear that communicating disappointment to people with a positive reputation may be 
very effective in addressing their defection. Observers, then, may in turn infer from 
communicated disappointment that the defector had a fairly positive reputation.  
Anger, on the other hand, may be particularly effective in addressing defection 
from people with a less positive or even a negative reputation. Anger is evoked by a 
“demeaning offense against me and mine”, whereby arbitrary, malevolent and 
inconsiderate offenses are particularly demeaning (Lazarus, 1991, p. 222). Rectifying such 
instances of injustice is the function of anger (Solomon, 1990) and this is achieved through 
threats, coercion and retaliation (Canary et al., 1998; Lerner & Tiedens, 2006). Anger is 
therefore a strongly interpersonal emotion (Averill, 1983) and its communication can 
indeed induce cooperation in others, (e.g., Sinaceur & Tiedens, 2006; Van Kleef et al., 
2004a), but may backfire as well (Van Dijk, et al., 2008; Van Kleef & Côté, 2007). This 
suggests that communicating anger is quite a risky and drastic strategy that is best reserved 
for ‘serious cases’. Such a case may occur when a person with a negative reputation, in 
spite of earlier warnings from others, defects yet another time. This would justify such 
radical measures as expressing anger and risking conflict, because coercion may be the 
only remaining option to induce cooperation. And even if, in the worst case, escalation 
would lead to enduring defection by the person with a negative reputation, this would still 
make only a relatively small difference compared to this person’s usual behavior. Thus, 
moral anger is an apt response when someone with a negative reputation commits an 
unjustified defection and we therefore expect other people to infer this negative reputation 
when moral anger is communicated.  
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3.3.1 Method 
  
Participants and experimental design. Seventy-five undergraduate students (17 
males, 58 females; Mage = 19.63) participated voluntarily in exchange for ¼1 or course 
credits. Participants were randomly assigned to the emotion conditions. 
 Procedure. Upon arrival in the laboratory, people were seated in a cubicle and 
presented with a scenario titled “helping colleagues at work”. We opted for the setting of a 
medium-sized work environment, because it would be familiar to undergraduates and the 
setting made forming reputations of all colleagues feasible and appropriate. Moreover, the 
nature of the cooperative behavior (see below) would make indirect reciprocity the 
predominant underlying mechanism of cooperation. Participants had to imagine having an 
administrative secondary job that required them to finish a specific amount of work before 
going home. As a result, some employees would occasionally happen to finish early and 
spend the rest of the day playing minesweeper and solitaire while others had to work late. 
Therefore, although it was completely voluntary, employees that finished early could, 
instead of leisurely playing games, choose to help those who would have to work late. We 
told that the benefit of not having to work late easily outweighed the cost of not being able 
to play games. Thus a situation arose where cooperation through indirect reciprocity would 
be possible: cooperation was individually costly, but would pay off when reciprocated by a 
third party.  
 Participants then read that Mark, a colleague who had been working at the 
organization for a few months and was equally productive as other employees, happened to 
have received two extra hours of work on five occasions, while having finished two hours 
early on five other days. In all cases colleagues were available to help him, but colleagues 
could also use his help at days he finished early. Participants subsequently read that on all 
five occasions they had observed whether or not Mark had actually helped. We then told 
participant that on the fifth occasion Mark did not help, but played games instead. No 
further information was provided about the other four occasions. Participants in the 
disappointment condition were then asked to imagine that they clearly did not feel angry, 
but disappointed about Mark’s action of yesterday, whereas participants in the anger 
condition were asked to imagine that they clearly did not feel disappointed but angry. 
Participants in the no-emotion condition were not asked to imagine how they felt about 
Mark’s defection. 
 Dependent measures. Our main dependent measure was how often participants 
thought Mark had helped in the first four occasions he had the opportunity. This is a good 
indication of Mark’s initial reputation before his defection on the fifth occasion. After all, 
reputations are judgments based on someone’s cooperative and defective acts in the past. 
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To facilitate comparison with Experiment 3.1, though, we also asked again how just and 
fair (r = .61, p < .001) participants judged Mark to be.  
 
 
3.3.2 Results and discussion 
  
Reputation inferences. One-way ANOVA revealed that our manipulation of 
emotion communicated reputation information, F(2, 72) = 24.72, p < .001, Ș² = .41. 
According to post-hoc tests, participants inferred from anger that Mark’s defection was 
preceded by less cooperation (M = 0.46, SD = 0.58) than they inferred from 
disappointment (M = 2.18, SD = 1.19, p < .001) or no emotion (M = 1.95, SD = 1.08, p < 
.001). The disappointment and no- emotion conditions did not differ (p = .43). Justice 
perceptions mirrored these results, F(2, 72) = 5.13, p = .008, Ș² = .12. Again, Mark was 
judged as more unfair when in response to Mark’s defection anger (M = 2.13, SD = 0.86) 
as opposed to disappointment (M = 2.96, SD = 1.17, p = .006) or no emotion (M = 3.00, 
SD = 1.35, p = .01) was experienced.  
These results provide strong evidence for the idea that reputation positivity is a 
fundamental dimension along which communicated anger and disappointment differ. 
Disappointment, then, conveys that someone had a positive initial reputation before 
committing defection, whereas anger conveys that someone has a less positive or negative 
initial reputation before committing defection. 
 
 
3.4 EXPERIMENT 3.3: JUSTIFIED VERSUS UNJUSTIFIED DEFECTION AND 
ANGER VERSUS DISAPPOINTMENT 
 
  Experiment 3.1 showed that moral emotions signal whose motives for defection 
are just and unjust, such that they can be reciprocated accordingly. Experiment 3.2 showed 
that when someone commits an unjustified defection, disappointment communicates this 
person to have a more positive reputation than anger does. In Experiment 3.3 our aim was 
to replicate and extend both findings by using a new paradigm that also allows us to rule 
out some alternative explanations. 
 Again we predict that moral emotions help to reciprocate unjustified defection 
with justified defection and that such justified defection is met with more cooperation than 
when no emotion would be communicated. However, whereas in Experiment 3.1 
participants had to respond to justified defection, we will now let them respond to 
unjustified defection. Consequently, participants should infer from the communication of 
anger and disappointment as opposed to no emotion that their recipient has defected and 
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was not justified in doing so. They should then also be more likely to respond with 
defection. Furthermore, because in the anger and disappointment conditions this defection 
would then be justified, participants should expect that the choice behavior of future 
donors would show relatively much approval of defection compared to cooperation, 
whereas this would not be the case in the no-emotion condition. The person who 
communicates emotion now also fulfils a different role than in Experiment 3.1. This 
person will be an observer who has acquired unique information about the reputation of the 
person that committed unjustified defection. We then expect participants to infer from this 
observer’s expression of moral emotion, as in Experiment 3.2, that the reputation of a 
defector is more positive when disappointment as opposed to anger is communicated.  
All in all, this new paradigm has several advantages. First, replicating the results 
of Experiment 3.1 in a situation where both people who communicate and receive 
emotional information have different roles testifies to the generalizability of our findings 
and to the flexibility of moral emotions as lubricants in indirect reciprocity in general. 
Second, unlike Experiment 3.1, we will not begin the experiment by measuring emotions 
in response to other people’s choice behavior, thereby ruling out any priming effects and 
demand characteristics of this first questionnaire. Third, whereas participants in 
Experiment 3.2 had to imagine that they themselves would feel angry or disappointed, 
participants now have to make inferences about other people’s communicated anger and 
disappointment. And fourth, whereas in Experiment 3.1 participants were informed that 
their recipient had defected, we did not provide this information in Experiment 3.3. Thus, 
if we replicated the findings of Experiment 3.1 and 3.2 by providing even less information 
to participants and introducing several methodological refinements that contribute to a 
more conservative test of our hypotheses, then this would deliver strong support for the 
idea that moral emotions are essential lubricants in indirect reciprocity. 
 
 
3.4.1 Method 
 
Participants and experimental design. Participants were 79 undergraduate 
students (26 men, 53 women; Mage = 19.86) who participated voluntarily in exchange for 
course credits. Participants were randomly assigned to the disappointment, anger, or no-
emotion conditions.  
Procedure. Participants entering the laboratory were welcomed and seated in 
separate cubicles behind a computer. We told them that in this experiment they would have 
to make financial decisions that would affect how many lottery tickets they would receive 
in a raffle with several ¼10 prizes. Participants could donate up to ten lottery tickets in 
each trial to other participants, who would then receive twice the number of donated 
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tickets. We explained that their chance to win a prize was independent of how many tickets 
other participants had accumulated. As in Experiments 3.1 and 3.2, this makes cooperation 
through indirect reciprocity possible, because donating tickets reduces one’s chances of 
winning a prize, but pays off when it is reciprocated by a third party.  
In the first part of the experiment we created a situation in which a person would 
supposedly obtain reputation information that the participant would not have. Because this 
person would also communicate anger or disappointment in the second part of the 
experiment, we could test if participants indeed inferred a more positive or less negative 
reputation from disappointment than from anger. In the first part, participants were 
therefore allegedly at random appointed to the role of observer in a sequential give-some 
dilemma between two other participants. In this game, one participant, named person K, 
would first get three opportunities to donate up to ten lottery tickets to the other, named 
person L. Person L would subsequently get three opportunities to donate tickets back to 
person K. All donated tickets would be doubled. Participants observed that both persons 
got forty lottery tickets and that in each of the first three trials person K donated eight out 
of ten tickets to person L. Participants did not get to see how many tickets in each of the 
following three trials person L donated back to person K, but person K did allegedly get to 
see this. The task was repeatedly interrupted with short delays to make participants believe 
that the computer connected to the server to transfer the information.  
In the second part of the experiment participants played an indirect reciprocity 
game. They therefore received, like person K and L before, forty tickets. After a short wait, 
we told them that person L was given another opportunity to donate lottery tickets, this 
time to another unknown participant from a previous research session. Person L could 
decide to either donate 0 or 10 tickets and this amount would be doubled. Person K was 
said to have secretly observed person L’s decision. Participants would then get the 
opportunity to help person L by donating any number of tickets between 0 and 10. An 
unknown participant from a future session would get the opportunity to help the 
participant.  
This explanation of the second part was followed by the emotion manipulation. 
Person K, who the participant thought had seen all of person L’s decisions, would 
communicate to the participant how he or she felt about person L’s decision in the indirect 
reciprocity game. After a short wait, participants in the anger condition read that person K 
felt angry about person L’s decision whereas participants in the disappointment condition 
read that person K felt disappointed. In the no-emotion condition no such information was 
provided. Next, the dependent variables were measured and finally the participants were 
debriefed, thanked and paid. One week later the winners of the lottery were announced. 
Dependent measures. After the emotion manipulation we first asked whether 
participants thought that person L had decided to cooperate with the participant from the 
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previous session (-7 = definitely not, 0 = no idea, 7 = definitely so) and if person L was 
perceived as just and fair (1 = totally disagree, 7 = totally agree; r = .69, p < .001). 
Subsequently, we asked participants how many tickets they would want to donate to 
person L. We also measured if participants believed that the participant from a future 
session would help them in case they would have donated 0 tickets and in case they would 
have donated 10 tickets (1 = totally disagree, 7 = totally agree). For both questions 
participants had to assume that this future participant would have the same information 
about person K and L as they themselves had. This allowed us to measure expectations of 
future cooperation while controlling for participants’ actual donations. Next, we measured 
how positive a reputation participants believed that person L had obtained in the first part 
of the experiment. We therefore asked how many lottery tickets participants thought that 
person L had donated back to person K in trials four, five and six during the first task (Į = 
.93). Finally, we administered two manipulation checks by asking to what extent person K 
felt disappointed and angry about person L’s decision toward the participant from the 
previous session. 
 
 
3.4.2 Results 
  
Manipulation checks. If our emotion manipulation was successful we should 
find an interaction between the emotion that was communicated and participants’ 
perceptions of the emotion that was communicated. That is, participants should fill out 
higher scores for the emotion that person K communicated than for the other emotions (a 
within-participants check) and reported disappointment should be highest in the 
disappointment condition whereas reported anger should be highest in the anger condition 
(a between-participants check). A 3 (emotion: disappointment vs. anger vs. no emotion) × 
2 (rating: disappointment vs. anger) did indeed yield an interaction, F(2, 73) = 23.36, p < 
.001, Șp² = .39. Planned comparisons showed that participants in the anger condition rated 
person K as more angry (M = 5.58) than did participants in the disappointment (M = 3.54, 
p < .001) or no-emotion condition (M = 3.41, p < .001). Also, participants in the 
disappointment condition rated person K as more disappointed (M = 5.50) than did 
participants in the no-emotion condition (M = 3.85, p < .001). The difference between the 
disappointment rating in the disappointment and anger conditions was marginally 
significant (Mdisappointment = 5.52, Manger = 5.03, p = .089). Furthermore, paired-sample t tests 
revealed that the participants’ in the disappointment condition rated person K as 
significantly more disappointed than angry (p < .001) and that participants in the anger 
condition rated person K as significantly more angry than disappointed (p = .02). 
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Table 3.3: Means (and standard deviations) of participants’ own cooperation, 
expected cooperation from the next person in the chain and inferences about person 
L. 
Communicated Emotion Dependent Variable 
Disappointment Anger No Emotion 
Inferred Cooperation  
Decision L 
-3.44a 
(2.40) 
-3.33a 
(2.75) 
3.41c 
(2.62) 
Justice Perceptions L 3.12a 
(0.85) 
3.22a 
(0.81) 
4.10b 
(0.45) 
Donated Lottery Tickets 5.72a 
(2.35) 
5.75a 
(2.66) 
7.19b 
(2.09) 
Expected Cooperation 
When Donating 10 
Tickets 
5.20a 
(1.12) 
4.83a 
(1.43) 
5.90b 
(0.60) 
Expected Cooperation 
When Donating 0 
Tickets 
2.84a 
(1.43) 
3.33a 
(1.69) 
2.63a 
(1.86) 
Reputation 18.21a 
(5.59) 
14.83b 
(7.87) 
22.85c 
(3.50) 
Note. Higher scores indicate higher cooperation, reputation and justice ratings. Means in the same row without 
identical subscripts differ at p < .05.  
 
Cooperation and emotion inferences. Did anger and disappointment signal 
unjustified defection? A one-way ANOVA showed that they did, F(2, 73) = 59.88, p < 
.001, Ș² = .62 (for means and standard deviations of Experiment 3.3, see Table 3.3). 
According to post-hoc tests, participants estimated it less likely that person L had 
cooperated when disappointment or anger (Mdisappointment = -3.44, Manger = -3.33) rather than 
no emotion was communicated (M = 3.41, both ps < .001). That anger and disappointment 
scores deviated from the midpoint of the scale (tanger = -7.17, tdisappointment = -5.95, both ps < 
.001) is additional evidence that participants inferred defection. Moreover, a one-way 
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ANOVA on justice judgments showed the same pattern, F(2, 73) = 14.46, p < .001, Ș² = 
.28. Person L was perceived as less fair when anger or disappointment were communicated 
(Mdisappointment = 3.12, Manger = 3.22) as opposed to no emotion (M = 4.10, both ps < .001), 
thereby indicating that person L’s defection was unjustified. 
 Did participants meet this unjustified defection by defecting themselves? A one-
way ANOVA indeed showed a main effect of emotion, F(2, 73) = 3.26, p = .04, Ș² = .08. 
Post-hoc tests revealed that disappointment and anger about person L led participants to 
cooperate less with this person (Manger = 5.75, Mdisappointment = 5.72) than when no emotion 
was communicated (M = 7.19, both ps = .03). Hence, participants responded to 
communicated anger and disappointment with defection. 
Finally, when comparing the anger and disappointment conditions to the no-
emotion condition, the choice behavior that participants expected from their future donor 
should be relatively favorable if they would have defected instead of cooperated. A 3 
(emotion) × 2 (participants’ decision: cooperation vs. defection) mixed-model ANOVA 
indeed yielded this interaction, F(2, 73) = 4.05, p = .01, Șp² = .12. Interestingly, simple-
effect analyses showed that participants’ defection seemed not so much encouraged by 
their expectation of a cooperative response (F[2, 73] = 1.16, p = .32) but rather by their 
expectation of a relatively uncooperative response if they would have cooperated, F(2, 73) 
= 6.40, p = .003, Ș² = .15. Accordingly, post-hoc tests showed that when anger or 
disappointment was communicated, participants expected their cooperation to be met with 
less cooperation than when no emotion was communicated (panger = .001, pdisappointment = 
.02). Thus, when deciding how to respond to unjustified defection, communicated anger 
and disappointment make the option of cooperation less attractive and as such encourage 
justified defection. 
Experiment 3.3 has thus far provided additional evidence for every hypothesis 
tested in Experiment 3.1. To replicate the main finding of Experiment 3.2 that 
disappointment communicates a more positive initial reputation than anger does, we 
conducted a one-way ANOVA on the number of lottery tickets that participants believed 
person L had donated in the first part of the experiment. This yielded a main effect of 
emotion, F(2, 73) = 12.13, p < .001, Ș² = .25. Post-hoc tests revealed that participants 
inferred a more positive initial reputation when disappointment (M = 18.21) versus anger 
(M = 14.83) was communicated, p = .047. Furthermore, when no emotion was 
communicated such that participants had no reason to assume defection in the first place, 
person L’s inferred initial reputation was higher (M = 22.85) than when anger or 
disappointment was communicated (panger < .001, pdisappointment = .003).  
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3.5 GENERAL DISCUSSION 
 
Our studies support the central hypothesis that the display of moral emotions 
allows people to distinguish when defection is justified and unjustified in indirect 
reciprocity and act accordingly. When moral anger or disappointment was communicated, 
people tended to (a) infer that an unjustified defection had been committed, (b) retaliate 
against this defector by defecting, and (c) respond with cooperation to such justified 
defection. We also showed that disappointment signaled a defector to have a more positive 
reputation than did anger. Our results thus show that moral emotions function as 
indispensable lubricants of indirect reciprocity that allow people to assess, communicate 
and act upon the reputations of others. Below, we will further outline and elaborate on our 
findings and subsequently discuss contributions and implications of our research, as well 
as possible limitations and avenues for future research. 
 
 
3.5.1 Summary of findings 
 
We began by showing that defection in indirect reciprocity does indeed elicit 
anger and disappointment (Experiment 3.1). Moreover, these emotions were stronger when 
witnessing defection against a cooperator than when witnessing defection against a 
defector. Because the latter instance of defection is more justified, this provides evidence 
that anger and disappointment differentiate between unjustified and justified defection. 
Note that these potent emotional reactions were evoked even though participants did not 
experience any direct disadvantage from the completely anonymous defection they 
observed. This defection, that did not harm participants’ interests, therefore qualifies in 
Haidt’s (2003) terms as a disinterested elicitor. Because a defining characteristics of moral 
emotions is that they are triggered by such disinterested elicitors (Haidt, 2003), our 
findings not only attest to the functionality of moral anger or outrage, but also introduce 
disappointment as a potential moral emotion. Moreover, disappointment over defection 
could not have been reported for strategic reasons, was even reported at higher intensities 
than was moral anger or than when no moral transgression was present and did not merely 
reflect the experience of non-discrete negative affect. These findings further increase the 
credibility of disappointment as an other-condemning moral emotion. 
Anger and disappointment are not merely a private reaction to unjustified 
defection, however. Experiments 3.1 and 3.3 showed that they also fulfil an important 
communicative and regulatory function in indirect reciprocity. First, the display of moral 
anger and disappointment makes publicly known who has stooped to defection. Second, 
such moral disapproval signals that the rightful response is to defect and, indeed, this is 
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what participants did. Finally, the moral motivation behind this defection encouraged an 
equally moral response: cooperation. Moral anger and disappointment thus signal who 
defected and why, so that unjust motives can be met with defection and just motives with 
cooperation. This enables people to establish cooperation through indirect reciprocity. 
Why at least two separate emotions deal with defection in indirect reciprocity was 
shown in Experiments 3.2 and 3.3. Indirect reciprocity is a game of reputations and these 
may vary considerably between people. Consequently, effective ways of dealing with 
unjustified defection may also vary. When people with a negative reputation defect yet 
again, a forceful, antagonistic response like anger may be required, whereas people with a 
positive reputation may only need to hear that they did not live up to their precious 
reputation. Accordingly, people inferred that a defector had a more positive initial 
reputation when disappointment as opposed to anger was communicated. The previous 
findings that people who express disappointment instead of anger are perceived to be more 
pro-socially motivated (Lelieveld, et al., 2009) and forgiving rather than retaliatory 
(Wubben et al., 2009a) also follow from our idea that disappointed people still envision 
their interaction partner as relatively valuable, reputable and worthy of future cooperation. 
We also obtained an interesting finding that we did not specifically predict: 
people cared about unjustified cooperation, too. In Experiment 3.1, cooperation with a 
defector elicited more disappointment than cooperation with a cooperator did. 
Furthermore, in Experiment 3.3 people feared that if they would cooperate with a defector, 
others would in turn defect against them. These findings, however, are not unprecedented 
in indirect reciprocity theory, which, in fact, has identified conditions under which 
defection in response to unjustified cooperation can be an established norm that promotes 
cooperation (Ohtsuki & Iwasa, 2004; 2006; Nowak & Sigmund, 2005). Apparently, then, 
moral anger and disappointment are not triggered specifically by unjustified defection, but 
rather by any deterioration of reputation. With that being said, unjustified defection did 
emerge as the cardinal transgression. In Experiment 3.1, it elicited more anger and 
disappointment than unjustified cooperation did. In Experiment 3.3 participants explicitly 
indicated that anger and disappointment was a clear sign of unjustified defection and not of 
unjustified cooperation. 
Thus, whereas defection against unjustified cooperation might be justifiable, such a norm 
does not prove as widespread as refusal to cooperate with defectors. 
 
 
3.5.2 Implications and contributions 
 
 Indirect reciprocity has been studied mainly by economists, biologists and game 
theorists. This has yielded convincing evidence that indirect reciprocity can establish 
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cooperation, as is also evident from the increasing popularity of reputation mechanisms to 
regulate anonymous one-shot business transactions (e.g., in web-based auctions). 
Psychologists may contribute by elucidating in what situations and how exactly people 
process which specific input to successfully deal with situations of indirect reciprocity. As 
it turns out, having exhaustive, descriptive information of who cooperated with who is 
insufficient input for people to distinguish situations in which defection is justified versus 
unjustified (Milinski et al., 2001). Having complementary information about moral 
emotions experienced by other people is at least as useful. Moral emotions provide 
information about the motives behind people’s behavior, making that defection may 
actually be perceived as fair and in that case be met with cooperation. The nuance, then, 
that not only actual behavior, but also its perceived underlying motivation influences 
people’s decisions to cooperate opens up indirect reciprocity even more to future 
psychological study.  
Although cooperation has received little psychological attention in situations of 
indirect reciprocity, it has been widely studied in situations called social dilemmas. Social 
dilemmas include problems such as deforestation, the emission of greenhouse gases and 
free-riding on the efforts of others in team projects and have in common that acting in 
one’s individual interest damages the collective interest (Weber et al., 2004). Both social 
dilemmas and indirect reciprocity therefore take place in groups, but in indirect reciprocity 
defective acts can be intentionally directed at specific defectors whereas in social 
dilemmas they disadvantage the whole group, including its cooperators. Cooperation 
therefore typically breaks down over time during later trials in social dilemmas, unless 
these trials are alternated with indirect reciprocity trials, so that defectors in the social 
dilemma can be singled out and defected against (Milinski, Semmann, & Krambeck, 2002; 
Rockenbach & Milinski, 2006; see also Fehr, 2004; Panchanathan & Boyd, 2004). We 
show that such instances of justified defection are driven and coordinated by moral 
emotions. And, importantly, in social dilemmas moral emotions can, unlike justified 
defection, actually be directed at specific individuals (Wubben, De Cremer, & Van Dijk, 
2009c). Display of moral emotions in social dilemmas may therefore, despite its lack of 
scholarly attention, increase cooperation to the high levels typically observed in indirect 
reciprocity. More specifically, cooperation may increase because moral emotions allow 
group members to show their dissatisfaction with a defector through more appropriate 
ways than defecting (Xiao & Houser, 2005). Furthermore, compared to defection, moral 
emotions could more effectively rally support for structural solutions such as punishing, 
sanctioning or excluding specific defectors (Fehr & Fischbacher, 2003; Fehr & Gächter, 
2000; Mulder, Van Dijk, De Cremer, & Wilke, 2006; Ouwerkerk, Kerr, Gallucci, & Van 
Lange, 2004; Yamagishi, 1986). And finally, moral emotions may avert a negative spiral 
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of defection by communicating that one’s own defection is solely motivated by getting 
defectors to repent and is therefore merely of a temporary nature.  
These virtues of moral emotions may be met with reticence by those who advise 
caution when labelling emotions, and particularly anger, as moral (Batson et al., 2009; 
Batson et al., 2007; Montada & Schneider, 1989). Batson and colleagues point out that the 
critical elicitor of moral anger—the violation of a moral standard—has never been 
disentangled from the victim’s relevance to one’s own identity. In fact, when they did 
disentangle both elicitors, they found that the moral violation of torture only aroused 
considerable anger when the identity of the victim was relevant to the participants and not 
when it was irrelevant—even though both violations were judged as equally immoral. 
Consequently, what has always been studied as moral anger might instead actually be 
identity-relevant personal anger. Our research may help remove such doubts about 
whether sincere moral anger or moral outrage really exists. This is because in Experiment 
3.1 we do find, unlike Batson and colleagues, strong evidence of moral anger. Defection is 
more morally justified against a defector than against a cooperator and indeed elicited less 
anger. But, importantly, the relevance of the victim’s identity and the amount of inflicted 
harm were kept equal in both cases and therefore do not present an alternative explanation 
for the emergence of moral anger. Batson and colleagues (2009) noted that such a finding, 
combined with theirs, would be evidence that moral anger exists, but is conditional. That 
is, whereas moral judgments are applied universally, moral emotions are aroused only 
when the violation harms an identity-relevant person. This conditional nature of moral 
anger may be beneficial given that anger is highly energy-consuming (Cannon, 1929), but 
the downside of this may be that, for example, charities should not count on moral anger to 
motivate donations to victims of injustice as long as these victims are perceived as 
irrelevant to the donor’s identity. 
Though the present results show, as with moral anger, that the violation of a moral 
standard is the critical elicitor of moral disappointment too, the more pressing theoretical 
question at hand is how moral disappointment fits in with the three other moral emotions 
that may be experienced when witnessing a transgression: contempt, anger and disgust 
(Haidt, 2003). Rozin, Lowery, Imada and Haidt (1999) have presented evidence that these 
three emotions map cleanly onto three different moral domains: Community, Autonomy 
and Divinity. Consequently, violations of communal codes elicit contempt, violations of 
individual rights elicit anger and violations of purity or sanctity elicit disgust. Should this 
so-called CAD-hypothesis be extended with a fourth domain to accommodate 
disappointment? We believe not. Disappointment is an emotional reaction to any type of 
unfulfilled positive expectations (Van Dijk & Van Harreveld, 2008) and therefore not 
specific to any moral domain. A minor moral violation by someone with a positive 
reputation in one of the three domains may then be satisfactorily addressed with 
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disappointment. Community, autonomy or divinity violations by frequent defectors can 
then, as the CAD-hypothesis states, be met with, respectively, the more drastic emotions of 
contempt, anger, or disgust. 
 
 
3.5.3 Possible limitations and future research 
 
Before closing with some avenues for future research, we wish to discuss a 
possible limitation to our findings: there was no face-to-face interaction. We decided 
against a procedure with face-to-face interaction to maintain full experimental control, thus 
increasing our confidence in a causal link between the communication of moral emotions 
and cooperation in indirect reciprocity. Caution is therefore advised when generalizing 
these results. However, as is evident from reputation-based e-commerce, indirect 
reciprocity often occurs without face-to-face interaction and information about third parties 
is frequently obtained through media such as e-mail, short message services (SMS), web 
logs and letters, all of which bear resemblance to our experimental procedures (Dellarocas, 
2003; Ling, 2008; McGrath & Hollingshead, 1994; Solove, 2007). Moreover, research 
paradigms similar to ours have produced findings that have been replicated when emotions 
were communicated non-verbally (Pietroni, et al., 2008, see also Van Kleef et al., 2009) or 
in face-to-face settings (Sinaceur & Tiedens, 2006). Thus, we have no a priori reasons to 
doubt the external validity of our findings, but future research on the generalizability of 
emotion effects in indirect reciprocity would nevertheless be desirable. 
Other avenues for future research also readily present themselves. Moral emotions 
communicate whose reputations are positive and negative and how the latest events 
changed them. Would emotion intensity then communicate the magnitude of this change? 
And would changes in an intermediate reputation elicit a mixed emotion? Can emotion 
information also lead to a reinterpretation of someone’s motives for previous defections? If 
anger and disappointment, both other-condemning moral emotions, affect reputations 
negatively, do other-praising moral emotions such as gratitude, admiration and elevation 
then affect reputations positively (cf. Haidt, 2003; Algoe & Haidt, 2009)? Are particularly 
stubborn defectors that need to be excluded because they undermine the whole community 
identified through contempt instead of anger or disappointment (cf. Fischer & Roseman, 
2007; Rozin et al., 1999)? How do emotions regulate reputations when opportunities to 
cooperate are not symmetrical (cf. Keltner, Van Kleef, Chen & Kraus, 2008)? And can the 
reputation dynamics that underlie indirect reciprocity be interpreted in terms of the insights 
that the emerging literature on gossip has to offer (cf. Baumeister, Zhang, Vohs, 2004; 
Beersma & Van Kleef, 2009; Dunbar, 2004 Emler, 1994; Foster, 2004)? Answers to these 
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questions may shed further light on perhaps the most important mechanism for 
cooperation: indirect reciprocity. 
 
 
3.5.4 Conclusion 
 
Indirect reciprocity can establish cooperation. Evolutionary game theory proves 
this and everyday observation verifies it. Now it is up to the social sciences to solve the 
puzzles that separate both extremes. We embarked on this undertaking by showing how 
people manage to defect against defectors without unleashing a chain reaction of defection. 
For this it has to be clear not only that someone has defected, but also why. Moral 
emotions communicate both. As a result, justified and unjustified defections can be 
distinguished, reputations reassessed and decisions to cooperate reconsidered. Thus, moral 
emotions appear indispensable lubricants of indirect reciprocity: they allow just motives to 
be reciprocated with cooperation and unjust motives with defection. 
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CHAPTER 4 
 
4. WHEN EMOTIONS OF OTHERS AFFECT DECISIONS IN 
PUBLIC GOOD DILEMMAS: AN INSTRUMENTAL VIEW9 
 
4.1 INTRODUCTION 
 
In our lives we belong to many groups. Whereas these groups serve many of our 
interests, it is also true that on many occasions our individual interests conflict with the 
collective interest of the group. Research on social dilemmas investigates people’s 
decisions when individual and collective interests collide (for reviews, see e.g. Messick & 
Brewer, 1983; Weber et al., 2004). Consider the situation in which a group wants to 
provide a public good, that is, a good that may benefit all members, even those who do not 
contribute to its provision. Often such public goods can only be achieved if the 
contributions surpass a certain threshold or provision point. In such a situation, individuals 
may be tempted to free-ride on the contributions of others by refraining from contributing 
themselves. But if every group member follows this strategy of self-interest, the 
contributions will fall short and the public good will not be provided. 
Whereas people often think of public good dilemmas as pertaining to large scale 
settings such as the issue of contributing to reduce the CO2 emission, many public good 
dilemmas that people face, such as team projects, take place in small group settings (see 
e.g., Hart & Van Vugt, 2006; Kerr, 1989). In such public good dilemmas group members 
often want to coordinate how much each member will contribute to the provision of the 
public good (Van Dijk & Wilke, 1993). The most obvious way of coordination is through 
intragroup discussion and extensive research has indeed shown that this increases the 
collective outcome (e.g., Dawes, van de Kragt, & Orbell, 1990; Kerr & Kaufman-
Gilliland, 1994). However, often it is not feasible to solve public good dilemmas this way, 
making that group members are encouraged to find more implicit ways of coordination. 
Examples of cues used for tacit coordination are group members’ endowment sizes (Van 
Dijk & Wilke, 1995), their social value orientation (De Kwaadsteniet, van Dijk, Wit, & De 
Cremer, 2006) and their use of reciprocity (Komorita et al., 1992).  
In the present article, however, we argue that an important, socially informative 
cue has not been examined yet in public good dilemmas: The emotions displayed by the 
other group members. We posit that the emotions that group members communicate allow 
people to infer whether or not the group can be expected to act fairly. These inferences 
subsequently affect people’s decisions in social dilemmas. We will argue and demonstrate 
                                                          
9
 This chapter is based on Wubben, De Cremer, & Van Dijk (2008) 
                                                                                                                  Chapter 4 
 
 62
that particularly the emotions of those who are most instrumental in providing the public 
good (i.e., those who have most resources available) will be influential.  
 
 
4.1.1 Communicated emotion as a socially informative cue in public good dilemmas 
 
The question of what exactly emotions are has been subjected to extensive 
research. Keltner and Gross (1999) define emotions as “episodic, relatively short-term 
biologically based patterns of perception, experience, physiology, action, and 
communication that occur in response to specific physical and social challenges and 
opportunities” (p. 468). However, relative to the amount of research that has been done on 
the structure of emotions, the question of whether emotions also influence social 
interactions has been vastly underrepresented. Only recently, researchers have started to 
focus on the potential of emotions to regulate and coordinate social interactions (i.e., a 
functional account; Keltner & Gross, 1999). In particular, researchers have acknowledged 
that someone communicating an emotion may signal certain intentions to the other 
interaction partner(s), who could subsequently take these into account for his or her future 
actions.  
Recent work by Van Kleef and colleagues (2004a) illustrates this point very 
clearly. These authors presented participants with a two-player negotiation paradigm in 
which the simulated negotiation opponent communicated either anger or happiness. Their 
results showed that participants adjusted their demand level accordingly. When anger was 
expressed, participants placed lower demands and made more concessions, while the 
opposite tendency occurred when happiness was communicated. Van Kleef et al. (2004) 
theorized that as an angry opponent could not be expected to make any (further) 
concessions, the only way to prevent the negotiation from ending in an impasse would be 
by making concessions oneself. In contrast, participants should infer from happiness that 
there was no threat to reaching an agreement, so that the necessity to concede would be 
lower. In concordance with this explanation, they showed that this effect of communicated 
emotion on demand level was mediated by the inferred limits of the negotiation partner. In 
short, these studies clearly show that in interdependent social interactions people readily 
use communicated emotions to make inferences, which are then used as the basis for 
subsequent actions (see also Van Kleef et al., 2006). 
The above studies were conducted in dyadic negotiation settings. In the current 
article, we aim to investigate whether a functional account of emotions may also be 
applied to public good dilemmas – another type of mixed-motive situation (Komorita & 
Parks, 1994). More specifically, will people pay attention to emotions that fellow group 
members express about, for example, the collective contributions in a team project? Will 
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people find it useful to know the emotions of a chairperson in a club concerning the 
contributions of other volunteers or the contributions of all financiers? We expect that they 
will, because emotions signal justice intentions which are important for future decision-
making within the group (De Cremer et al., 2007). In work teams, for example, people may 
infer from emotions that their group members are unlikely to arrive at a fair distribution of 
tasks and that as a result they would have to do an unfair amount of work to make the team 
project a success. This may lead them to take rigorous actions, such as leaving the group 
(see below). Furthermore, because more actors are involved in public good dilemmas than 
in dyadic negotiation settings, group members are typically less certain about how much 
the others will contribute, making coordination more of an issue. Hence, the display of an 
emotion by a group member can be expected to be an even more informative cue in such a 
situation.  
 
 
4.1.2 Anger and guilt as coordination means in social dilemmas 
 
In the current studies we will focus on two discrete emotions that have been 
shown to predict actions in social dilemmas: anger (Stouten et al., 2005) and guilt 
(Ketelaar & Au, 2003). As we will argue below, both anger and guilt elicit justice related 
inferences. Therefore we will examine whether these inferences mediate the effects of 
these two emotions on decision-making in public good dilemmas.  
Anger can be briefly defined as the emotion that is being provoked by “a 
demeaning offense against me and mine” (Lazarus, 1991, p. 222). An offense is 
particularly demeaning when it is inconsiderate, arbitrary or malevolent (Lazarus, 1991). 
From a functional perspective, anger serves to rectify injustice (Lerner & Tiedens, 2006; 
Solomon, 1990). Thus, when in a group a person communicates anger, one may infer that 
an unfair act has happened (De Cremer, Wubben, & Brebels, 2008). Indeed, in social 
dilemma settings it has been consistently shown that self-interested, defective behavior 
elicits anger in group members (e.g., Dawes et al., 1977; Schroeder, Steel, Woodell and 
Bembenek, 2003), which subsequently motivates them to take retributive measures against 
the defector (De Kwaadsteniet, Van Dijk, Wit, & De Cremer, in press; Stouten et al., 
2006). Thus, a group member who is angry may not be expected to contribute many 
resources to the common pool, seeing that this would only encourage even more 
exploitative behavior. So when anger is communicated to a third group member, this 
person may not expect the others to strive for a fair contribution to the public good in the 
near future – at least not until the defector has diametrically changed his or her behavior. 
When guilt is communicated on the other hand, the opposite prediction can be 
made about the anticipated justice in the group. Guilt can briefly be described as the 
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emotion that is experienced after “having transgressed a moral imperative” (Lazarus, 1991, 
p. 240). Thus, unlike anger, guilt communicates that it is not another person but one self 
who is responsible for a detrimental or unfair action toward the other group members. And 
with it, it communicates an intention to repair this deleterious action (Baumeister et al., 
1994; Keltner & Buswell, 1997). Thus, when in a public good dilemma guilt is 
communicated to a third group member, this person will infer that the transgressor is out to 
restore justice in the group (Ketelaar & Au, 2003; Schroeder et al., 2003). It can be 
concluded, then, that communicated guilt will lead a third party to anticipate a higher level 
of justice in the group than when anger is communicated. 
Will the emotion of any group member have a similar effect on one’s justice 
inferences and decisions? Or, will it depend on the extent to which the group member 
communicating the emotion is instrumental in providing the public good? In social 
dilemmas often group members are not equally influential or powerful (De Cremer, 2007). 
In the social dilemma literature such situations are known as asymmetric public good 
dilemmas, referring to the notion that some members are more instrumental in providing 
the public good than others (Van Dijk & Wilke, 1993). This notion is commonly modelled 
by varying group members’ endowment sizes, effectively making some group members 
“wealthier” than others. Research on such asymmetric dilemmas has revealed that 
differences in endowments make those with high endowments contribute more to the 
public good and feel more critical and influential than those with fewer endowments (De 
Cremer & Van Dijk, 2002; Van Dijk & Wilke, 1995). 
In the present research, we argue that particularly the emotions of the group 
members who are highly instrumental in providing the public good (i.e., wealthy members) 
will influence people’s decisions. The notion that emotions have a function of coordinating 
social interactions suggests that other group members are capable of being responsive to 
the displayed emotions (Keltner & Gross, 1999). In the case of asymmetric step-level 
public good dilemmas, the main reason for coordinating the social interaction is to reach 
the provision point. In this view, it follows that the person who is most instrumental in 
reaching this provision point (that is, the one who possesses the most resources) is most 
important for efficient coordination. Therefore we predict that group members will be 
more responsive to the emotion of a wealthy person than of a person who can contribute 
relatively little to the public good.  
 
 
4.1.3 Behavioral reactions: Exit and democratic leadership 
 
Even though research on public good dilemmas usually focuses on contributions, 
we decided to examine different behavioral reactions. Our reason for doing so is that it 
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may be ambiguous how the anticipated level of justice that is inferred from communicated 
emotions will affect contributions. For example, when one suspects that the group will not 
act fairly, one may either decrease one’s own contributions to avoid being a “sucker”, or 
increase one’s contributions to compensate for the expected low contributions of one’s 
fellow group members. However, research on social dilemmas shows that the anticipated 
level of injustice does unambiguously encourage people’s preference to change the 
structure of the dilemma (Messick et al., 1983; Rutte & Wilke, 1984; Samuelson & 
Messick, 1986; Samuelson, Messick, Rutte, & Wilke, 1984). Therefore we will focus on 
these alternative reactions.  
Even though the anticipated injustice that could be inferred from communicated 
emotion may be dealt with by resorting to structural changes, this does not necessarily 
mean that these changes benefit the group as a whole. That is, structural changes may 
either be situated at the individual or collective level. An important individual structural 
solution may be that people individually decide to withdraw from the situation by leaving 
the group. For example, workers in an industry can decide between pulling together in 
union activities and not doing so, but they may also choose to exit the industry or unit in 
which the organizing efforts are made (Orbell et al., 1984). Moreover, as prior research has 
shown, this decision to exit the situation is particularly likely to be made when unfair 
decision procedures are used or expected (Brockner, Tyler, & Cooper-Schneider, 1992; 
Hirschman, 1970; Olson-Buchanan, 1996). Note however that – especially in small group 
settings – this individual solution may be detrimental to the collective interest. Indeed, if 
too many group members decide to exit the group, then not enough group members will be 
left to reach the provision point and obtain the public good (Van Vugt & Hart, 2004; Van 
Vugt, Jepson, Hart, & De Cremer, 2004).  
In contrast to this individual (and possibly detrimental option) of exiting the 
group, people may also opt for a more constructive structural change for the group as a 
whole by installing a leader (De Cremer, 2000, Messick, 1983; Rutte & Wilke, 1984, 
1985). Because one of the main reasons to implement a leader in these cases is to further 
the collective outcome by preventing any unfair decisions from being made, it follows that 
especially a strong preference will be observed for the adoption of a democratic leader. 
These type of leaders consult other group members before making decisions and can be 
held accountable for their actions or even be replaced if necessary (Bass, 1990). 
Thus, when justice prospects endanger the provision of the public good, group 
members may resort to either opting for an individual structural change such as exiting the 
group – even though this has detrimental consequences for the group – or adopt the more 
positive collective solution of installing a democratic leader. Therefore it is important to 
investigate both preferences for the exit option (Experiment 4.1) and preferences for 
installing a democratic leader (Experiment 4.2). 
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4.2 EXPERIMENT 4.1: EXIT 
 
As discussed before, communicated anger and guilt differ in who is to blame for a 
detrimental action. Therefore we predict that an angry group member is perceived to have 
contributed more to the public good in previous trials than a group member who expresses 
guilt. Also, for the upcoming decision round we expect to find a main effect of emotion, 
such that an angry group member is expected to contribute less to the common pool than a 
group member who communicates guilt.  
According to the instrumental view, the inferences about the single group member 
who communicates the emotion will be particularly consequential for the inferences about 
the group as a whole when this person is able to contribute many endowments to the public 
good. Thus, when anger is communicated, the group will be less perceived to aim for 
justice than when guilt is expressed, but especially when this emotion is displayed by a 
group member with high endowment size. Similarly, when a group member displays 
anger, this will lead to higher preferences to exit the group than when guilt is 
communicated, but, again, particularly when the person expressing this emotion is highly 
instrumental for the provision of the public good. Moreover, we hypothesize that the 
interaction effect of communicated emotion and differences in endowment size on exit 
preferences will be mediated by the anticipated level of justice in the group. 
 
 
4.2.1 Method 
 
Participants and experimental design. Participants were 73 undergraduate 
students at Tilburg University (22 males, 51 females, Mage = 20.25, SD = 2.62) who 
participated in exchange for course credit or a monetary reward of ¼4 (approximately $5). 
The experimental design included the group member’s emotion (anger vs. guilt) and 
endowment size (low vs. high) as between-participants variables. Participants were 
randomly allocated to these experimental conditions. 
Procedure. Upon arrival at the laboratory, participants were welcomed and seated 
in separate cubicles in front of a computer. They were led to believe that they would 
engage in a computer-mediated interaction with other participants.  
Introduction to the public good dilemma. In the present experimental paradigm 
the participants were told that they would be a newcomer to a group that had already been 
playing several trials in a public good dilemma. To enhance the credibility of this 
statement, first an individual filler task was administered while the other group members 
were allegedly “taking decisions in a group”. After approximately ten minutes, participants 
were told that as a newcomer they would now replace another participant in a group that 
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had already been taking decisions. Subsequently, the nature of the public good dilemma 
was explained. Participants were told that sometimes personal interest and collective 
interest are at odds and that they would be placed in such a situation. They would form a 
group of three members (that is, the participant as a newcomer and two old-timers) and 
each of the three group members would possess a certain number of chips. Because the 
identity of group members would not be revealed, each member was denoted by a number. 
More precisely, group member 1 would have 100 chips (i.e., low endowment size), the 
participant would always receive number 2 and an endowment of 200 chips and group 
member 3 would have an endowment of 300 chips (i.e., high endowment size). 
Participants were told that each chip was worth ¼0.10 (approximately $0.12) and that each 
group member had to decide how many chips to contribute to the group. If a total amount 
of 400 or more chips was contributed, every group member would receive an amount of 
200 chips, regardless of their own contributions to the group. Thus, if the threshold would 
be reached, each participant would receive the bonus of 200 chips plus the chips one 
decided not to contribute. However, if the provision point of 400 chips was not reached, no 
bonus was disbursed and participants would only keep the chips they decided not to 
contribute.  
Manipulations. After the explanation of the public good dilemma, participants 
were instructed by means of a pre-programmed message on the computer to open an 
envelope that had just been delivered by the experimenter a few minutes earlier. Inside the 
envelope was a form with three questions that had allegedly been filled out by one other 
group member. The first two questions were multiple choice and served to manipulate how 
wealthy the group member communicating the emotion was. The questions “Which group 
member are you?” and “What is the maximum number of chips that you received to 
contribute in each round?” were filled out with “1” and “100” respectively in the condition 
where the group member communicating the emotion had a low endowment size and with 
“3” and “300” respectively in the high endowment size condition. Then, the emotion 
manipulation followed by means of the third question. The exact formulation of this 
question was: “As you have been working with this group for several rounds, we want to 
ask you the following: How do you feel with respect to how the contributions to the 
collective pool are developing?” Depending on whether guilt or anger was manipulated, 
the answer of the alleged group member read: “I feel rather guilty/angry about the way 
things are going here”. 
Dependent measures. Inferences about the past and future contributions of the 
group member communicating the emotion were measured using two items: “I think that 
the group member from whom I received the envelope has contributed many of his or her 
chips in the previous trials” and “I think that the group member from whom I received the 
envelope intends to contribute few of his or her chips to the public good”. To assess the 
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participants’ anticipated level of justice in the group, they were asked the following 
question: “I think this group will set out to achieve a fair contribution of chips”. In line 
with Van Vugt and Hart (2004), we measured exit preferences as follows: “Due to the 
specific events I experienced, I would rather exit the group”. It was made clear that 
participants would retain their chips if they chose to exit the group. These four items were 
all measured on a scale ranging from 1 = totally disagree to 7 = totally agree. To assess 
whether the manipulation of the person who communicated the emotion was effective, 
participants were asked to indicate from which group member they had received an 
envelope and how high that person’s endowment size was. Following Tiedens (2001), 
participants rated the message they received from their fellow group member on a variety 
of emotions including the focal emotions anger and guilt (1 = not at all angry/guilty, 7 = 
very much angry/guilty). Finally, participants were thoroughly debriefed, paid and thanked. 
 
 
4.2.2 Results 
 
Manipulation checks. Participant’s ratings of the fellow group member’s 
emotions were submitted to a 2 (group member’s emotion: angry vs. guilty) × 2 
(endowment size: low vs. high) ANOVA, revealing only a significant main effect of group 
member’s emotion. That is, when participants to whom guilt was communicated were 
asked after their fellow group member’s emotion, they reported that the group member felt 
more guilty (M = 6.30, SD = 1.66) than participants in the angry group member condition 
(M = 1.94, SD = 1.15); F(1, 69) = 164.40, p < .001, η² = .70. Likewise, the group member 
was perceived to be more angry by participants to whom anger (M = 6.25, SD = 1.42) as 
opposed to guilt (M = 3.41, SD = 1.14) was expressed, F(1, 69) = 87.69, p < .001, η² = .56. 
Finally, it may be noted that participants rated their group member’s emotions significantly 
above the midpoint of the 7-point Likert scale on the corresponding checks, both when 
anger was communicated (M = 6.25, SD = 1.42, t = 9.50, p < .001) and when guilt was 
expressed (M = 6.30, SD = 1.66, t = 8.40 p < .001). 
 To check whether the manipulation of the group member’s endowment size was 
successful, we examined whether participants could recall which group member 
communicated the emotion and how large his or her endowment size was. Out of the 73 
participants, 70 (95.9%) answered both questions correctly. 
 Inferred contributions. A 2 (emotion: angry vs. guilty) × 2 (endowment size: 
low vs. high) ANOVA on the item measuring inferred contributions in previous trials 
yielded only a significant main effect of emotion, F(1, 69) = 51.09, p < .001, η² = .42. A 
group member who expressed anger was believed to have contributed more of his or her 
chips to the public good in previous trials (M = 5.11, SD = 1.67) than a group member 
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communicating guilt (M = 2.62, SD = 1.28). A 2 (emotion: angry vs. guilty) × 2 
(endowment size: low vs. high) ANOVA on the item measuring expected contributions in 
the upcoming trial also revealed, as predicted, only a main effect of emotion, but now in 
the opposite direction, F(1, 69) = 8.85, p < .005, η² = .11. That is, a group member who 
expressed anger was expected to contribute less of his or her chips to the public good in 
the upcoming trial (M = 5.03, SD = 1.83) than a group member who communicated guilt 
(M = 3.70, SD = 1.94) 
Inferred justice in the group. The item measuring to what extent the group was 
perceived to aim for a fair contribution of chips was submitted to a 2 (emotion: angry vs. 
guilty) × 2 (endowment size: low vs. high) ANOVA. First, a main effect of emotion was 
found, F(1, 69) = 4.00, p < .05, η² = .05: when anger was communicated, participants 
expected the group to behave less fairly in the future (M = 3.53, SD = 1.50) than 
participants in the guilt condition (M = 4.08, SD = 1.19). A main effect was also obtained 
for endowment size, F(1, 69) = 6.41 p < .05, η² = .08, indicating that these justice 
judgments were more positive in the low (M = 4.16, SD = 1.34) as opposed to the high 
endowment size condition (M = 3.44, SD = 1.32). These main effects were qualified by a 
significant interaction between emotion and endowment size, F(1, 69) = 5.45, p < .05, η² 
=.07 (see Table 4.1). Simple-effects analysis showed that within the high endowment 
condition, the displayed emotion had a significant effect on the inferred justice in the 
group. When a wealthy group member communicated anger, participants expected the 
group to be less fair (M = 2.76, SD = 1.03) than when a wealthy group member expressed 
guilt (M = 4.05, SD = 1.27), F(1, 69) = 9.26, p < .005, η² = .13. Within the low endowment 
condition, however, no such effect was obtained; F(1, 69) < 1, p < .82.  
 
Table 4.1: Inferred justice in the group as a function of communicated emotion and 
endowment size. 
 Communicated Emotion Dependent 
Variable 
Endowment Size  Anger Guilt 
Low 4.21ª (1.55) 4.11ª (1.13)
 
Inferred Justice in 
the Group 
High 2.76b (1.03) 4.05ª (1.27) 
Note. Higher scores indicate higher inferred justice. Standard deviations are given in parentheses. Means with a 
different superscript differ at p < .05 according to simple-effects analyses. 
 
Preferences to exit the group. A 2 (emotion: angry vs. guilty) × 2 (endowment 
size: low vs. high) ANOVA on the exit measure revealed a main effect of emotion, F(1, 
69) = 7.69, p < .01, η² = .09, showing that participants preferred to leave the group more 
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when a group member expressed anger (M = 3.75, SD = 1.59) as opposed to guilt (M = 
2.95, SD = 0.97). This main effect was qualified by a significant interaction between 
emotion and endowment size, F(1, 69) = 5.12, p < .05, η² = .06 (see Table 4.2). Simple-
effects analysis revealed that within the high endowment condition exit preferences were 
higher when a fellow group member communicated anger (M = 4.29, SD = 1.40) instead of 
guilt (M = 2.79, SD = 0.98), F(1, 69) = 12.50, p < .001, η² = .15. Again, in the low 
endowment size condition this effect was absent F(1, 69) < 1, p < .72. 
 
Table 4.2: Exit preferences as a function of communicated emotion and endowment 
size. 
 Communicated Emotion Dependent 
Variable 
Endowment Size  Anger Guilt 
Low 3.26ª (1.63) 3.11ª (0.96)
 
Exit Preferences 
High 4.29b (1.40) 2.79ª (0.98) 
Note. Higher scores indicate higher preferences to exit. Standard deviations are given in parentheses. Means with 
a different superscript differ at p < .05 according to simple-effects analyses. 
 
Mediation analysis. To examine whether the interaction effect on exit 
preferences can be explained by participants’ inferences about justice in the group, a 
mediation analysis following Baron and Kenny’s (1986) procedure was conducted. First, 
predicting exit preferences by entering communicated emotion, endowment size and their 
interaction in a linear regression model yielded results that were identical to ANOVA. That 
is, the same main effect of emotion (ȕ = -.31; p < .01) and the interaction effect occurred (ȕ 
= -.25; p < .05). When these three terms were used to predict justice judgments in the 
group, the results also matched those of the reported ANOVA. The same main effects of 
emotion (ȕ = .22; p < .05) and endowment size (ȕ = -.28; p < .05) and the significant 
interaction (ȕ = .26; p < .05) were revealed. Third, when justice judgments were included 
as a covariate with emotion, endowment size and emotion × endowment size to predict exit 
preferences, a significant effect of justice judgments on exit preferences emerged (ȕ = -.31; 
p < .05). Finally, and most importantly, in this model the interaction effect between 
emotion and endowment size on exiting preferences was considerably reduced, ȕ = -.17; p 
= .12.  
Even though the recommendations of Baron and Kenny (1986) to establish 
mediation are widely used, their procedure has also been criticized for a lack of statistical 
power (MacKinnon, Lockwood, Hoffman, West, & Sheets, 2002). Moreover, it does not 
directly test the null hypothesis that the indirect effect significantly differs from 0. 
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Another, more formal test of mediation that is commonly used, is the Sobel-test. However, 
this test requires distributional assumptions that may not be met in small sample sizes 
(Preacher & Hayes, 2004; Shrout & Bolger, 2002). We therefore decided to also test for 
mediation by adopting a bootstrap method as advocated by Preacher and Hayes (2008; see 
also Bollen & Stine, 1990; Mallinckrodt, Abraham, Wei, & Russell, 2006; Preacher and 
Hayes 2004; Shrout and Bolger, 2002), which suffers from none of these disadvantages. 
Following Preacher and Hayes (2008), we used bootstrapping to estimate the 
indirect effect of the emotion × endowment term on exit preferences with group justice 
judgments as mediator, while controlling for the emotion and endowment terms. Using 
10,000 bootstrap resamples and bias corrected and accelerated intervals, we obtained 
confidence intervals that did not contain zero at the 95% level (i.e., LL CI = -.282; UL CI 
= -.005). Thus, the extent to which participants believed that the group would set out to 
achieve fair contributions mediated the interaction effect between emotion and endowment 
on exit preferences (p < .05).  
 
 
4.2.3 Discussion 
 
The results of Experiment 4.1 were in line with our reasoning. Angry group 
members were perceived to have contributed a large share of their endowment in the past, 
but were expected to contribute little in the near future, while group members who 
communicated guilt were perceived to have contributed little in the past, but were expected 
to contribute much in the near future. But even though in the case of communicated anger 
both wealthy and less wealthy group members were expected to contribute a relatively 
small share of their endowments in the upcoming trial, it was only when the anger was 
communicated by a wealthy group member that it had a differential impact on the 
inferences about the group as a whole. That is, our findings show that people preferred to 
leave the group more when their fellow group member felt angry as opposed to guilty, but 
only when this person was highly instrumental for provision of the public good. In 
addition, participants also considered the group as more unfair when anger was 
communicated relative to guilt, but again, only in the large endowment size condition. 
These findings thus provide the first evidence ever (at least to our knowledge) that 
emotions of wealthy group members affect the decisions of new group members in social 
dilemma settings, in this case, the decision to leave the group. Moreover, the extent to 
which participants judged that the group would set out to achieve a fair contribution of 
chips appeared to mediate this interaction effect.  
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4.3 EXPERIMENT 4.2: DEMOCRATIC LEADERSHIP 
 
Group members are not always able to leave the group immediately (i.e., this 
choice is not always presented or presents a viable option). Thus, the choice for the 
individual structural change is not always possible when unfairness is expected. Under 
such circumstances, what may group members decide then? As we mentioned earlier in 
our introduction, under circumstances of impending unfairness people may also opt for a 
constructive structural solution for the group as a whole by implementing a leader (De 
Cremer, 2000; Messick, 1983; Rutte & Wilke, 1984, 1985). In particular, they may want to 
install the kind of leader that may help prevent unfair decisions from being made (i.e., a 
democratic leader, Bass 1990). Thus, we expect that when people are unable to leave the 
group, they will prefer to assign a democratic leader. 
In the above line of reasoning we suggest that the presence of an angry (relative to 
a guilty) person who can contribute many endowments to the public good implies that 
unfair decisions are made in the group and that as a result this wealthy person will refrain 
from contributing to the group’s welfare. The mediation analysis of Experiment 4.1 
already provided some evidence for this assumption, but, in Experiment 4.2, we do not 
focus solely on a measured impression of fairness and preparedness of the wealthy 
member to contribute. Instead we will manipulate this proposed process (Sigall & Mills, 
1998). That is, in Experiment 4.2, we will manipulate whether the wealthy person 
displaying the emotion promises to act in the collective interest or does not make such a 
promise. Consequently, we can expect that if this promise is made, the effect of the 
displayed emotion of the wealthy group member on the preference for a democratic leader 
will not emerge. After all, in that case, one may be less fearful that the angry person will 
refrain from cooperating because of the unfair situation. If no promise is made, we expect 
that there will be a stronger preference for implementing a democratic leader when the 
wealthy member is angry relative to guilty. 
Taken together, in Experiment 4.2, an interaction effect between promise-making 
and display of emotions is expected on preferences for a democratic leader. People will 
prefer a democratic leader more when anger as opposed to guilt is communicated, but 
primarily when the person expressing the emotion does not also include a promise to 
cooperate. Because Experiment 4.1 showed that the effect of communicated emotion 
emerges only when the communicator is able to contribute much to the public good, all 
participants were placed in the condition where the emotion was communicated by a 
wealthy group member. 
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4.3.1 Method 
 
Participants and experimental design. Seventy-six undergraduate students at 
Tilburg University (58 female and 18 male, Mage = 20.28 SD = 2.66) participated 
voluntarily in exchange for course credit or a monetary reward of ¼4 (approximately $5). 
The experimental design included two between-subjects variables: communicated emotion 
(anger vs. guilt) and promise (yes vs. no). The assignment of participants to these 
conditions was random. 
Procedure. The procedure of Experiment 4.2 was identical to the one of 
Experiment 4.1, except for the following issues. First, in Experiment 4.2 all participants 
were placed in the high endowment condition. Second, the manipulation of a promise was 
introduced by adding a line to the answer of the alleged group member on the question 
about how he or she felt with respect to the contributions to the collective pool (i.e., the 
emotion manipulation). In the promise condition, participants could read in addition to 
their group member’s emotion: “In the next round I will do my best for the group”. In the 
no-promise condition, no additional information was given. 
Dependent measures. We told participants that based on their expectations of the 
decision round, they could decide to adopt a democratic leader (cf. Van Vugt & De 
Cremer, 1999). In line with Van Dijk, Wilke, & Wit (2003) the following item was used to 
measure preferences for a democratic leader: “I would like to appoint a leader who 
consults others to make decisions for the group” (1 = totally disagree to 7 = totally agree). 
The effectiveness of the emotion manipulation was checked in the same way as in 
Experiment 4.1. The promise manipulation was checked by asking participants to write 
down the contents of the message that had been delivered to them. Finally, participants 
were debriefed, paid and thanked. 
 
 
4.3.2 Results 
 
Manipulation and procedure checks. Participants’ ratings of the group 
member’s emotions were submitted to a 2 (group member’s emotion: angry vs. guilty) × 2 
(promise: yes vs. no) ANOVA, revealing only a significant main effect of group member’s 
emotion. That is, participants in the guilt condition reported the group member to feel more 
guilty (M = 6.31, SD = 1.33) than participants in the anger condition (M = 3.20, SD = 
1.80); F(1, 72) = 74.17, p < .001, η² = .51. Likewise, participants in the anger condition 
evaluated the group member to be more angry (M = 6.65, SD = 0.74) than those in the guilt 
condition (M = 2.75, SD = 1.57); F(1, 72) = 202.92, p < .001, η² = .73. Finally, 
participants’ ratings of their group member’s emotions were significantly above the 
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midpoint of the 7-point Likert scale on the corresponding checks, both when anger was 
communicated (M = 6.65, SD = 0.74, t = 22.79, p < .001) and when guilt was expressed (M 
= 6.31, SD = 1.33, t = 10.42, p < .001). 
 To check the procedure for the promise manipulation, participants were asked to 
recall the message they received from the fellow group member. Out of the 76 participants, 
2 participants in the anger condition and 4 participants in the guilt condition (7.9% in total) 
recalled this information incorrectly. This difference between conditions was not 
significant.  
Preferences to appoint a democratic leader. A 2 (emotion: angry vs. guilty) × 2 
(promise: yes vs. no) ANOVA on the preference for a democratic leader score yielded only 
the expected significant interaction, F(1, 72) = 5.07, p < .05, η² = .07 (see table 4.3). 
Simple-effects analysis showed that in the no-promise condition, participants preferred to 
appoint a democratic leader more when the wealthy group member expressed anger (M = 
5.55, SD =1.23) as opposed to guilt (M = 4.39, SD = 2.15), F(1, 72) = 5.06, p < .05, η² = 
.06. When the wealthy group member did make a promise, no effect of emotion was found, 
F(1, 72) < 1, p < .36. 
 
Table 4.3: Preferences to appoint a democratic leader as a function of communicated 
emotion and endowment Size. 
 Communicated Emotion Dependent 
Variable 
Promise  Anger Guilt 
Yes 4.85ab (1.35) 5.33ab (1.53)
 
Democratic 
Leadership 
No 5.55a (1.23) 4.39b (2.15) 
Note. Higher scores indicate higher preferences to exit. Standard deviations are given in parentheses. Means with 
a different superscript differ at p < .05 according to simple-effects analyses. 
 
 
4.4 GENERAL DISCUSSION 
 
Across two laboratory experiments it was shown that the emotion displayed by a 
group member affects one’s preferences to install structural changes or to leave the group 
altogether, particularly when the one expressing the emotion was highly instrumental in 
providing the public good. Moreover, the analyses provided insights in the underlying 
mechanisms of the interactive effect between group member’s communicated emotion and 
endowment size on preferences for exit and structural changes. Below, we discuss the most 
important findings and implications. 
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The first important contribution of the present research is the interaction between 
the type of emotion communicated by a fellow group member and the endowment size of 
this person. More precisely, Experiment 4.1 showed that people were more inclined to exit 
the group when anger relative to guilt was communicated, but only when the person 
displaying the emotion was able to contribute much to the public good. This moderating 
role of endowment size shows that people take the emotional displays of the wealthy 
(relative to the less wealthy) more into account for their subsequent evaluations about the 
group. The present findings also support our reasoning about the effects of anger and guilt. 
These emotions have distinct effects on exit preferences because they signal different 
justice prospects, at least for the near future. More specifically, someone expressing anger 
is signalling that a person in the present group has been acting unfairly and that therefore 
fair contributions to the public good can not be expected until this conflict has been 
resolved. On the other hand, when guilt is expressed, an unfair act has also occurred, but 
the person committing this act communicates the intentions to make up for this behavior 
(which is especially important if this positive future behavior is displayed by the wealthy 
group member). Thus, as our analyses have also shown, communicated anger leads people 
– more than guilt – to conclude that their group would not set out to achieve justice.  
A second important finding is that the reason why communicated anger (relative 
to guilt) affects decision-making seems to be explained not only by one’s justice concerns 
(see Experiment 4.1), but also by the fact that the group member who displays anger is 
expected to refrain from cooperation. Indeed, when in Experiment 4.2 the group member 
who was highly instrumental in providing the public good made an explicit promise not to 
violate the moral norm of cooperation, the effect of displayed emotions did not emerge. 
This finding provides additional support for the idea that the emotions used in the present 
research exert their effects (at least partly) by means of implicitly signalling justice 
prospects in the group. After all, the effect of emotions is overridden when a more explicit 
justice cue such as a promise to contribute is provided. Previous research has primarily 
examined promises in a prisoner’s dilemma context (e.g. Lindskold & Bennett, 1973) or as 
an explanation for why group discussion increases cooperation (e.g. Orbell, Van de Kragt, 
& Dawes, 1988), but the current research is (at least to our knowledge) the first to show 
that within a step-level public good dilemma a promise to cooperate may play a role in 
one’s desire to install structural changes such as a democratic leader. Also, by showing that 
in a social dilemma a promise may counteract the effect of communicated emotions 
because it alters justice prospects, this research contributes to the ongoing integration of 
the social dilemma and justice literature (see De Cremer & Tyler, 2005; Schroeder et al., 
2003).  
It is also interesting to note that in Experiment 4.1 the effect of communicated 
guilt did not seem to be moderated by whether or not the person displaying the emotion 
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was highly instrumental in providing the public good or not. This finding provides further 
evidence for the view that the function of guilt is merely to repair one’s detrimental action 
and not necessarily to overcompensate it (cf. Baumeister et al., 1994). Therefore, when a 
group member communicates guilt, the recipient of that emotion may perceive this as an 
intention to restore justice and not necessarily as an intention to lift justice beyond the 
originally anticipated level. Thus, people do not prefer to stay in the group more when a 
wealthy as opposed to a less wealthy group member expresses guilt. 
To summarize so far, the present findings thus contribute significantly to the 
social dilemma literature, both from a theoretical and more applied perspective. Public 
good dilemmas may be found on different levels of aggregation, ranging from world scale 
issues like CO2 emissions and global warming to small group behavior like contributions 
to a team effort. With our focus on interpersonal emotions and individual reactions such as 
exit from the group, our findings are especially relevant to the understanding of small 
group behavior. Take, for example, the public good dilemma of a work team in which the 
group members are dependent on each other to complete the team project. When in such a 
team a group member communicates an emotion, this provides a salient reference point for 
people to make decisions such as whether or not one wants to exit the team or assign a 
democratic leader that may facilitate coordinating individual efforts in the task. Moreover, 
we showed that emotions displayed by group members who are highly instrumental in 
making the team project a success have a greater impact on such preferences for structural 
changes than group members who are less instrumental. Furthermore, the reason why 
anger and guilt have these effects in work teams is that they signal implicitly whether or 
not a work team will set out to achieve justice and can be expected to cooperate. Thus, the 
research shows that to better understand how groups or teams may manage social dilemma 
situations a focus on intragroup relations (e.g., the emotions and promises that group 
members communicate to one another) can be fruitful (see also Stouten et al., 2006).  
Before closing, a potential limitation to the reported findings needs to be 
addressed. In real life situations, emotions are often communicated verbally in a face-to-
face interaction. Our reason for manipulation by means of a written note was to maintain 
as much experimental control as possible to demonstrate causality. As a consequence, 
caution is advised when generalizing these results. On the other hand, nonverbal 
communication of emotion through a computer is becoming increasingly prevalent 
nowadays due to the rising popularity of e-mail and chat programs, so in this sense our 
procedure does actually have significant ecological validity. Furthermore, it is common for 
media to use interviews and quotes of people, (e.g., opinion polls and eyewitness reports in 
newspapers), making that individually expressed emotion by means of messages can be 
quite influential in many social dilemmas. Finally, in a negotiation context, the findings of 
a paradigm similar to ours have been replicated in face-to-face settings (Van Kleef et al., 
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2006; Sinaceur & Tiedens, 2005). Nevertheless, future research to the generalizability of 
our research is desirable. 
To conclude, the emotions of other group members may serve as a potent, socially 
informative cue that may direct people in making decisions in social dilemma situations. 
Communicated emotions may be especially potent because they allow people to draw 
justice inferences that in turn affect their decisions, even before these justice inferences are 
confirmed or invalidated by what exactly happened in the contribution session. As such, 
the current research delivers an important contribution to our understanding of how the 
relations and shared history that individuals in a group have with each other (as 
communicated by emotional displays) play a role in how they cope with and decide in 
social dilemma situations.  
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CHAPTER 5 
 
WHEN AND HOW COMMUNICATED GUILT AFFECTS 
CONTRIBUTIONS IN PUBLIC GOOD DILEMMAS10 
 
5.1 INTRODUCTION 
 
People interacting in groups sometimes find that their individual interests conflict 
with the collective interest. Individuals may be tempted, for example, to refrain from 
investing time, energy, or resources in a team project, so they may free-ride on the efforts 
of others. If, however, each individual follows this strategy, the team project will 
inevitably fail and all will be worse off than if they would have cooperated. This type of 
mixed-motive situation is referred to as a social dilemma, or—more specifically—as a 
public good dilemma (for reviews, see Pruitt, 1998; Weber et al., 2004). Often, public 
goods can only be provided when the total amount of contributions surpasses a certain 
threshold or provision point. Such instances are known as step-level public good dilemmas 
and will be the focus of the present research.  
 In step-level public good dilemmas it is important for people to display 
cooperation by means of coordinating their individual contributions so that they do not 
squander resources in an attempt to reach the provision point. A generally preferred 
solution to this coordination problem is for each group member to contribute an equal 
share of the provision point (Lutz, 2001; Messick, 1993). Indeed, because this so-called 
equality rule is both fair and efficient (Stouten et al., 2005), it is an effective coordination 
principle that is frequently adhered to or at least used as an anchor to base one’s eventual 
contributions on (Allison et al., 1992; Samuelson & Allison, 1994; Van Dijk & Wilke, 
1995).  
For an individual group member, using the equality rule to coordinate 
contributions is only effective when the other group members can be expected to act in a 
similar way. One therefore needs to be responsive to cues from other group members that 
may signal their intentions to cooperate, especially when one is a newcomer to a group and 
thus lacks information about previous social dilemma interactions. One cue that people 
entering an existing group may pay attention to, and one that has been neglected by social 
dilemma research so far, is how the group members feel about past decisions. An 
interesting illustration that affect about past decision behavior within the group may be 
present and thus can be used by group members to base their inferences and decisions on is 
provided by Dawes and colleagues (1977; see also Xiao & Houser, 2005). They noted that 
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 This Chapter is based on Wubben, De Cremer, & Van Dijk (2009c) 
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after playing a social dilemma “one of the most significant aspects of this study did not 
show up in the data analysis” (p. 7) thereby referring to the observation that it was not 
unusual for participants “to become extremely angry, or to become tearful” (p. 7) at other 
participants who had defected. In fact, these authors even note that the affect level was so 
high that they were unwilling to run any intact groups because of the effect the game might 
have on the members’ feelings of each other. 
In the present research we therefore aim to answer two questions. First, when will 
group members’ display of emotions such as guilt be considered as useful or informative in 
determining decisions to contribute, or—as we prefer to define it in the present paper—
when will it be evaluated as instrumental (Experiment 5.1)? Second, how will this 
emotional display affect contributions and the use of the equality rule in public good 
dilemmas (Experiment 5.2)? In the present paper, we will first claim that emotions can 
serve as important cues to base decisions on. Second, we will reason that such cues will be 
most functional when coordination is needed the most. Thus, we will develop the argument 
that communicated emotions are most instrumental when it is relatively difficult to achieve 
the public good (i.e., high provision point). 
 
 
5.1.1 Emotional displays in social dilemmas 
  
A large quantity of research has addressed what exactly an emotion is. Accordingly, 
emotions can be defined as: “episodic, relatively short-term biologically based patterns of 
perception, experience, physiology, action, and communication that occur in response to 
specific physical and social challenges and opportunities” (Keltner & Gross, 1999). 
However, scholars have also started to focus on the potential of emotions to regulate and 
coordinate social interactions (i.e., a functional account; Frijda & Mesquita, 1994; Keltner 
& Gross, 1999; Oatley & Jenkins, 1992).  
The idea that communicated emotions may convey certain intentions which one 
may subsequently take into account for one’s own actions has been convincingly 
demonstrated by Van Kleef, De Dreu and Manstead (2006; see also De Cremer et al., 
2008; Sinaceur & Tiedens, 2006; Van Kleef et al., 2004a). These authors showed that 
when a negotiation opponent communicated guilt, people were unlikely to concede 
because they expected their opponent to be willing to make up for his or her tough 
demands that were offered in previous rounds (Van Kleef et al., 2006). Even more 
important for the present paper, very recent research has provided first evidence that in 
step-level public good dilemmas emotions communicated by fellow group members shape 
a third party’s justice judgments of the group, which subsequently affect this person’s 
preferences for structural change (Wubben, De Cremer, & Van Dijk, 2008). Thus, the 
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information that communicated emotion conveys about fellow group members’ intentions 
may be expected to also influence a third party’s contribution decisions and use of the 
equality rule. 
 
 
5.1.2 Communicated guilt as a coordination means in step-level public good dilemmas 
 
What do people entering an existing group wish to know in a public good 
dilemma? They are probably interested in how previous social dilemma interactions have 
developed and whether or not the other group members can be expected to cooperate in the 
future. Emotions communicate such inferences. In the present article we focus on 
communicated guilt. We do so because people often evaluate social dilemmas in terms of 
morality (e.g., Van Lange & Kuhlman, 1994), and guilt is the emotion that is experienced 
after “having transgressed a moral imperative” in the past (Lazarus, 1991, p. 240; see for 
applications of guilt in social dilemma settings e.g., Ketelaar & Au, 2003; Nelissen et al., 
2007). 
What do we infer if we see that a particular member communicates guilt? The 
communication of guilt may simultaneously generate inferences about the person 
displaying guilt and the other persons in the group. In a public good dilemma people may 
first of all conclude that the member who communicates guilt has not contributed enough 
to the public good. And if not contributing to the public good in a previous decision round 
leads a group member to feel guilty, a newcomer may infer that there must have been a 
well-established norm of cooperation to which the other group members did adhere. That 
is, if one’s fellow group members would have refrained from cooperating as well, there 
would be no norm prescribing cooperation and not contributing to the public good would 
therefore be no reason to experience guilt. Guilt may therefore not only signal that the 
person displaying guilt did not contribute, but also that the other persons in the group did 
cooperate. Thus, whereas at first sight guilt merely indicates the presence of a repentant 
transgressor, other group members may indirectly profit from this emotional display 
because it may lead third parties to evaluate them as prosocial. 
So how do these inferences affect the expectations regarding the future? From a 
functional perspective, guilt signals appeasement (Barrett, 1995; Keltner & Buswell, 
1997). As such it is associated with an intention to repair the damage that one has inflicted 
to a relationship (Baumeister et al., 1994; Lewis, 2000). Guilt therefore leads to increased 
prosocial behavior, including helping, making amends, compliance and cooperation 
(Carlsmith & Gross, 1969; Ketelaar & Au, 2003; Regan, Williams & Sparling, 1972; Van 
Kleef et al., 2006). A person communicating guilt therefore signals the willingness to 
contribute to the public good in the future. And because guilt may also signal that the other 
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group members are willing to contribute, a third party may infer that all fellow group 
members intend to cooperate in the upcoming decision round. Thus, even though guilt 
suggests collective failure in the past, people may infer that their fellow group members 
aim to reach the provision point in the future. 
 The main question in Experiment 5.1 which we alluded to earlier (i.e., when do 
newcomers find communicated guilt instrumental in determining their contribution 
decisions?) is thus related to the question “When do people find it instrumental to know 
that one’s fellow group members can be expected to cooperate?” The answer is not 
immediately clear, because having information about fellow group members’ intentions 
will not always be required to determine how much one should contribute to the public 
good in order to reach the provision point (cf. Van Vugt & De Cremer, 2002; Wubben et 
al., 2008, for similar accounts of instrumentality). In fact, even without receiving emotion 
feedback it is quite common for people to expect others to adhere to equality (Allison et 
al., 1992; Samuelson & Allison, 1994; Van Dijk & Wilke, 1995). Communicated guilt may 
therefore primarily facilitate coordination under circumstances where people would 
anticipate that their fellow group members might not cooperate. Under such conditions, 
people may feel that their own contributions may be wasted. In step-level public good 
dilemmas, the anticipation that others may not contribute such that their own contributions 
may be wasted, is referred to as fear (Rapoport & Eshed-Levy, 1989). It has been shown to 
be particularly prevalent when the provision point increases to more than 60% of group 
members’ total endowments (Poppe & Zwikker, 1996). Indeed, under such circumstances 
efficient coordination is impeded because people’s actual contributions do not rise 
accordingly, making not only that the public good is provided less often but also that more 
resources are wasted by those who did contribute (Suleiman & Rapoport, 1992). Therefore 
we reason that only when the provision point is high the display of guilt may be evaluated 
as more instrumental than neutral emotion feedback, because only then there is substantial 
fear that communicated guilt may help reduce.  
 
 
5.2 EXPERIMENT 5.1 
 
Experiment 5.1 was designed to test if communicated guilt is particularly 
instrumental in deciding how much to contribute when the provision point is perceived as 
difficult to obtain. That is, as a first test of our hypothesis we used a subjective evaluation 
of a fixed provision point to investigate the potential importance of communicated guilt for 
decision-making in step-level public good dilemmas. Thus, we asked participants to what 
extent they felt that many chips were required to reach the provision point and, 
subsequently, how helpful and useful they considered the emotion feedback from a fellow 
                                                                                                                  Chapter 5 
 
 82
group member to be. Using a separate first study for only these critical inferences allowed 
us to measure perceived instrumentality directly without unintentionally influencing 
participants’ contribution decisions. 
 
 
5.2.1 Method 
 
Participants and experimental design. Participants were 47 undergraduate 
students (17 men and 30 women, average age = 18.79 years, SD = 0.95) who participated 
voluntarily in exchange for course credits or a monetary award of ¼3 (approximately $4). 
The study consisted of an Emotion (guilt vs. neutral) × Judgment of provision point level 
(continuous) between-participants design. Participants were randomly assigned to the 
emotion conditions. 
Procedure. Upon arrival at the laboratory, participants were divided into groups 
of three and were placed in front of a computer in three adjacent individual cubicles. It was 
explained that the experiment was about “taking decisions in groups” and that all 
interactions between group members would take place via the computer. 
After being seated, participants were informed that two group members would 
immediately start one trial of making decisions in groups, while one group member would 
join the others in round two as a newcomer. Although participants believed that the 
computer assigned the role of newcomer at random to one of the group members, in reality 
the participant was always the newcomer. Furthermore, the participant was denoted by the 
letter B, whereas the other two persons would be known as group member A and C. While 
group members A and C were allegedly playing the first trial in a public good dilemma, 
the participant was requested to fill out a short individual filler task. Next, the nature of the 
public good was explained. Participants were told that sometimes personal interest and 
collective interest are at odds and that they and their group members would be placed in 
such a situation. It was mentioned that when the participant joined the other two group 
members, the game would be transformed from a two-person to a three-person game. Each 
group member would receive 200 chips and had to decide how many chips to contribute to 
the group. We set the provision point at the intermediate level of 50% (Poppe & Zwikker, 
1996). Thus, if 300 or more chips were contributed in total to the group, each group 
member would receive 280 chips, regardless of their own contributions to the group. Thus, 
if the threshold was reached, each participant would receive the bonus of 280 chips plus 
the chips he or she decided not to contribute. However, if the provision point of 300 chips 
was not reached, no bonus would be given and participants would only have the chips that 
they had decided not to contribute. 
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Because we were interested in exploring the influence that participants’ subjective 
evaluation of the difficulty to establish the provision point could exert on how instrumental 
participants considered the communicated emotion information to be (see below), we 
asked them directly to what extent they felt that they had to contribute many chips to 
obtain the bonus (1 = totally disagree to 7 = totally agree). 
Manipulation. We manipulated communicated emotion by providing participants 
with emotion feedback from the participants who had allegedly played a trial in a public 
good dilemma already. To enhance the credibility of this manipulation, participants were 
requested to fill out a printed form with three questions that had just been brought in by the 
experimenter. First, participants had to indicate whether they were participant A, B or C. 
Second, they had to fill out whether they were a newcomer or had already been taking 
decisions for one round. For the third and last question it was made very clear that it 
should only be answered by participants who in the second question had indicated not to 
be a newcomer. It read: “How do you feel with respect to how the contributions to the 
collective pool are developing?” All participants correctly indicated that they as group 
member B were a newcomer and subsequently they all left the third question unanswered, 
as was instructed. Next, they were asked to contact the experimenter who let them wait for 
a few minutes until everybody had filled out their form. When eventually all three group 
members were ready, the experimenter would open the doors of the three adjacent cubicles 
simultaneously and instruct the group members collectively. Thus, a situation was created 
in which the subjects could not see each other, but all could see the experimenter. The 
experimenter explained that he would collect all forms, complete a few administrative 
tasks and would then redistribute the forms. A minute after each participant had handed 
over his or her form, the experimenter reopened the three cubicles one at a time to ask each 
participant separately if it was correct that he or she would be the newcomer in the 
upcoming trial. When participants confirmed this, he delivered them a bogus form that was 
exactly similar to the one the participant had filled out, but with different answers to the 
three questions. The question “which group member are you” was answered with “A” and 
it was indicated that the fellow group member who allegedly filled out the form was not a 
newcomer, but had already been taking decisions during the first round. The 
communicated emotion was manipulated by means of the third answer. The question 
“How do you feel with respect to how the contributions to the collective pool are 
developing?” was answered with either “I feel rather guilty about these contributions” in 
the guilt condition or with “I don’t really have a pronounced feeling about these 
contributions” in the neutral-emotion condition. Subsequently, the dependent measures 
were administered. Finally, participants were debriefed, paid and thanked1. 
Dependent measures. To assess whether participants considered the 
communicated emotion to be instrumental in determining their contributions, we used two 
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items. More precisely, we asked them to indicate to what extent they considered what 
member A wrote about his or her feelings to be “useful” and “necessary information” to 
help determining how much to contribute. (i.e., “I find what group member A has written 
about his or her feelings necessary to determine accurately how many chips I should 
contribute” and “The form that has been filled out by group member A helps me to 
determine how many chips I have to contribute”; 1 = totally disagree to 7 = totally agree). 
These two items were averaged into a measure of instrumentality of communicated 
emotion (r = .69, p < .001). To check the effectiveness of the emotion manipulation, we 
presented participants with a variety of emotions—including the focal emotion guilt—and 
asked them to what extent they believed participant A experienced this emotion (1 = totally 
disagree to 7 = totally agree; cf. Tiedens, 2001).  
 
 
5.2.2 Results and Discussion 
  
Manipulation checks. To check the effectiveness of the emotion manipulation, 
the item measuring to what extent the participants perceived group member A to feel guilty 
was submitted to a one-way ANOVA, revealing a main effect of emotion. When group 
member A had communicated guilt, participants reported this person to feel more guilty 
(M = 6.33, SD = 1.35) than when no emotion had been communicated (M = 3.27, SD = 
1.08); F(1, 45) = 74.61, p < .001, η² = .62.  
 Instrumentality of communicated emotion11. To analyze when participants 
perceived the communicated emotion to be most instrumental, we first centered the scores 
on the item measuring to what extent participants judged the provision point to be high 
(Cohen, Cohen, West, & Aiken, 2003). We also effect-coded the emotion variable by 
assigning the value -1 to the guilt condition and the value 1 to the neutral condition. Next, 
a hierarchical regression analysis was conducted in which the instrumentality of the 
communicated emotion was predicted by the main effects of emotion and judgment of 
provision point level in step 1 and the product of these two variables in step 2. 
As predicted, the analysis revealed a significant interaction term between emotion 
and judgment of provision point level (ȕ = -.31, p < .05). To further explore this effect, we 
plotted the interaction using the predicted means one standard deviation above and below 
the mean of the measure of judgment of provision point level (for high and low scores on 
                                                          
11
 Because participants’ subjective evaluation of the difficulty of realizing the public good was measured before 
the emotion manipulation, there was no reason not to assume the orthogonality of both variables. Indeed, a one-
way ANOVA showed that participants in the guilt condition did not find the provision point harder to obtain (M = 
4.62, SD = 1.12) than participants in the no-emotion condition (M = 4.27, SD = 1.54), F(1,45) < 1, p = .39.  

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judgment of provision point level, respectively). These means are presented in Figure 5.1. 
Subsequent simple-effect analyses revealed that when the provision point was evaluated as 
difficult to obtain, communicated guilt was considered more instrumental than neutral 
emotion feedback in determining how much to contribute (ȕ = -.50, p < .05). On the other 
hand, when participants felt they did not need to contribute many chips to reach the 
provision point, no such difference emerged (ȕ = .13, p = .55). 
 
Figure 5.1: The relationship between emotion and instrumentality of communicated 
emotion as a function of judgment of provision point level (Experiment 5.1).  
Instrumentality of Communicated Emotion
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Note. Higher values reflect higher instrumentality. 
 
 Experiment 5.1 can be regarded as a first test of the idea that emotional 
information from fellow group members is not always regarded as useful information to 
employ in one’s decision behavior. Indeed, the results provide supportive evidence for the 
idea that people entering the group value and desire emotional information more when 
they estimate the provision point as difficult to reach. These findings should be interpreted 
with caution, however, for two reasons. First, we did not manipulate the provision point 
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level but used a subjective evaluation of the difficulty to reach the provision point. Second, 
we measured perceptions instead of behavior to assess the instrumentality of the 
communicated emotion. The results of Experiment 5.1 nevertheless suggest that effects of 
communicated guilt can be expected to become manifest only when the provision point is 
high.  
 
 
5.3 EXPERIMENT 5.2 
  
Having established when emotion information will probably be most instrumental in 
providing the public good and thus when effects of communicated guilt can be expected to 
occur, we moved on to test our second research question, that is, will communicated guilt 
affect a third party’s inferences and contribution decisions and, if so, how? To this end, we 
assessed not only people’s inferences about previous events that caused their fellow group 
member to feel guilty, but also measured contribution decisions and contribution 
expectations at different levels of the provision point. In addition we now manipulated the 
provision point. More precisely, in the low-provision-point condition we set the threshold 
to a mere 35%, but in the high-provision-point condition we set it at 70%; a level at which 
fear is typically important (Poppe & Zwikker, 1996; Suleiman & Rapoport, 1992). 
 In our introduction we already theorized which inferences people may make when 
they learn that a member communicates guilt. In Experiment 5.2 we will actually measure 
these inferences about the previous and upcoming decision round to test our hypotheses. 
Because we will not provide participants with specific information of how high the 
provision point in the first round was (see below), we hypothesize that participants’ 
inferences of their fellow group members’ previous contributions are based only on the 
emotion manipulation. More specifically, as explained before, we first expect that when a 
person communicates guilt in a public good dilemma, a newcomer to the group will infer 
that this person has contributed less in the previous decision round than the other group 
member (Hypothesis 1a). In line with this hypothesis, we predict that a person 
communicating guilt will also be inferred to have contributed less than when this person 
would have communicated no emotion (Hypothesis 1b). As a result, a newcomer may 
conclude that it is less likely that the public good has been provided in the previous trial 
when guilt as opposed to no emotion is communicated (Hypothesis 1c). Finally, a 
newcomer may infer that when a group member communicates guilt, the other person in 
the group has made higher contributions than when a group member communicates no 
emotion (Hypothesis 1d). 
As alluded to earlier, the emotional display of guilt also allows one to draw 
inferences about contributions in the upcoming decision round. As for the person who 
Social Functions of Emotions in Social Dilemmas 
 
 87
communicates guilt one may wonder to what extent this person will actually make up for 
his or her violation. In this regard it seems that guilt merely signals an intention to repair a 
detrimental action and not so much an intention to overcompensate it (Baumeister et al., 
1994). Therefore we predict that a person communicating guilt will be expected to increase 
his or her contributions compared to the previous round. In that case, this person can be 
expected to restore his or her cooperation to the same level as a person who provided only 
neutral feedback. A third party may therefore expect a person communicating guilt to 
increase his or her contributions compared to the previous decision round so that an effect 
of communicated guilt versus no emotion on expected contributions in the upcoming 
decision round will not emerge (Hypothesis 2a). As for the other group member, one may 
infer that this person has already displayed a willingness to cooperate—something that is 
not so obvious when no emotion is communicated. A newcomer may then infer that this 
group member can be expected to cooperate again in the upcoming decision round, even 
when the provision point is high. Thus, we predict that this person will be expected to 
contribute when the provision point is low, regardless of the emotion that is 
communicated, while in the high-provision-point condition this person will be expected to 
contribute more when guilt as opposed to no emotion is communicated (Hypothesis 2b). 
The total expected contributions of both fellow group members together, then, will yield a 
similar interactive effect of emotion and provision point (Hypothesis 2c). 
How will these favorable expectations about fellow group members’ contributions 
when guilt is communicated affect a newcomer’s own contributions? A prevalent reason 
not to contribute to a public good dilemma consists of the fear that one’s resources are 
wasted if others refrain from contributing (Parks & Hulbert, 1995; Rapoport & Eshed-
Levy, 1989). This fear is especially dominant when the provision point is high (Poppe & 
Zwikker, 1996; Suleiman & Rapoport, 1992). The display of guilt will reduce this fear, 
however, due to the implicit assumption that one’s fellow group members can be expected 
to cooperate. As a result, we expect that newcomers will be cooperative and not fear 
adhering to equality, even when the provision point is high. Thus, an interactive effect of 
emotion and provision point on contributions (Hypothesis 3a) and adherence to equality 
(Hypothesis 3b) is predicted, such that differential effects of guilt and neutral emotion 
feedback will only emerge when the provision point is high. In that case we predict a third 
party to cooperate more when guilt instead of no emotion is communicated. Following this 
reasoning, we predict that a third party’s expectations of his or her fellow group members’ 
contributions mediate the expected interaction between emotion and provision point level 
on a third party’s contributions (Hypothesis 4).  
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5.3.1 Method 
  
Participants and experimental design. A total of 152 undergraduate students 
(37 men and 115 women, average age = 19.04 years, SD = 1.60) participated voluntarily in 
exchange for course credits or a monetary award of ¼4 (approximately $5). Participants 
were randomly assigned to a 2 (emotion) × 2 (provision point) factorial design. 
 Procedure. For this experiment we assigned participants to similar roles as in 
Experiment 5.1. That is, we again used the letter A to denote the person communicating 
guilt or no emotion, the letter B to denote the participant and the letter C to denote the 
other group member. The emotion manipulation was also kept identical: right before the 
dependent measures were administered the experimenter brought in a manually filled out 
form with guilt or no emotion information that was allegedly written by group member A.  
Experiment 5.2 was in two important ways different from Experiment 5.1. First, 
participants in the high-provision-point condition were introduced to a public good 
dilemma in which they had to contribute 420 chips to reach the provision point. In the low-
provision-point condition, participants had to contribute 210 chips to reach the provision 
point. Hence, if one were to follow the equality rule, one would need to contribute 70 chips 
in the low- and 140 chips in the high-provision-point condition. Because each participant 
had 200 chips available, participants had to contribute 35% and 70% to provide the public 
good in the low- and high-provision-point condition, respectively. We also explained that 
now the participant would join the group as a newcomer, the parameters of the game that 
were used in round one were changed. This was done so that participants were unable to 
determine what the provision point in the first decision round had been, allowing us to 
exclude the possibility that our results were influenced by any anchoring effects. 
Second, because participants now had to play a trial in a public good dilemma, a 
financial incentive was introduced to promote the experimental realism of our paradigm 
(cf. Aquino, Steisel, & Kay, 1992). It was explained that the more chips one was able to 
accumulate, the higher the chance to win one of six prizes of ¼10 (approximately $13). 
These prizes were awarded one week after the experiment. When all instructions about the 
public good dilemma and the emotion feedback were provided, the dependent measures 
were administered.  
 Dependent measures. To understand how the emotion that was communicated 
by group member A would be interpreted with respect to previous events, participants 
indicated on a scale ranging from 1 = totally disagree to 7 = totally agree to what extent 
they agreed with the following item: “I think that group member A has contributed many 
chips during the first round”. The same question was asked for the third group member, 
who was known to participants as group member C. Participants also had to indicate 
whether or not they believed that during the first round the public good had been provided. 
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Our main dependent measure was the amount of chips that the participant was willing to 
contribute to the public good. In addition, we asked how many chips participants estimated 
that group member A would contribute and how much they estimated participant C to 
contribute to the public good. The provision point level was checked with the following 
question: “How many chips does the group need to contribute, so that the bonus will be 
disbursed to the group?” The effectiveness of the emotion manipulation was checked in the 
same way as in Experiment 5.1. 
 
 
5.3.2 Results 
  
Manipulation checks. Out of 152 participants, 4 participants (2.6%) were unable 
to correctly indicate the provision point level and they were removed from further 
analyses12. The emotion manipulation was checked with a 2 (emotion) × 2 (provision 
point) ANOVA, revealing only the expected main effect of emotion; F(1, 144) = 246.19, p 
<.001, η² = .63. Group member A was perceived to feel more guilty when guilt (M = 6.45, 
SD = 1.20) as opposed to no emotion (M = 3.31, SD = 1.22) was communicated. 
Inferences about first decision round13. The relevant means for these inferences 
can be found in Table 5.1. We predicted participants to infer about the first decision round 
that the person communicating guilt had contributed little to the public good, leading them 
to expect that the provision point had not been reached. Therefore we submitted the items 
measuring estimated contributions of group member A and C to a 2 (emotion) × 2 
(provision point) × 2 (group member) mixed-model ANOVA with the last factor as a 
repeated-measures variable. This yielded main effects of emotion (F[1, 144] = 32.44, p < 
.001, η² = .18; for guilt M = 3.27, SD = 0.73; for no emotion M = 3.98, SD = 0.78) and 
group member (F[1, 144] = 194.82, p < .001, ηp² = .57; for member A M = 2.86, SD = 
1.43; for member C M = 4.42, SD = 1.23). These main effects were qualified by a 
significant Emotion × Group member interaction, F(1, 144) = 172.81, p < .001, ηp² = .55. 
In line with Hypothesis 1a, simple-effects analyses revealed that when group member A 
communicated guilt, he or she was estimated to have contributed less in the first trial than 
group member C, F(1, 144) = 353.21, p < .001, ηp² = .71. This effect did not emerge when 
group member A communicated no emotion, F < 1, p = .56. In addition, two separate 2 
(emotion) × 2 (provision point) ANOVAs on the items measuring estimated contributions 
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  Including these participants in the analyses showed the same pattern of results. 
13
 Because the information provided in Experiment 5.2 prohibited participants from making any reasonable 
estimation of the provision point level in the first decision round, we did not expect, nor obtain any effects of 
provision point on these measures.  

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of group member A and C in the first trial showed two main effects of emotion. Supporting 
Hypothesis 1b, when group member A communicated guilt, he or she was believed to have 
contributed less during the first trial than when no emotion was communicated, F(1, 144) = 
232.48, p < .001, η² = .62.  
 
Table 5.1: Means and standard deviations on estimations of group members’ 
contributions in decision round one by emotion (Experiment 5.2).  
 Emotion Dependent Variables 
Guilt Neutral 
Estimated contributions group member Aa 1.69a  
(0.67) 
3.94b 
(1.06)
 
Estimated contributions group member Ca  4.85c  
(1.37) 
4.03b 
(0.93)
 
Note. Higher scores indicate higher contributions. Standard deviations are given in parentheses. Means with a 
different subscript differ at p < .05. 
aGroup member A is the person communicating the emotion; group member C is the other fictional person. 
 
In accordance with Hypothesis 1c, a 2 (emotion) × 2 (provision point) ANOVA 
on the item measuring to what extent participants believed that the provision point had 
been reached in the first trial, revealed that communicated guilt was believed to indicate a 
lower probability of collective success in the first trial (M = 2.38, SD = 1.20) than when no 
emotion was communicated (M = 3.58, SD = 1.50), F(1, 144) = 28.43, p < .001, η² = .16. 
Finally, the results of a 2 (emotion) × 2 (provision point) ANOVA confirmed 
Hypothesis 1d. When group member A communicated guilt, group member C was 
perceived to have contributed more than when participants received neutral emotion 
feedback, F(1, 144) = 18.11, p < .001, η² = .11.  
Expected contributions. Table 5.2 shows the means of all expected 
contributions, including the participants’ own contributions. Whereas participants inferred 
that group member A had defected in the first decision round when he or she 
communicated guilt as opposed to no emotion, we also expected this effect to disappear for 
the upcoming decision round (Hypothesis 2a). To show that this effect was specific for 
group member A and not for group member C, we standardized participants’ estimations 
of group member A and C’s contributions in round one and round two using z-scores and 
conducted a 2 (emotion) × 2 (decision round) × 2 (group member) ANOVA, with the latter  
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Table 5.2: Means and standard deviations on participants’ and estimations of group 
members’ contributions in decision round two by emotion and provision point 
(Experiment 5.2).  
 Provision Point Dependent Variables Emotion 
Low (210) High (420) 
Guilt 73.26a  
(22.57) 
138.61c 
(20.20)
 
Contributions participant 
Neutral  70.93a  
(12.77) 
109.24b  
 (52.44) 
Guilt 70.29a  
(32.13) 
113.75b 
(39.14)
 
Contributions  
group member Aa  
Neutral  68.00a  
(18.84) 
103.95b 
 (43.76) 
Guilt 66.43a  
(18.49) 
124.44c 
(33.76)
 
Contributions  
group member Ca 
Neutral  72.00a  
(12.85) 
94.22b  
 (45.03) 
Note. Higher scores indicate higher contributions. Standard deviations are given in parentheses. Means with a 
different subscript differ at p < .05 according to simple-effects analyses. 
aGroup member A is the person communicating the emotion; group member C is the other fictional person. 
 
two factors being repeated-measures variables. This yielded a significant three-way 
interaction, F(1, 146) = 86.12, p < .001, ηp² = .37. A separate 2 (emotion) × 2 (decision 
round) repeated-measures ANOVA on the estimated contributions of group member C did 
not reveal a significant interaction, suggesting that the reported effect of emotion on 
estimated contributions in round 1 (see hypothesis 1d) was not significantly different in 
round 2, F(1, 146) = 1.94; p = .17. A similar repeated-measures ANOVA on the estimated 
contributions of group member A, however, did reveal a significant interaction of Emotion 
× Decision round, F(1, 146) = 102.90, p < .001, ηp² = .41. Whereas participants inferred 
that a person communicating guilt had contributed less than a person communicating no 
emotion (as reported when testing Hypothesis 1c), in line with Hypothesis 2a this effect of 
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emotion was no longer present in participants’ estimation of group member A’s 
contribution for the upcoming decision round.  
Next, we tested if participants estimated group member C to be cooperative when 
guilt was communicated—even when the provision point was high (Hypothesis 2b)—by 
submitting this group member’s expected contributions for the upcoming decision round to 
a 2 (emotion) × 2 (provision point) ANOVA. This yielded, first, main effects of provision 
point, F(1, 144) = 65.32, p < .001, η² = .29 and emotion, F(1, 144) = 65.32, p < .001, η² = 
.29. Participants expected higher contributions when the provision point was high (M = 
109.12, SD = 42.41) than low (M = 69.40, SD = 15.87) and when guilt was communicated 
(M = 95.85, SD = 39.87) compared to no emotion (M = 82.68, SD = 34.20). These main 
effects were qualified by a significant Emotion × Provision point interaction, F(1, 144) = 
13.00, p < .001, η² = .06. In line with Hypothesis 2b, simple-effects analysis indicated that 
when the provision point was high, participants predicted that group member C would 
contribute more when group member A communicated guilt instead of no emotion, F(1, 
144) = 18.33, p < .001, η² = .08. This effect was absent when the provision point was low 
(F < 1, p = .43). 
A 2 (emotion) × 2 (provision point) ANOVA on group member A and C’s total 
expected contributions also yielded the predicted interaction (Hypothesis 2C); F(1, 144) = 
5.91, p < .05, η² = .03. Again, compared to no emotion feedback (M = 198.16, SD = 
83.82), communicated guilt led to higher expected contributions (M = 238.19, SD = 52.24) 
when the provision point was high, but this effect did not emerge with a low provision 
point (F < 1, p = .79). 
 Contributions. Participants’ contributions were submitted to a 2 (emotion) × 2 
(provision point) ANOVA, revealing main effects of provision point, F(1, 144) = 104.28, p 
<.001, η² = .39 and emotion, F(1, 144) = 9.75, p <.005, η² = .04. Contributions were 
higher when the provision point was high (M = 123.73, SD = 42.32) as opposed to low (M 
= 72.01, SD = 17.93) and when guilt (M = 106.39, SD = 39.17) as opposed to no emotion 
(M = 89.34, SD = 41.92) was communicated. More importantly and supporting Hypothesis 
3a, the interaction between emotion and provision point was significant, F(1, 144) = 7.09, 
p < .01, η² = .03. Simple-effects analysis revealed that when the provision point was high, 
participants contributed more when guilt was communicated than when neutral emotion 
feedback was given, F(1, 144) = 16.55, p <.001, η² = .06. When the provision point was 
low, however, this effect was absent; F < 1, p = .74.  
Adherence to equality and coordination. Even though these findings seem to 
suggest differences between conditions in adherence to equality, the correct procedure to 
validate this claim would be to test whether there are differences in the frequencies with 
which group members use the equality rule. Thus, participants were classified as following 
the equality rule when they contributed 70 chips and 140 chips in the low and high-
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provision-point condition, respectively. Using these strict criteria14, 62 out of 148 
participants adhered to equality. To examine this classification as a function of provision 
point and emotion, a hierarchical log-linear analysis was conducted (cf. Van Dijk & Wilke, 
2000), revealing the highest order interaction (Emotion × Provision point × Adherence to 
equality) to be significant, Ȥ²(1) = 7.47, p <.01. To further explore this interaction, separate 
chi-square tests on the emotion and adherence to equality variables were performed at 
different levels of the provision point. In the high-provision-point condition, there was a 
significant effect of emotion on whether or not participants would adhere to equality, Ȥ²(1) 
= 5.31, p < .05. In line with Hypothesis 3b, odds ratios indicated that the odds of adherence 
to equality when guilt was communicated was 3.24 times as high as the odds of adherence 
to equality when no emotion was communicated. When the provision point was low, 
however, this effect of emotion was absent, Ȥ²(1) = 2.29, p = .13, odds ratio guilt: no 
emotion = 0.49:1. 
Mediation analysis. We predicted that participants will use their expectations of 
both group member A and C’s contributions in the upcoming decision round to determine 
whether or not they will contribute to the public good (Hypothesis 4). To examine this 
mediated moderation hypothesis, we decided to adopt a different approach than the one 
advocated by Baron and Kenny (1986). Even though their recommendations to establish 
mediation are widely used, their procedure has also been criticized for a lack of statistical 
power (MacKinnon et al., 2002). Moreover, it does not directly test the null hypothesis that 
the indirect effect significantly differs from 0. Another, more formal test of mediation that 
is commonly used, is the Sobel-test. However, this test requires distributional assumptions 
that may not be met in small sample sizes (N < 200; Preacher & Hayes, 2004; Shrout & 
Bolger, 2002). We therefore decided to test for mediation by adopting a bootstrap method 
                                                          
14
 A limitation of using such strict criteria for adherence to equality is that participants who deviate only slightly 
from equality are lumped into the same category as participants who deviate heavily. Therefore we complemented 
this analysis with a 2 (emotion) × 2 (provision point) ANOVA on the absolute difference between participants’ 
actual contributions and the amount that they should contribute to adhere to equality (i.e., 70 and 140 chips in the 
high and low-provision-point condition, respectively; cf. Van Dijk & Wilke, 2000). The results were in line with 
the analysis we presented above. We again observed a significant interaction, F (1,144) = 17.71, p < .001, η² = 
.10. Simple-effect analyses showed that communicated guilt led people to deviate from equality less (M = 11.67, 
SD = 16.43) than neutral emotion feedback (M = 41.03, SD = 44.63) when the provision point was high, F (1, 
144) = 23.52, p < .001, η² = .16. This effect was absent when the provision point was low, F (1,144) = 1.17, p = 
.28 (Ms = 13.89 vs. 7.43, SDs = 17.94 vs. 10.37). 
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as advocated by Preacher and Hayes (2008; see also Bollen & Stine, 1990; Preacher and 
Hayes 2004; Shrout and Bolger, 2002), which suffers from none of these disadvantages.15 
Following Preacher and Hayes (2008), we used bootstrapping to estimate the 
indirect effect of the Emotion × Provision point term on participants’ contributions with 
the total expected contributions of both group member A and C as mediator, while 
controlling for the emotion and provision point terms. The basic idea of this procedure is to 
extract n cases with replacement from the original sample, and reestimate the size of the 
indirect effect in this new resample. This procedure should be repeated at least 1000 times. 
If, when using standard significance levels of Į = .05, the size of the indirect effect in at 
least 95% of these resamples is in all cases either larger or smaller than 0 (as indicated by 
the obtained confidence intervals), the indirect effect is significant. Accordingly, using 
10,000 bootstrap resamples and bias corrected and accelerated intervals (see Preacher & 
Hayes, 2008), we obtained confidence intervals that did not contain zero at the 99% level 
(i.e., LL CI = -7.23; UL CI = -0.11). Thus, the expected contributions of the other group 
members mediated the interaction effect between emotion and provision point on 
participants’ own contributions (p < .01).  
 
 
5.4 GENERAL DISCUSSION 
 
Taken together, the present results are supportive of the central hypothesis that 
communicated guilt is an important, socially informative cue that people use for their 
decisions to contribute and adhere to equality in a step-level public good dilemma. In 
addition, we identified a structural variable (i.e., provision point) that plays an important 
role in when differential effects of communicated guilt as opposed to neutral emotion 
feedback are particularly likely to emerge. The results show that communicated guilt has 
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 If we were to follow Baron and Kenny’s procedure, we would also arrive at the conclusion that group 
members’ expected contributions mediated the interaction effect of emotion and provision point on own 
contributions, as will be shown here. First, predicting participants’ contributions by entering emotion, provision 
point and their interaction in a linear regression model yielded results that were identical to ANOVA. That is, the 
same interaction effect occurred (ȕ = -.16; p < .01). When these three terms were used to predict expected 
contributions of fellow group members, the results also matched those of the reported ANOVA. Again a 
significant interaction of emotion and provision point (ȕ = -.16; p < .05) was revealed. Third, when expected 
contributions were included as a covariate with emotion, provision point and emotion × provision point to predict 
own contributions, a significant effect of expected contributions on participants’ contributions emerged (ȕ = .45; 
p < .001). Finally, and most importantly, in this model the interaction effect between emotion and provision point 
on participants’ contributions disappeared, ȕ = -.09; p = .12. 

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effects at three separate stages of the decision-making process. It does not only provide 
information about how fellow group members behaved in previous social dilemma 
interactions, but also about how these group members will behave in the future. 
Ultimately, communicated guilt is therefore also instrumental in making one’s own 
contribution decisions. Below, we discuss the most important findings and implications.  
The first important contribution of this research is that the communication of an 
emotion in a social dilemma is sufficient for people to draw conclusions about previous 
events in a social dilemma. Indeed, the mere communication of guilt readily led people to 
come up with the scenario of a selfish group member who added to collective failure 
despite the cooperative efforts of the other group member. As such the present research 
further emphasizes the salience of concepts such as collective failure and variance in 
cooperative behavior between group members, because even very basic information about 
how a fellow group member feels already revealed very strong effects on inferences that 
are related to these concepts (cf. De Cremer & Van Dijk, 2002; Samuelson & Messick, 
1986). Note that obtaining these findings should be accredited to the use of a newcomer 
paradigm, because this required participants to make inferences about previous social 
dilemma interactions in which they did not take part.  
People go beyond this question of which events induced an emotional state in a 
fellow group member, however. The present research shows that people also use 
information about a fellow group member’s emotion as a basis for their expectations of 
this person’s future contributions and even the future contributions of other fellow group 
members. More specifically, the results supported the idea that guilt mainly communicates 
an intention to repair instead of overcompensate one’s detrimental action (cf., Baumeister 
et al., 1994; see also Wubben et al., 2008). That is, a person communicating guilt was 
expected to contribute his or her fair share in the future, but not more than that. A possible 
explanation for this finding that a transgressor seems able to get away with merely 
promising to not transgress again may be that the victim of the detrimental action is partly 
comforted already by the knowledge that the experience of guilt is very unpleasant for the 
transgressor (Baumeister et al., 1994; O’Malley & Greenberg, 1983). Our findings suggest 
a complementary explanation however. Experiencing guilt may not only be a punishment 
for the transgressor, but also a reward for the victim. That is, when a person communicates 
guilt, third parties also seem to evaluate the other group members as more prosocial than 
when guilt is not communicated. This forwards the interesting and paradoxical hypothesis 
that inducing the unpleasant feeling of guilt in a fellow group member may in itself be 
beneficial because it actually allows one to build a reputation of being a cooperator (cf. 
Hardy & Van Vugt, 2006). 
The effects of communicated emotion are not merely limited to inferences about 
fellow group members. The present research also shows that the communication of guilt 
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may actually increase one’s own contributions to the public good by inducing people to 
adhere to equality more often. As such these findings respond to the recent call that 
“research on social dilemmas could be significantly improved by examining cooperation 
[...] as a process driven by emotion communication” (Boone & Buck, 2003, p. 176). In this 
regard it is important that participants were told that the person from whom they received 
emotional information was unaware that this information would be communicated to them. 
The question whether the display of guilt also induces cooperation in social dilemmas 
when strategic motives for communication are not excluded therefore remains to be 
addressed in future research (cf. Van Kleef et al., 2006). 
The present research also reveals that differential effects of communicated guilt 
versus no emotion may not always become manifest. Only in situations where people are 
not so sure or even distrustful about their fellow group members’ cooperative intentions 
may communicated guilt increase one’s contributions. Such a situation occurs when the 
provision point is high (as opposed to low). Especially in that case participants fear 
wasting many resources as a result of their fellow group members’ potential failure to 
assist in contributing the high amount of resources that is required to provide the public 
good. Our findings show that in such instances emotion information is evaluated as very 
useful and valuable (Experiment 5.1). When the provision point is high, emotional 
information is useful because in the case of communicated guilt it signals that one’s fellow 
group members may be expected to cooperate and thus there is less fear that one’s own 
contribution is simply a waste of many resources. Under circumstances of a low provision 
point fear of wasting one’s resources is less prevalent because the public good is easy to 
obtain. In fact, under conditions of a low provision point there was a nonsignificant 
tendency for people to evaluate communicated guilt as less valuable than no emotion 
information. Also, when in that case guilt was communicated there was a nonsignificant 
trend for people to deviate from equality more often in such a way that they contributed 
slightly more than necessary. These slight trends in the data lead to the interesting 
suggestion that when a coordination task is easy already, additional information may—
even when it is favorable—only complicate coordination. This will merely cause 
participants to contribute more than necessary in order to “play it safe”.  
A final important finding of the present research is that the interactive effect of 
emotion and provision point on people’s own contributions is mediated by their 
expectations of fellow group members’ contributions. This suggests that people 
deliberately consider their fellow group members’ expected contributions to decide 
whether or not they should act in the collective interest by trying to reach the provision 
point. Conversely, it is interesting to note that prior research has shown that communicated 
guilt in two-party negotiations encourages people to actually take advantage of their 
opponent’s expected cooperation by setting higher goals for themselves and, subsequently, 
Social Functions of Emotions in Social Dilemmas 
 
 97
making less concessions (Van Kleef et al., 2006). This apparent controversy is easily 
reconciled, however. First, the cell means of the expected contributions of fellow group 
members when guilt was communicated indicate that there was little opportunity for such 
strategic mismatching, seeing that participants generally did not expect to reach the 
provision point by contributing less than the equality rule would prescribe. Moreover, as 
opposed to negotiations, the risk/reward ratio for strategic mismatching in public good 
dilemmas may be perceived as quite high, because contributing too little would lead one to 
irreversibly squander one’s complete contribution. 
Following similar logic, we can provide evidence against two alternative 
explanations for our effects. First there is the possibility that the communication of guilt 
invokes a realization in people that apparently a social dilemma may induce guilt in 
oneself. This anticipated guilt may subsequently lead people to exhibit considerable levels 
of cooperation, even when the provision point is high. A second explanation is that the 
communication of guilt, which is a moral emotion (Tangney, 2007; Tracy & Robins, 
2006), makes concepts of morality salient, thus encouraging cooperative behavior. First, 
these two explanations seem highly unlikely, because they cannot explain why, as 
mentioned above, in negotiations communicated guilt actually lead people to be less 
cooperative (Van Kleef et al., 2006). Moreover, our finding that people base their 
contribution decisions on their expectations of fellow group members’ contributions is 
strong evidence for our explanation that communicated guilt reduces fear that the provision 
point will not be reached. This mediational role of expected fellow group members’ 
contributions is less uniquely predicted by the alternative explanations of anticipated guilt 
or activated concepts of morality. 
Before closing, we wish to outline a promising avenue for future research. Seeing 
that communicated guilt is an important emotional cue in social dilemmas, other emotions 
deserve scholarly attention as well. Anger in particular needs mentioning, because it can 
readily be elicited in social dilemmas (Stouten et al., 2005) and has the potential to degrade 
the whole group to enduring defection (Schroeder et al., 2003). Future research could 
therefore contribute significantly by focusing on preventing the potential escalating effect 
of communicated anger in social dilemmas. In a similar vein, social dilemma literature 
could be furthered by unveiling how communicated emotion may play a role in fostering 
and maintaining high levels of cooperation. For example, will communicated happiness 
safeguard cooperation, or will it under some conditions actually encourage fellow group 
members to act more selfishly in the future? These questions highlight the necessity to 
investigate communicated emotion in social dilemmas. 
To conclude, an important strength of the present research is that it is the first to 
show in social dilemmas that communicated emotion allows people not only to infer what 
happened in past interactions, but also to predict how their fellow group members will 
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behave in the future. These expectations subsequently affect even people’s own 
cooperative behavior in social dilemmas. The scarcity of research in this area is 
remarkable, given Dawes and colleagues’ (1977) observation that it was not at all 
uncommon for the affect level in their social dilemma experiments to skyrocket. Our 
findings, then, are evidence that an intragroup focus—or a focus on emotional displays in 
particular—is fruitful for better understanding how groups may manage social dilemma 
situations.  
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CHAPTER 6 
 
6. GENERAL DISCUSSION 
  
This dissertation started with the observation that social dilemmas provoke 
unusually strong emotions. I cited a passage from Dawes et al. (1977) to underscore this, 
but there are others. Bonacich (1976, see also Dawes, 1980), for example, notes that in a 
social dilemma study where communication was allowed and the temptation to defect was 
high, participants jokingly threatened to push anyone that would defect down the stairs, to 
not let defectors leave the place alive, to beat them up, to report their misbehavior in the 
student newspaper or to take them to small claims court. Exaggerated as these threats may 
be, they still suggest emotional chaos if someone were to defect.  
In fact, I can confirm this from my own four years of experience. Even though, in 
compliance with Dawes and colleagues’ (1977) warning, I always took great care to make 
sure that participants remained anonymous, many of them still showed considerable 
emotional involvement. This was true when participants could earn lottery tickets, but 
especially so when the decisions that were made affected their outcomes directly, as in 
Experiment 3.1. In that experiment some participants inquired, in proper student slang, 
who it was that “screwed them over” or they called defectors names before rushing out 
(even though they never lost more than ¼2). One participant, after noticing during the 
debriefing that it was not uncommon to cooperate, confided in me that she felt guilty about 
defecting and quickly left the laboratory. Others gave me a pervasively sour look when I 
told them their cooperation had been met with defection and they therefore had to return 
part of their show-up fee, whereas yet others appeared visibly elated when I showed them 
that their decision to cooperate had inspired others to do the same in return.  
Emotions in social dilemmas thus are real. But do they also serve any function or, 
at least, have interpersonal effects? The four empirical chapters in this dissertation 
represent the first systematic attempt to investigate if emotions urge defectors to cooperate, 
encourage group members to coordinate, or lead group members to install structural 
solutions. In this general discussion I will first summarize all main findings, then present 
their contributions and implications and, before closing, discuss some possible limitations 
and avenues for future research. 
 
 
6.1 SUMMARY OF THE EMPIRICAL FINDINGS 
  
The aim of Chapter 2 was to investigate if direct reciprocity, as embodied by the famous 
tit-for-tat strategy, can be even more effective in averting defection if it is backed up by the 
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communication of emotion and, moreover, which emotion then induces more cooperation: 
anger or disappointment. Both emotions had been found to establish cooperation (e.g., Van 
Kleef et al., 2004; 2006), but, unlike disappointment, anger had also been found to backfire 
under certain circumstances, to arouse anger in the other and cause further escalation of 
conflicts (Van Dijk et al., 2008; Van Kleef & Côté, 2007). It was therefore hypothesized 
that disappointment would more effectively avert defection than would anger. 
 To test this, participants played a give-some game against a computer-simulated 
partner that employed a tit-for-tat strategy. In this game both players had a number of coins 
that were twice as valuable to their partner. Donating coins to the other was therefore 
costly, but paid off when reciprocated. After every few rounds, one’s partner would either 
communicate no emotion or would communicate anger or disappointment with an intensity 
that increased as participants defected more. As it turned out, when disappointment was 
communicated, higher levels of cooperation were indeed established than when anger or 
no emotion was communicated. Expressing anger did not lead to favorable outcomes: it 
evoked anger in participants, who had a negative overall impression of their partner and 
perceived him or her as relatively retaliatory and unforgiving. Disappointed partners were 
not perceived less positively or as unforgiving or retaliatory. In fact, when participants 
received the opportunity to inconspicuously increase or decrease their partner’s outcomes, 
they were more generous when their partner had been disappointed than when anger or no 
emotion had been communicated. The data thus point clearly in favor of expressing 
disappointment instead of anger or no emotion when a return favor is refused. 
 Chapter 3 also focused on anger and disappointment, but then in indirect 
reciprocity. Cooperation through indirect reciprocity is based on reputation: people known 
to cooperate deserve cooperation and people known to defect deserve defection. 
Disappointment and anger were proposed as part of a solution to a problem that results 
from such indirect-reciprocity logic: How do you distinguish between selfish, unjustified 
defection, motivated by greed, and retaliatory, justified defection that is motivated by a 
desire to discourage defection? 
 In Experiment 3.1, participants played a game of indirect reciprocity for real 
money and without deception. First it was shown that the unjustified act of defection 
against a cooperator elicited more disappointment and anger than the more justified act of 
defection against a defector did. This is especially interesting because participants 
experienced these emotions as a third party, having nothing to gain or lose from the 
defection that they observed, which provides good evidence for the idea that both anger 
and disappointment can be truly moral emotions (cf. Haidt, 2003; Batson et al., 2008). 
More important, however, is that anger and disappointment also signaled to third parties 
whether defection was justified or unjustified. Defection out of anger or disappointment 
was seen as a response to unjustified defection, was perceived as just and elicited more 
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cooperation than defection out of boredom or defection without emotion communication 
did. 
 Experiment 3.1 was not designed to show differential effects of anger and 
disappointment; this was the purpose of Experiment 3.2. Disappointment is a reaction to 
unfulfilled positive expectations (Van Dijk & Van Harreveld, 2008) and may therefore be 
an appropriate response to people who did not live up to their relatively positive reputation 
because they defected. Anger is a more coercive, forceful reaction which, as Chapter 2 also 
showed, may lead to escalation and is therefore best reserved for more ‘serious cases’, that 
is, defection by people who already have a relatively negative reputation. To test this 
hypothesis, participants read a scenario in which cooperation through indirect reciprocity 
was possible. As predicted, participants inferred that an employee who failed to help his 
colleagues had committed more similar defections in the past when his latest defection 
elicited anger instead of disappointment. Compared to anger, disappointment thus signals 
that defection is committed by a person with a positive reputation.  
Experiment 3.3 replicated the major findings of Experiment 3.1 and 3.2 with a 
new laboratory paradigm. It again showed that the communication of anger and 
disappointment allows third parties to discriminate justified from unjustified defection and 
that when disappointment over defection is expressed, third parties infer that the defector 
has a more positive reputation than when anger is expressed. Chapter 3 thus helps to solve 
a major problem in empirical research on indirect reciprocity by showing that through 
emotion communication people succeed in retaliating against defectors without unleashing 
a chain reaction of defection in response. 
 In Chapter 4, asymmetric step-level public good dilemmas were studied. It was 
investigated if emotions can be seen as social cues that inform participants about whether 
successful coordination is a likely prospect. The presence of an angry group member 
would suggest conflict and defection for the future, whereas the presence of a guilty group 
member would suggest social repair and cooperation. However, the idea was that such 
emotion inferences would only be instrumental for participants’ subsequent decisions if the 
angry or guilty member was actually capable of contributing considerable resources to 
realize the public good. Evidence for such a process is best provided by measuring 
preferences for structural solutions, such as exiting the group and installing a democratic 
leader. After all, when a group member that can contribute many chips is angry and, 
consequently, the future prospects for successful coordination are bleak, clear preferences 
for structural solutions can be predicted. 
 Across two studies, evidence for this reasoning was obtained. Experiment 4.1 
showed that an angry group member signaled an unwillingness to cooperate any further, 
whereas the opposite effect emerged for a guilty group member. However, only when the 
emotional group member had many endowments to contribute and thus was highly 
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instrumental in realizing the public good, participants inferred that the communicated 
emotion would affect whether or not a just future outcome would occur. Thus, participants 
chose to exit the group when a group member with many endowments expressed anger. 
Alternatively, when given the option of a more constructive structural solution, 
participants in Experiment 4.2 preferred to install a democratic leader when confronted 
with an angry group member with many endowments. Experiment 4.2 also showed another 
boundary condition to effects of emotion communication. When explicit promises are 
made, the implicit messages that can be inferred from emotions are no longer attended to. 
 The accumulated evidence from Chapter 4, which suggested that emotions may 
be used as socially informative cues in step-level public good dilemmas, paved the way to 
specifically study guilt in Chapter 5 and examine when and how exactly it allows people to 
coordinate their contributions to reach the provision point. Guilt signals that good chances 
of successful coordination await the group in the future, as was already clear from Chapter 
4. But this knowledge should only be useful if there is a coordination task ahead that 
would otherwise be difficult to overcome. Experiment 5.1 therefore tested if participants 
found guilt, as expressed by a fellow group member, more informative when they judged 
the provision point as difficult, rather than easy, to reach. This is indeed what the results 
showed. 
 The logical next step, then, was to examine in Experiment 5.2 if the 
communication of guilt led participants to successfully coordinate their contributions when 
the provision point was so high that under normal circumstances they would find adhering 
to equality too risky. First, participants inferred, in line with the social correction function 
of guilt, that the group member expressing guilt probably defected in the past but would 
refrain from doing so in the future. Moreover, participants inferred that if defection was 
sufficient reason to experience guilt, the other group member probably was a cooperative 
person that could be expected to act cooperatively in the future. Being convinced, then, 
that both their fellow group members would cooperate, participants in the guilt condition 
typically contributed enough to reach the provision point, even when it was high. 
Participants in the no-emotion condition, in contrast, were less certain that their group 
members would cooperate and therefore only managed to coordinate successfully when the 
provision point was low. Guilt thus facilitates coordination, but this can only be 
demonstrated empirically if a situation is created in which coordination normally fails, 
such as a public good dilemma with a high provision point. 
 To summarize, in all empirical chapters emotions conveyed important social 
information that affected participants’ subsequent decisions. They increased cooperation in 
an iterated prisoner’s dilemma by signaling forgiveness instead of retaliation, they 
prevented a chain reaction of defection in situations of indirect reciprocity by signaling 
when defection was justified and unjustified, they increased preferences for structural 
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change by signaling bleak or bright prospects for future cooperation and they let people 
adhere to equality even when the provision point was high. The main finding of this 
dissertation, then, is that by and large, emotions function as ubiquitous and indispensable, 
socially informative cues that help establish cooperation. 
 
 
6.2 IMPLICATIONS AND CONTRIBUTIONS 
 
This is not the place to regurgitate the implications of each individual chapter, but 
rather to take a broader perspective. After all, the empirical chapters are in many ways 
interconnected. Chapters 2 and 3 both report findings on how anger and disappointment 
guide reciprocity. Chapters 4 and 5 both report findings on the coordination potential of 
emotions in step-level public good dilemmas. Comparing the findings of both pairs of 
chapters, then, leads to conclusions that reach further than those presented in each 
individual chapter. Moreover, Chapter 3, 4 and 5 are among the first empirical 
investigations of emotion communication in interdependent situations that do not focus on 
dyadic interactions, but more broadly on intragroup settings and situations with third party 
observers. Furthermore, in all chapters a social-functional approach to emotions is adopted, 
so the pros and cons of this approach are also worth discussing. I will also outline the 
practical implications of the present findings.  
 
 
6.2.1 Disappointment and anger in reciprocal situations 
 
The bold message of Chapter 2 was that in situations of direct reciprocity 
expressing disappointment induces more cooperation than expressing anger does. In 
Chapter 3 on indirect reciprocity, anger had a more positive role. There it was proposed 
that communicating anger may effectively address repeated or severe defection, whereas 
communicating disappointment may effectively address incidental or mild defection. A 
closer look at participants’ donations in Experiment 2.1 (see also Figure 2.1) shows that 
before any emotion was communicated, participants already displayed an average 
cooperation rate of over 70%. This clearly does not qualify as severe defection. A possible 
boundary condition for the findings obtained in Chapter 2 therefore presents itself. When 
involved in a reciprocal relationship with a notorious defector, expressing disappointment 
may not be one’s best hope. It may even be interpreted as an opportunity to defect some 
more without having to fear immediate escalation. Instead, expressing anger, combined 
with a tit-for-tat strategy, may induce more cooperation. 
                                                                                                                   Chapter 6 
 
 104
 That disappointment is a less antagonistic emotion than anger does not necessarily 
mean it always is a ‘weak’ supplication emotion that communicates dependency and a 
need for support (Van Kleef et al., 2006; see also Clark, Pataki, & Carver, 1996). This may 
be true when one starts lamenting to a third party how disappointed one feels about being 
wronged (Timmers et al., 1998). But when one steps up directly to the wrongdoer and 
expresses disappointment, one does not so much desire support—one desires the other to 
live up to one’s positive expectations or to a positive reputation (see Chapter 3). In Chapter 
2, the communication of disappointment thus seems to be taken as an active attempt at 
rectification, rather than as a passive plea for help. But both motives do not necessarily 
conflict. Perhaps disappointment itself has the interpersonal function of eliciting empathy, 
but the subsequent intentional act of communicating one’s disappointment to the person 
that caused it may function to elicit behavioral change—and be understood by both 
persons as such. When intentionally displayed, disappointment may thus grow from a 
‘weak’ supplication emotion into a powerful emotional trump. 
 
 
6.2.2 Guilt and anger in step-level public good dilemmas  
 
Chapter 5 showed that when guilt was communicated in a symmetric public good 
dilemma, people contributed enough to reach a provision point that they would otherwise 
evaluate as too high to obtain. Would this finding generalize to asymmetric public good 
dilemmas, as studied in Chapter 4? Previous research has shown that asymmetry itself 
need not impede successful coordination; people readily adhere to a decision heuristic 
based on proportionality instead of equality (Van Dijk & Wilke, 1995; 2000). A 
precondition to also demonstrate effects of guilt in asymmetric dilemmas, then, again 
seems to be that the provision point is around 70% of group members’ total endowments 
(which is slightly higher than the provision point used in Chapter 4). There are two 
complicating factors, however. First, recall that when in Chapter 5 a group member 
communicated guilt while the provision point was high, participants actually inferred the 
other group member to be significantly more cooperative than when no emotion was 
communicated. Consequently, if in an asymmetric dilemma a group member with many 
endowments feels guilty, increased cooperation may be expected from the group member 
with only few endowments—perhaps not the most encouraging prospect. A second 
complicating factor is that, conversely, when a group member with few endowments 
communicates guilt, participants may pay little attention to this information, as shown in 
Chapter 4. Only participants with, for example, a dispositional tendency to process much 
information before acting may realize after some deliberation that such guilt actually 
implies that the group member with many endowments will display increased cooperation 
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(Van Kleef et al., 2004). The effects that guilt has in asymmetric dilemmas may thus be 
somewhat weaker than in symmetric dilemmas, or at least more difficult to demonstrate 
empirically. 
 A complementary question is what effects the communication of anger, as studied 
in Chapter 4, may have on cooperation in symmetric step-level public good dilemmas, as 
studied in Chapter 5. Chapter 4 showed that angry group members were expected to no 
longer cooperate, which would bode ill for successful future coordination. Moreover, anger 
implies that other group members have previously defected (see also Schroeder et al., 
2003; Stouten et al., 2005). In line with the mediation analysis of Chapter 5, people may 
infer that their contribution will be insufficient to reach the provision point and therefore 
defect too (Kerr, 1992; Messick et al., 1983; Rapoport & Eshed-Levy, 1989; Suleiman & 
Rapoport, 1992). Only when the provision point is quite low and the public good very 
profitable, it is conceivable that people try to compensate for their fellow group members’ 
defection (cf. Karau & Williams, 1991). Yet such cooperation in the face of intragroup 
conflict, even when economically rational, may be rare. People fear being the “sucker” 
(Kerr, 1989) or, due to emotional contagion (Hatfield et al., 1994), simply defect out of 
irritation (Friedman et al., 2004; see also Chapter 2). One of the most constructive ways, 
then, to deal with anger in social dilemmas is through structural change, as examined in 
Chapter 4. 
 
 
6.2.3 Intragroup dynamics 
  
Research on interpersonal effects of emotion in interdependent situations has 
focused almost exclusively on dyadic interactions (for an exception, see Van Beest et al., 
2008). As a result, it has been demonstrated that, for example, an angry negotiator is 
perceived as tough but also as dislikable and annoying, which may influence subsequent 
actions toward this negotiator (Friedman et al., 2004; Sinaceur & Tiedens, 2006; Van 
Kleef et al., 2004). In such research, anger is both communicated to and experienced 
toward the same person. But when more than two people are involved in an interdependent 
situation, the possibility arises that emotion is also communicated, be it intentionally or 
coincidentally, to a person to whom it is not experienced. Third parties may thus be 
informed of developments they themselves did not witness. This has important 
interpersonal consequences. When third parties know that—apparently—guilt, anger, 
gratitude or awe is experienced toward another, this is likely to affect their social 
perception of and subsequent social interaction with this person. The practical relevance of 
this is evident from the sheer fact that everyday conversations consist for 60% of often 
emotionally-laden talk about absent others (i.e., gossip; Wert & Salovey, 2004; 
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Baumeister, Zhang, & Vohs, 2004). But even outside the research area of interdependent 
situations, such emotion inference by third parties is basically ignored, at least by several 
authoritative volumes on social aspects of emotions (Guerrero & Andersen, 1998; Lewis, 
Haviland-Jones, & Feldman Barrett, 2008; Parkinson et al., 2005; Planalp, 1999). 
Affective influences on person perception have been studied empirically, but usually only 
when affect was experienced either by observers themselves (Forgas, 1991; Forgas & 
Bower, 2001), or by the observed person (Knutson, 1996; Montepare & Dobish, 2003; 
Sommers, 1984; Tiedens, 2001).  
Nevertheless, it is evident from this dissertation that emotions, when 
communicated to third parties, are also informative of and even have monetary 
consequences for the person toward whom they are experienced. In Chapter 3, people that 
elicited anger or disappointment were believed to have defected and therefore received 
defection in return more often than when no emotional information was available. 
Disappointment also signaled a more positive reputation than anger did. In Chapter 5, third 
parties perceived a group member toward whom guilt was experienced as pro-social, 
which led them to act more cooperatively too.  
Three conclusions may be drawn from these effects of emotion. First, they are 
driven more by inferences than by emotional contagion. Guilt, after all, does not spread 
through contagion, but did lead to pro-social impressions of the group member toward 
whom it was experienced. Contagion could play a role, though. Anger that is aroused 
through contagion may lead to aggression even before it is clear what injustice has been 
committed by the person that elicited anger. But even then it seems at least as common that 
communicated anger leads one to infer an injustice, which subsequently arouses anger 
toward the perpetrator in oneself, too. This process may even occur in absence of the 
perpetrator or of any factual information about the transgression. The fact that third parties 
are typically somewhat less directly involved in emotional episodes may cause a more 
inferential, analytical information-processing style as well. 
Second, the communication of guilt appears to influence inferences about the 
person toward whom it is experienced through a more elaborate process than anger and 
disappointment do. In social dilemmas all three emotions primarily signal defection, but 
only in the case of guilt the emotional person is also the one who actually committed the 
defection. From this inference it is another step to infer that the person toward whom it is 
experienced probably did cooperate. Conversely, it is immediately clear that a person who 
elicited disappointment or anger has defected, but from there it is another step to infer that 
the emotional person him- or herself then probably cooperated. The accompanying effect 
sizes in studies 3.3, and 5.2 also suggest that inferences about the person toward whom an 
emotion is experienced are more primary for anger and disappointment than for guilt. In 
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situations of cognitive load, then, such effects are likely to occur only for anger and 
disappointment and not for guilt.  
Third, these results show that emotions are an indication of someone’s 
cooperative reputation. Guilt signals that the person to whom it is experienced has been 
more cooperative than when disappointment is expressed, which, in turn, signals more 
cooperation than anger. The position of other emotions along this continuum can easily be 
hypothesized as well: gratitude and admiration may outscore guilt, while contempt and 
disgust may even be outscored by anger. In social dilemmas this continuum of cooperative 
reputation may be most appropriate, but in other situations different types of reputations—
or perhaps even a general valence dimension—may be accurate. Emotion intensity may 
communicate the magnitude of reputation change. Such processes demonstrate that 
emotion communication is also relevant for the literature on leadership, gossip and social 
perception.  
 
 
6.2.4 Evaluating a social-functional account of emotions 
 
After four empirical chapters of articulating hypotheses and discussing findings 
by adopting a social-functional account of emotions, the time has come to provide a 
critical evaluation of this account. Since the birth of our species cooperation has 
simultaneously been one of humanity’s greatest strengths and greatest challenges, so if 
emotions truly have social functions, social dilemmas are where this should be apparent 
(Keltner et al., 2006). Many effects of communicated emotion are indeed documented in 
this dissertation, but does this mean emotions are socially functional? 
First, there is a difference between testing a theoretical framework and using it to 
generate hypotheses. In Chapter 4, for example, when anger was communicated, installing 
a democratic leader that could monitor defectors was preferred. While this is clearly in line 
with the socially corrective function of anger, preference to install a democratic leader is 
too indirect a measure of this function to be a critical test of it. Certainly, structural change 
may solve social dilemmas, so it is wonderful that a social-functional account can so 
readily be used to generate sensible hypotheses about structural change. But this advantage 
of a social-functional account is rather tautological; positing that emotions are functional 
obviously generates more hypotheses than positing they are not functional. The real 
question is if functions can be tested empirically. 
Here, another difficulty arises that I referred to earlier. Functions of emotions can 
not be identified solely through their regular beneficial consequences. Also required is an 
analysis of how these consequences are the result of goal-directed action that is implied in 
the origin and development of the emotion and its communication (Keltner & Gross, 
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1999). That means that hypotheses about the specific functions of emotions may be 
incorrect even if the beneficial consequences they predict are routinely confirmed 
empirically. Whether or not emotions serve social functions is therefore also a 
philosophical debate. But data are nevertheless helpful. They may not be able to provide a 
definite verification of hypotheses about function, but they can certainly falsify them by 
showing that certain beneficial consequences do not occur. Let us, with this in mind, re-
examine several of the reported findings. 
Good support was found in Chapter 5 for the social function of guilt: socially 
repairing one’s transgressions (Baumeister et al., 1994; Frijda & Mesquita, 1994; Lewis, 
2008). It should be noted that the ‘manner of organization’ (Keltner & Gross, 1999) of the 
social-functional account I adopted in this chapter differs from other chapters. In Chapters 
2 and 3 I took specific functions as unit of analysis (i.e., averting defection in direct 
reciprocity and justifying defection in indirect reciprocity, respectively) and studied 
whether or not anger and disappointment serve these functions. In Chapter 5, however, I 
took a specific emotion as unit of analysis (i.e., guilt) and studied what function it had in 
social dilemmas. Thus, I did not examine beneficial effects of guilt by staging a situation 
in which social repair in a social dilemma was required, but instead examined if third 
parties inferred that a group member who felt guilty had transgressed and intended to 
socially repair this transgression. This is indeed what I found: group members that felt 
guilty were expected to restore their cooperativeness to conventional levels. But more 
beneficial consequences resulted. Guilt also improved the cooperative reputation of the 
group member toward whom it was experienced. It is difficult to determine whether or not 
this is also an integral part of the social function of guilt, but it could be if, as the data 
suggest, it leads a transgressor to get away with social repair instead of social 
overcompensation. The beneficial consequence that third parties also cooperated more 
when guilt was communicated is more likely to be a side effect than a social function of 
guilt. 
Mixed support was found for the social function of anger. Chapters 2 and 3 
provided a direct test of the effectiveness of anger in averting defection and justifying 
retaliation against defectors—two behaviors that can be subsumed under the supposed 
social correction function of anger (Averill, 1982; Frijda & Mesquita, 1994; Solomon, 
1990). Anger did get the message across: in both chapters it signaled retaliation. But it 
only had beneficial consequences in Chapter 3, where third parties reacted more leniently 
to retaliatory defection that was motivated by anger. In dyadic interactions, anger did not 
induce more cooperation and even aroused anger in response, despite that its 
communication after a clear failure to reciprocate was certainly justified. To claim that 
anger is often not functional is premature, however. As noted above, in Chapter 2 anger 
might have been functional if the average level of cooperation in dyads had been lower. 
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Moreover, the claim that anger does not function to rectify injustice in interdependent 
situations needs to be based on more than one study. Few of such studies are available, 
though, because in most studies in which beneficial consequences of anger were not found, 
the expression of anger was not a response to a clear social wrongdoing and therefore not a 
direct test of its functionality (e.g., Friedman et al., 2004; Van Beest et al., 2008; Van Dijk 
et al., 2008; Van Kleef & Côté, 2007). Still, one may doubt to what extent some anger 
components—especially those that prepare for physical violence (e.g., increased blood 
flow to the arms; Ekman, Levenson, & Friesen, 1983)—are functional in modern societies 
where both parties can often be certain that physical violence will not result. Admittedly, 
false alarms need not imply dysfunctionality (Nesse, 1990) and anger displays may to 
some extent have been ritualized, but more successful ways to correct social wrongdoings 
may nevertheless be available. 
The findings in Chapters 2 and 3 suggest that disappointment may be one of such 
ways to correct social wrongdoings. It averted defection in direct reciprocity and it 
justified retaliatory defection in indirect reciprocity. If these are functions of 
disappointment, they certainly need not be the only ones. Disappointment, after all, is often 
caused by other events than unjust actions or social wrongdoings (e.g., bad luck). 
However, as noted above, experiencing disappointment is one thing, but intentionally 
confronting a defector with it is another. In that case, disappointment, like anger, does in 
fact appear to assume the function of social correction. This process is a clear 
demonstration of how volition may play a role in the assignment of specific emotions to 
specific social functions. As a result, the extent to which there is functional overlap 
between anger and disappointment may vary across cultures. This leads to the interesting 
hypothesis that in cultures where disappointment has less of a social correction function, 
conflicts may be settled more often through anger and, possibly, physical violence. 
All in all, then, the final evaluation of a social-functional account of emotion is 
generally positive, though a few caveats should be kept in mind. First, its success in 
generating and confirming interesting hypotheses is in itself no evidence for its main 
assumption that emotions are socially functional. Second, neither does evidence that 
emotions have beneficial consequences necessarily imply functionality. Third, not all 
emotions need to be equally functional—some may even have become somewhat less 
functional in contemporary society. And fourth, the relation between emotion and social 
function is rather dynamic: they may not always map cleanly onto each other and 
functional overlap between emotions may occur and change over time. With that being 
said, adopting a social-functional account of emotion has certainly been instrumental in 
showing that emotions communicate social information that can reduce social uncertainty, 
facilitate coordination and even transform (one’s perceptions of) the underlying outcome 
structure of social dilemmas. 
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6.2.5 Practical implications 
 
That this dissertation has drawn from and—so I hope—contributes to 
fundamental theories on social dilemmas and emotion does not mean, of course, that it 
does not also have clear practical implications. After all, as Kurt Lewin (1951) famously 
put it: “There is nothing so practical as a good theory” (p. 159). Indeed, it is obvious from 
everyday experience that emotions are involved when people return favors to each other 
and to third parties (or fail to do so) and when they work together in small groups. The 
most general advice that follows from this dissertation is to express these emotions, for 
they are mostly functional. One possible caveat, though, is that whereas emotions may 
establish cooperation, this does not mean they should be communicated if they are not 
experienced. In fact, in Chapters 3, 4 and 5 such strategic display of emotion was ruled out 
by the experimental procedure. Even in Chapter 2, where the communication of emotion 
was not involuntary, its expression was always appropriate and justifiable. Another caveat 
is that expressing anger directly to defectors may occasionally backfire. A constructive 
alternative to lashing out in anger may be, in small groups at least, to propose that a 
democratic leader be installed—a suggestion that other group members are likely to 
support if they suspect that anger is brewing. 
That emotions generally encourage cooperation means from a practical point of 
view that care must be taken that the proper conditions for their communication are 
created. This can be achieved both in face-to-face and computer-mediated settings (Derks 
et al., 2008). What is important, though, is that group members are motivated to pay 
attention to each others’ emotions. Under conditions of time pressure (Van Kleef et al., 
2004) or distrust (Van Kleef et al., 2006), for example, emotions are unlikely to foster 
cooperation. Norms may also dampen the expression of emotions. Bies and Tripp (2007), 
for instance, criticize the ‘managerial perspective’ that is traditionally assumed in 
organizational psychology on the grounds that it depicts especially anger as inefficient and 
its expression as unprofessional. To the extent that such a managerial perspective is 
adopted in the workplace, then, any beneficial consequences of emotions on cooperation 
will not materialize. 
A final practical implication that must not be overlooked has to do with the 
important guiding role that science plays in many people’s lives. Cooperation is not some 
vague, theoretical concept and neither is emotion: people think about both a lot and even 
articulate lay theories about them (Ben-Artzi & Mikulincer, 1995; Miller, 1999; 
Wakefield, 1993; Zammuner, 2000). What if science would downplay people’s 
predisposition to cooperate, portray emotions as dysfunctional remnants of the prehistoric 
era and assert that moral emotions do not exist? It might affect the world views and self-
construals of many people and instill pessimism and cynicism. Of course, science is not 
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about sketching rosy pictures of human behavior. But this dissertation suggests that these 
three views are unrealistically gloomy—and that should be an encouraging thought to 
many. 
 
 
6.3 LIMITATIONS AND SUGGESTIONS FOR FUTURE RESEARCH 
 
I do not have the illusion that this dissertation provides a treatment of emotion 
communication in social dilemmas that is even anywhere near exhaustive. Many avenues 
for future research are recommendable. Furthermore, there are several possible limitations 
to this dissertation that deserve attention. I will outline these below. 
 
 
6.3.1 Ecological validity of computer-mediated settings 
 
In several empirical chapters I have already briefly discussed the pros and cons of 
my preference to study emotion and cooperation in computer-mediated instead of face-to-
face settings. A more elaborate explanation for this preference follows here. The primary 
advantage of computer-mediated interaction is that emotions can be communicated without 
compromising experimental control, so that causality can be established. As demonstrated 
in Experiment 3.1, this does not necessarily require deception or prevent a proper use of 
monetary incentives. But it may evoke concerns about ecological validity. The act of 
cooperation itself, however, often does not occur in face-to-face settings. Donating money 
to charity, preparing for a meeting and writing a chapter for an edited book are all 
examples of cooperation in the absence of others—and all can even be conducted on a 
computer. Some social dilemmas are even inherent to digital environments (Smith & 
Kollock, 1999). But also the communication of emotion often does not occur in face-to-
face settings, but through media such as e-mail, SMS, web logs or chat services (Derks et 
al., 2008; Ling, 2008). In this sense the research paradigms adopted in this dissertation are 
certainly ecologically valid. 
Whether the current findings can also be generalized to face-to-face settings is 
another question. Indeed, there are obvious differences between both contexts (Derks et al., 
2008). For example, in computer-mediated settings the absence of mimicry impedes 
emotional embodiment. Also, the increased time lag between messages may facilitate 
emotion regulation. But digital environments are by no means emotionally impoverished. 
The lack of physical contact and non-verbal emotional cues may be compensated with 
emoticons or an increased use of emotion words (Derks et al., 2008). Indeed, in spite of 
initial skepticism about the emotional richness of computer-mediated settings (Rice & 
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Love, 1987; Sproull & Kiesler, 1986), little evidence has accumulated since then that 
supports such view (Derks et al., 2008; Walther 1995; Walther & Burgoon, 1992). The 
crucial question, however, is if comparable effects of emotion communication can be 
observed in both settings. Whereas little research has addressed this question directly, 
many findings that were obtained with similar paradigms as reported here (e.g., Van Kleef 
et al., 2004a) have been replicated when emotions were communicated non-verbally (Van 
Kleef et al., 2009; Pietroni, et al., 2008) or in face-to-face settings (Sinaceur & Tiedens, 
2006). I therefore have no a priori reason to question the generalizability of the present 
findings to face-to-face settings, but future research could resolve this issue more 
definitively.  
 
 
6.3.2 Resource dilemmas 
 
One could wonder to what extent the present findings generalize to other types of 
social dilemmas. I did examine interpersonal effects of emotion in iterated two-player 
give-some dilemmas, in indirect-reciprocity games and in step-level public good 
dilemmas, but not in another important type of social dilemmas: resource dilemmas 
(Ostrom, 2002). Obviously, like in public good dilemmas, group members in resource 
dilemmas are also confronted with general problems revolving around defection, 
coordination and structural change, so emotions will probably be no less functional here. 
Still, emotions may have somewhat different effects in resource dilemmas, for example 
because adhering to the decision heuristic of equal final outcomes instead of 
proportionality is more common. As a result, in asymmetric step-level resource dilemmas 
influential group members often end up with fewer resources than in asymmetric step-level 
public good dilemmas (Van Dijk & Wilke, 2000). This may affect the finding in Chapter 4 
that the emotions of influential group members are attended to more closely, although it is 
not immediately clear how. A higher preference for equality may mean that one’s attention 
to other group members (and their emotions) is also distributed more equally, though it 
may also mean that the higher level of cooperativeness that is expected from influential 
group members leads one to monitor their emotions more closely.  
The effect of anger in step-level public good dilemmas on group members’ 
preference to install a leader may also either be attenuated or exacerbated in resource 
dilemmas. On the one hand, unlike in resource dilemmas, group members in public good 
dilemmas have private possessions before making their decisions and may therefore not be 
willing to hand over their decisional freedom at the first sign of conflict in the group (Van 
Dijk et al., 2003). On the other hand, collective failure may be evaluated as a suboptimal 
gain in a step-level resource dilemma, but as a loss of one’s own contributions in a step-
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level public good dilemma (Brewer & Kramer, 1986; Fleishman, 1988). Because losses 
loom larger than gains (Kahneman & Tversky, 1979), imminent collective failure—as 
signaled by anger—may make group members more willing to install a leader in public 
good dilemmas than in resource dilemmas (Van Dijk et al., 2003). In other words, there are 
both reasons to hypothesize that the effects of emotion reported in this dissertation will be 
weaker and stronger in resource dilemmas. Future research, then, would probably succeed 
in replicating many of the present findings, but, in doing so, could also shed light on the 
various differences between dilemma types that are likely to affect the impact of 
communicated emotions. 
 
 
6.3.3 Interpersonal effects of other emotions 
 
Anger, guilt and disappointment are logical emotions to study in social dilemmas, 
but by far not the only ones. Contempt may signal that a group member has defected 
repeatedly and needs to be excluded from the social dilemma (Fischer & Roseman, 2007). 
A function opposite to that of anger may be fulfilled by gratitude, which signals an 
intention to reciprocate or reward a cooperative act (Trivers, 1971; Haidt, 2003). The 
communication of gratitude should therefore increase the likelihood of collective success 
in step-level social dilemmas, especially because, unlike guilt, it is not preceded by 
defection. Indebtedness also signals an intention to reciprocate, but this emotion is 
oppositely valenced than gratitude because it is more of a dutiful response to the perceived 
expectations of a benefactor (Watkins, Scheer, Ovnicek, & Kolts, 2006). Third parties may 
thus infer increased cooperation from indebtedness, but only in the short term. Personal 
achievements and success can elicit pride, which may communicate that one deserves 
increased status (Keltner et al., 2006; Tracy & Robins, 2007). However, in social dilemmas 
the definition of success may differ for cooperators and defectors, and for that reason also 
its interpretation by others when it is displayed. An important function of shame is, if 
possible, to repair one’s damaged self-concept (De Hooge et al., 2008; Frijda, Kuipers, & 
Ter Schure, 1989; Tangney, Miller, Flicker, & Barlow, 1996), which can be done by 
cooperating with those toward whom one feels ashamed (De Hooge et al., 2008). Its 
interpersonal effects may therefore resemble those that were found for guilt in Chapter 5. 
Obviously, then, plenty avenues for future research exist, but there is a caveat. That much 
research has documented structural effects of specific emotions on human behavior does 
not necessarily mean that lay people will make similar predictions when observing 
emotional others. Future research may unveil structural differences between both that 
result from human fallacy—or bad experimental design. 
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6.3.4 Other social functions of emotions 
 
As explained earlier, emotions have several general social functions at the 
interpersonal level (Keltner & Haidt, 1999; 2001; Keltner & Kring, 1998). One is to 
provide information about the other player’s emotions, beliefs, and intentions. This 
function fits well with a research area like social dilemmas which is rooted in game theory, 
because information may alter (one’s perceptions of) the underlying outcome structure of 
social dilemmas. To the extent that it does, it is likely to be instrumental in one’s 
subsequent decisions, as especially Chapters 4 and 5 show. The type of emotional 
information that was studied in this dissertation was mostly social. And indeed, it elicited 
inferences about retaliation or forgiveness, justified or unjustified defection, bleak or 
bright prospects for successful coordination and intentions to cooperate. But emotions may 
not only reduce social uncertainty, but also provide information about the task 
environment. The previously mentioned study by Sorce and colleagues (1985) where 
infants were more likely to cross a visual cliff if mothers displayed joy or interest as 
opposed to fear or anger provides a clear demonstration of this. It is plausible that 
emotions have a similar function in social dilemmas. Future research could therefore study 
how and when emotions reduce resource or group size uncertainty. 
Second, emotions have an evocative general social function (Keltner & Haidt, 
2001). In particular, they may induce complementary emotions in others. Distress, for 
example, may evoke sympathy (Batson & Shaw, 1991) and embarrassment may evoke 
amusement (Keltner et al., 1997). Emotions that are thus evoked may subsequently elicit 
socially adaptive other-oriented responses such as avoidance, affiliation, and cooperation. 
Initially, the function of more contagious, reciprocal emotions—such as one person 
catching another’s sadness (Hatfield et al., 1994)—were also labeled as evocative (Keltner 
& Haidt, 1999; Keltner & Kring, 1998), but their function was later seen as more 
informative instead (Keltner & Haidt, 2001). Indeed, unlike complementary emotions, 
emotions that are experienced through contagion typically seem less intentionally directed 
at other people, but may help to better understand why the other person experiences a 
particular emotion. This dissertation has primarily focused on the informative function of 
emotion, but the evocative function deserves future investigation as well. Such research 
could reveal interpersonal effects of emotions that are not so much mediated by inferences 
about intentions to cooperate, but by complementary emotions that alter the values 
individuals attach to their own and others’ outcomes. 
A final general social function of emotion is that of an incentive in social 
interaction (Keltner & Haidt, 1999; 2001; Keltner & Kring, 1998). In other words, 
emotional expressions can reinforce desirable and deter undesirable social behavior. 
Parent-child interactions provide an obvious illustration of this function (Tronick, 1989). I 
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wonder, though, if this nevertheless important function can also be subsumed under the 
evocative and informative functions of emotion. After all, how else than through evoking 
complementary emotion or providing information can emotions serve as incentives? 
Moreover, the evocative and informative functions still seem required to differentiate the 
deterrent function of anger and fear and the incentive function of joy and interest (Sorce et 
al., 1985). Perhaps, then, the concepts of deterrent and incentive are a convenient 
denominator of many interpersonal effects of emotion rather than that they represent a 
separate outcome or process. Still, it is clear from Chapter 2 that emotions are a deterrent 
of defection, so the exact underlying process is certainly worth studying. 
 
 
6.3.5 Beyond social-functional accounts 
 
Several decades ago, the only viable solution to social dilemmas was “mutual 
coercion, mutually agreed upon” (Hardin, 1968) and emotions were seen by many as 
“useless and bad for our peace of mind and blood pressure” (Skinner, 1948). In recent 
years both research areas have started to converge. Research on interpersonal effects of 
emotion in interdependent situations is becoming increasingly popular. How may this 
emerging research area be advanced? I predict that our understanding of cooperation will 
be furthered greatly by dual-process models that refine social-functional approaches to 
emotion. Dual-process models have great explanatory power because they hypothesize that 
behavior (or any other outcome) may result from at least two different pathways, such as a 
conscious and an unconscious one, that may interact in many ways (Gilbert, 1999). Indeed, 
dual-process assumptions are implicit in much modern theory on emotion (Baumeister et 
al., 2007), social dilemmas (Weber et al., 2004) and, in fact, as is evident from the above 
discussion, also in social-functional accounts of emotion.  
Especially relevant to follow-up research is the Emotion as Social Information 
(EASI) model (Van Kleef, 2009). It proposes that emotions have interpersonal effects 
through an inferential or an affective pathway. The inferential pathway brings about 
behavior through an appraisal-based analysis of the other person’s emotion, whereas the 
affective pathway brings about behavior through emotional contagion or by affecting 
interpersonal liking and impressions of the emotional person. Furthermore, the model 
proposes that the observer’s information processing and social-relational factors moderate 
both processes. The model can parsimoniously account for many interpersonal effects of 
emotion and the distinction between an affective and an inferential route is appealing. But 
empirical research is needed to validate it further and suggest ways to extend it. For 
example, information processing and social-relational factors may determine whether the 
inferential or affective route takes precedence, but what determines how they both 
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influence each other, as would be the case when one’s communication of anger leads to 
inferences that arouse anger in the other? And how is the finding that anger can 
subliminally elicit fear (Dimberg & ėhman, 1996) part of the affective route? Is this a 
special case of emotional contagion, or should the interpersonal effect of emotion on 
interpersonal liking that the model proposes be regarded as part of a more general process 
that involves several affective states (cf. complementary emotion, Keltner & Haidt, 2001)? 
The answer to such questions may be obtained in a context where the communication of 
emotion has been ignored until now: Social dilemmas.  
 
 
6.4 CONCLUSION 
  
It has been known for decades that social dilemmas elicit strong emotions. As it 
turns out, these are no mere epiphenomena—they actually help solve various cooperation-
related problems that may arise. Suboptimal cooperation in reciprocal dyadic relationships 
may be addressed by communicating disappointment, which does not even convey a 
negative impression. Communicating anger is better reserved for situations of indirect 
reciprocity; it justifies retaliatory defection against defectors, especially against regular 
defectors. Otherwise, communicating disappointment is a better way to justify to observers 
that one defected to retaliate. The communication of anger in step-level public good 
dilemmas is another matter. Compared to guilt, it signals bleak prospects for future 
coordination, especially when expressed by an influential group member, making that 
group members often prefer structural solutions such as installing a democratic leader. 
Structural solutions are not necessary when guilt is expressed—guilt actually leads people 
to contribute their fair share even when collective success is difficult to obtain. Taken 
together, these findings show that emotions generally function as socially informative cues 
that help to solve social dilemmas. It is my hope that this encouraging finding inspires 
scholars and lay people alike to further explore the potential of emotions to promote 
mutual cooperation.  
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SAMENVATTING (DUTCH SUMMARY) 
 
Coöperatie is een fundamenteel organiserend principe van sociale interactie, niet 
alleen in tweetallen, maar ook in groepen en complexe samenlevingen (Nowak, 2006). Een 
handeling is coöperatief wanneer afstand gedaan wordt van het eigenbelang om het 
gemeenschappelijk belang te dienen. Situaties waarin eigenbelang en gemeenschappelijk 
belang botsen, en dus waarin coöperatie en non-coöperatie (defectie) mogelijk is, heten 
sociale dilemma’s. Het is reeds lang bekend dat sociale dilemma’s sterke emoties oproepen 
(Dawes e.a., 1977). De centrale vraag in deze dissertatie is echter wat voor invloed deze 
emoties hebben op medemensen in een sociaal dilemma. In hoeverre helpen emoties—of is 
het zelfs hun functie—om coöperatie te bewerkstelligen en sociale dilemma’s op te lossen? 
 Hoofdstuk 1 biedt een inleiding tot coöperatie in sociale dilemma’s en emoties. 
Een belangrijk mechanisme dat kan leiden tot coöperatie is directe wederkerigheid. Hier 
beantwoorden ontvangers van defectie en coöperatie dit zelf met, respectievelijk, defectie 
en coöperatie. Bij indirecte wederkerigheid zijn het niet de ontvangers, maar derden die 
defectie en coöperatie wederkeren. Belangrijk voor de studie van coöperatie zijn verder 
publiek goed dilemma’s, gemodelleerd naar de realisatie van bijvoorbeeld clubs en schone 
lucht. Van deze publieke goederen kan ook geprofiteerd worden door hen die niet aan de 
voorziening ervan hebben bijgedragen. Dit maakt defectie individueel rationeel, maar ook 
collectief rampzalig. Om een publiek goed te realiseren is vaak een minimale hoeveelheid 
bijdragen nodig. Dit is het provisiepunt, en dergelijke dilemma’s heten stapsgewijze 
publiek goed dilemma’s. Het behalen van een provisiepunt vereist coördinatie van 
bijdragen tussen groepsleden onderling. Wanneer onvoldoende coöperatie dreigt, wordt 
vaak besloten tot structurele oplossingen zoals het aanstellen van een democratisch leider 
of het verlaten van het sociale dilemma.  
Het belang van emoties voor zowel directe en indirecte wederkerigheid als 
publiek goed dilemma’s volgt uit een sociaal-functionele benadering van emoties (Keltner 
& Haidt, 2001). Deze benadering stelt onder meer dat emoties sociale informatie 
verschaffen door de intenties, motivaties en overtuigingen van een interactiepartner aan te 
geven, wat helpt om sociale interacties te coördineren. Onderzoek naar onderhandelingen 
toont inderdaad aan dat het communiceren van emoties effect heeft op de concessies die 
onderhandelaars doen (bijv. Van Kleef e.a., 2006). Emoties zouden daarom eveneens 
kunnen helpen bij problemen die betrekking hebben op coöperatie, alsmede op coördinatie 
en structurele oplossingen, welke allen relevant zijn in sociale dilemma’s. Op dit 
theoretische raamwerk werden de vier empirische hoofdstukken gebaseerd die in dit 
proefschrift zijn gerapporteerd. 
Het doel van Hoofdstuk 2 was om te onderzoeken of directe wederkerigheid, 
belichaamd door de beroemde, strikt wederkerige, leer-om-leer (tit-for-tat) strategie zelfs 
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nog effectiever is in het afweren van defectie als deze gesteund wordt door de 
communicatie van emotie en, verder, welke emotie dan meer coöperatie teweegbrengt: 
boosheid of teleurstelling. Van beide emoties is bekend dat ze coöperatie bewerkstelligen 
(bijv. Van Kleef e.a., 2004; 2006), maar, anders dan teleurstelling, is bekend dat boosheid 
ook averechts kan werken in bepaalde omstandigheden, boosheid kan oproepen in de ander 
en verdere escalatie kan veroorzaken (Van Dijk e.a., 2008; Van Kleef & Côté, 2007). 
Verwacht werd daarom dat teleurstelling effectiever dan boosheid zou zijn in het afweren 
van defectie. 
 Om dit te testen speelden proefpersonen een ‘geef-dilemma’ met een 
computergesimuleerde partner die een leer-om-leer strategie hanteerde. In dit spel hadden 
allebei de spelers een aantal munten die twee keer zoveel waard waren voor de ander. Het 
doneren van munten was daarom kostbaar, maar loonde in geval van wederkering. Na elke 
paar ronden communiceerde de partner ofwel geen emotie, ofwel boosheid of teleurstelling 
met een intensiteit die toenam naarmate proefpersonen meer defecteerden. Het 
communiceren van teleurstelling bleek inderdaad hogere niveaus van coöperatie te 
bewerkstelligen dan het communiceren van boosheid of geen emotie. Het uiten van 
boosheid leidde niet tot gunstige resultaten: het wekte boosheid op in proefpersonen, die 
een negatieve algehele indruk kregen van hun partner en deze als relatief 
vergeldingsgezind en weinig vergevingsgezind beoordeelden. Sterker nog, wanneer 
proefpersonen de mogelijkheid kregen om zonder medeweten van hun partner diens 
opbrengsten te laten toe- of afnemen waren ze grootmoediger wanneer hun partner 
teleurstelling in plaats van boosheid of geen emotie had gecommuniceerd.  
 Hoofdstuk 3 focuste ook op boosheid en teleurstelling, maar dan in indirecte 
wederkerigheid. Coöperatie door middel van indirecte wederkerigheid is gebaseerd op 
reputatie: wie erom bekend staan te coöpereren verdient coöperatie en wie erom bekend 
staat te defecteren verdient defectie. Voorgesteld werd dat teleurstelling en boosheid 
onderdeel zijn van een oplossing voor een probleem dat voortkomt uit zulke indirecte-
wederkerigheidslogica: Hoe onderscheid je zelfzuchtige, ongerechtvaardigde defectie, 
gemotiveerd door hebzucht, van vergeldingsgezinde, gerechtvaardigde defectie, 
gemotiveerd door een verlangen om defectie te ontmoedigen?  
 In Experiment 3.1 speelden proefpersonen een spel van indirecte wederkerigheid 
om echt geld en zonder deceptie. Eerst werd aangetoond dat de ongerechtvaardigde 
handeling van defectie tegen een coöperator meer teleurstelling en boosheid opriep dan dat 
de meer gerechtvaardigde handeling van defectie tegen een defecteerder deed. Dit is met 
name interessant omdat proefpersonen deze emotie als een derde partij ervoeren, zonder 
iets te winnen of verliezen te hebben van de defectie die ze oberveerden. Dit is een sterke 
aanwijzing dat zowel boosheid en teleurstelling wel degelijk morele emoties kunnen zijn. 
Belangrijker is echter dat boosheid en teleurstelling ook aan derden te kennen gaven of 
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defectie gerechtvaardigd was of niet. Defectie uit boosheid of teleurstelling werd gezien als 
een antwoord op ongerechtvaardigde defectie, werd als rechtvaardig beoordeeld en bracht 
meer coöperatie teweeg dan dat defectie uit verveling of defectie zonder communicatie van 
emotie deden. 
 Experiment 3.1 was niet ontworpen om verschillende effecten van boosheid en 
teleurstelling aan te tonen; dit was het doel van Experiment 3.2. Teleurstelling is een 
reactie op onvervulde positieve verwachtingen (Van Dijk & Van Harreveld, 2008) en kan 
daarom een gepast antwoord zijn op mensen die doordat ze hebben gedefecteerd niet  
voldaan hebben aan hun relatief positieve reputatie. Boosheid is een meer dwingende, 
krachtigere reactie die, zoals Hoofdstuk 2 liet zien, kan leiden tot escalatie en daarom beter 
bewaard kan worden voor meer ‘serieuze gevallen’, namelijk defecteerders die reeds een 
relatief negatieve reputatie hebben. Om deze hypothese te testen lazen proefpersonen een 
scenario waarin coöperatie door middel van indirecte wederkerigheid mogelijk was. Zoals 
voorspeld concludeerden proefpersonen dat een werknemer die naliet zijn collega’s te 
helpen, in het verleden meer gelijksoortige defecties had gepleegd wanneer zijn meest 
recente defectie geen boosheid maar teleurstelling opriep. Vergeleken met boosheid geeft 
teleurstelling dus te kennen dat defectie gepleegd is door een persoon met een positieve 
reputatie. 
 Experiment 3.3 repliceerde de belangrijkste bevindingen van Experiment 3.1 en 
3.2 met een nieuw laboratoriumparadigma. Het toonde opnieuw aan dat de communicatie 
van boosheid en teleurstelling derden in staat stelde om gerechtvaardige en 
ongerechtvaardigde defectie te onderscheiden en dat wanneer defectie teleurstelling 
oproept, derden concluderen dat de defecteerder een positievere reputatie heeft dan 
wanneer defectie boosheid oproept. Hoofdstuk 3 helpt zodoende om een belangrijk 
probleem in empirisch onderzoek naar indirecte wederkerigheid op te lossen door aan te 
tonen dat mensen er door middel van communicatie van emoties in slagen om terug te 
slaan tegen defectors zonder een kettingreactie van defectie te ontketenen. 
 In Hoofdstuk 4 werden stapsgewijze publiek goed dilemma’s bestudeerd die 
asymmetrisch waren: niet alle groepsleden hadden evenveel geldmiddelen tot hun 
beschikking. Onderzocht werd of emoties als sociale hints beschouwd kunnen worden die 
proefpersonen informeren over of succesvolle coördinatie een waarschijnlijk vooruitzicht 
is. De aanwezigheid van een boos groepslid zou conflict en defectie suggereren voor de 
toekomst, terwijl de aanwezigheid van een schuldig groepslid sociale reparatie en 
coöperatie zou suggereren. Maar het idee was dat zulke gevolgtrekkingen uit emotie alleen 
instrumenteel zouden zijn voor de daaropvolgende beslissingen van proefpersonen als het 
boze of schuldige groepslid daadwerkelijk in staat was om een aanzienlijke hoeveelheid 
geldmiddelen bij te dragen om het publiek goed te realiseren. Evidentie voor een dergelijk 
proces kan het best verschaft worden door het meten van voorkeuren voor structurele 
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oplossingen zoals het verlaten van de groep en aanstellen van een democratisch leider. 
Immers, wanneer een groepslid dat veel geldmiddelen kan bijdragen boos is en de 
vooruitzichten voor succesvolle coördinatie derhalve somber zijn, valt onomwonden te 
voorspellen dat structurele oplossingen de voorkeur zullen hebben.  
 Door twee studies werd deze redenering bevestigd. Experiment 4.1 toonde aan dat 
proefpersonen van een boos groepslid vermoedden dat deze niet verder zou gaan met 
coöpereren, terwijl het omgekeerde effect gevonden werd voor een schuldig groepslid. 
Echter, alleen wanneer het emotionele groepslid veel geldmiddelen kon doneren en dus 
uitermate instrumenteel was in het realiseren van het publiek goed, concludeerden 
proefpersonen dat de gecommuniceerde emotie invloed zou hebben op of er al dan niet een 
rechtvaardige opbrengst behaald zou worden. Proefpersonen kozen daarom alleen om de 
groep te verlaten wanneer een groepslid met veel geldmiddelen boosheid communiceerde. 
Anderzijds, wanneer ze konden kiezen voor een meer constructieve structurele oplossing, 
gaven proefpersonen in Experiment 4.2 er de voorkeur aan om een democratisch leider aan 
te stellen wanneer ze geconfronteerd werden met een boos, invloedrijk groepslid. 
Experiment 4.2 demonstreerde ook een andere voorwaarde voor effecten van 
gecommuniceerde emoties. Wanneer expliciete beloften zijn gemaakt wordt er niet langer 
aandacht besteed aan de impliciete betekenis die uit emoties kan worden afgeleid. 
 De opeengestapelde evidentie van Hoofdstuk 4 die suggereerde dat emoties 
gebruikt kunnen worden als sociale hints in stapsgewijze publiek goed dilemma’s, baande 
de weg om meer specifiek schuld te bestuderen in Hoofdstuk 5 en te bekijken wanneer en 
hoe precies emoties mensen in staat stellen om hun bijdragen te coördineren om het 
provisiepunt te behalen. Schuld is een teken dat goede kansen om succesvol te coördineren 
in het verschiet liggen, zoals ook uit Hoofdstuk 4 bleek. Maar deze kennis zou alleen 
nuttig moeten zijn als er een coördinatietaak voorhanden is die anders moeilijk te 
overwinnen zou zijn. Experiment 5.1 testte daarom of proefpersonen vonden dat schuld, 
geuit door een medegroepslid, informatiever was wanneer zij het behalen van het 
provisiepunt als makkelijk, in plaats van moeilijk, beoordeelden. Dit is inderdaad wat de 
resultaten lieten zien. 
 De logische volgende stap was dan ook om te bekijken in Experiment 5.2 of het 
communiceren van schuld ertoe leidde dat proefpersonen hun bijdragen succesvol 
coördineerden wanneer het provisiepunt zo hoog was dat ze het onder normale 
omstandigheden te riskant zouden vinden om hun eerlijke deel bij te dragen. Ten eerste 
concludeerden proefpersonen, overeenkomstig de sociale correctiefunctie van schuld, dat 
het groepslid dat schuld uitte waarschijnlijk gedefecteerd had in het verleden, maar 
daarvan zou afzien in de toekomst. Verder concludeerden proefpersonen dat als defectie 
voldoende reden was om schuld te ervaren, het andere groepslid waarschijnlijk een 
coöperatief persoon was waarvan verwacht kon worden dat deze ook in de toekomst zou 
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coöpereren. In de overtuiging dat beide medegroepsleden dus zouden coöpereren, droegen 
proefpersonen doorgaans genoeg bij om het provisiepunt te bereiken, zelfs als deze hoog 
was. Proefpersonen in de geen-emotie conditie, daarentegen, waren er minder zeker van 
dat hun groepsleden zouden coöpereren en slaagden er daarom alleen in om succesvol te 
coördineren wanneer het provisiepunt laag was. Schuld faciliteert dus coöperatie, maar dit 
kan enkel empirisch aangetoond worden als een situatie gecreëerd wordt waarin coöperatie 
normaliter faalt, zoals een publiek goed dilemma met een hoog provisiepunt.  
 De bevindingen die in deze vier empirische hoofdstukken werden gedaan, worden 
in Hoofdstuk 6 nog eens op een rijtje gezet. De bevindingen van Hoofdstuk 2 en 3 samen 
en van Hoofdstuk 4 en 5 samen worden bestudeerd om bredere uitspraken te kunnen doen 
over, respectievelijk, boosheid en teleurstelling in wederkerigheid, en boosheid en schuld 
in stapsgewijze publiek goed dilemma’s. Hoofdstuk 3, 4 en 5 worden ook besproken 
omdat er voorafgaand aan dit onderzoek weinig bekend was over de communicatie van 
emotie in situaties waarin meer dan twee mensen onderling afhankelijk zijn voor de 
allocatie van opbrengsten. De implicaties en steun voor een sociaal-functionale aanpak van 
emoties worden ook weergegeven, evenals praktische implicaties van dit proefschrift.  
Verder worden in Hoofdstuk 6 beperkingen van het huidige onderzoek en 
suggesties voor toekomstig onderzoek besproken. De voor- en nadelen van het bestuderen 
van door de computer gemedieerde sociale interactie worden genoemd en bekeken wordt 
in hoeverre het huidige onderzoek gegeneraliseerd kan worden naar een ander belangrijk 
type sociaal dilemma, namelijk resource dilemma’s. Verder wordt gespeculeerd over 
mogelijke interpersoonlijke effecten van andere emoties en over mogelijke andere functies 
van emoties in sociale dilemma’s, afgezien van het verschaffen van sociale informatie. 
Ook wordt aangevoerd dat onderzoek naar interpersoonlijke effecten van emoties verrijkt 
kan worden door middel van “dual process models”. Het proefschrift sluit af met de 
bemoedigende conclusie dat emoties over het algemeen functioneren als sociale hints die 
helpen om coöperatie te bewerkstelligen.  
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l)SOCIAL FUNCTIONS OF EMOTIONS IN SOCIAL DILEMMAS
Cooperation is both one of the fundamental organizing principles and one of the major
problems of contemporary society. On the one hand, most people readily act in the
collective interest by donating to charity, helping out their co-workers or voting during
elections, even when they could easily get away with not engaging in these time-, money-
and energy-consuming acts. On the other hand, societal issues such as organizational
misconduct, loutish behaviour and global warming arise exactly because people do not
always cooperate, but often pursue their self-interest instead. These type of situations
where the collective and self-interest collide have become known as social dilemmas. 
It has been established for decades that social dilemmas elicit strong emotions in
people – even to the extent that threats and curses are no exception. Yet that these
 emotions are not just remarkable, intrapersonal phenomena but that they may actually
lead others to cooperate is an idea that has long been alien in psychology. Only recently
have scholars started to accept that emotions generally fulfil clear functions in social
interactions. However, it has never been investigated directly whether this also means
that expressing emotion helps to establish cooperation in social dilemmas. This
dissertation is a first step to fill this empirical vacuum and a test of whether cooperation
truly is a human talent.
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